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ABSTRACT 
Academic earmarks identified by the U.S. Congress through attachments to funding 
bills have represented a sizeable and growing revenue stream to institutions of higher 
education, yet little has been determined about the impacts this funding has on these 
institutions or the products of these institutions. A study was defined to test the argument that 
academic earmarks provided support for institutions to build research and development 
(R&D) infrastructure necessary for competition with peers. The population of interest was all 
U.S. public research institutions, and the principal research question was whether academic 
earmarks provided these institutions with increased academic R&D infrastructure as 
indicated by changes in R&D expenditures between 1993 and 2002. Structural equation path 
analysis was used to test the relationships among institutional control variables, total 
academic earmarks received, change in R&D expenditures, and institutional peer rankings 
over ten years. 
The study demonstrated evidence that the practice of congressional academic 
earmarking at public research institutions did not have an effect on change in R&D 
expenditures or an effect on peer rankings. Three institutional control variables (EPSCoR 
affiliation, institutional ranking, and presence of an accredited engineering program) were 
found to be significant predictors of academic earmarks, accounting for 39% of the variable's 
variance. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Academic earmarks identified by the U.S. Congress through attachments to funding 
bills have represented a sizeable and growing revenue stream to postsecondary education, yet 
little is known about impacts of this funding on these institutions or the products of these 
institutions. Academic earmarks (i.e., "pork-barrel" funding, or congressional earmarks) are 
intended to benefit an institution through appropriations set aside for specific research 
projects, programs, equipment, or construction. Legislators hope these appropriations will 
have a positive impact on their local economies through making institutions more 
competitive and prestigious, creating jobs or knowledge, and supporting industry 
development. Limited current evidence is available regarding the impact of academic 
earmarking on higher education (Brainard & Borrego, 2003). As this funding continues to 
increase during each federal budget cycle, it becomes increasingly more important for 
policymakers to understand the long-term impacts of this funding mechanism. Pork-barrel 
spending is a regular part of congressional activity. If it is shown that funding research 
through distributive political procedures produces no discernible results for academic 
prestige or competitiveness, then greater consideration may be given to funding research 
using a peer-reviewed merit-based approach. 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) defines 
academic earmarks to higher education as, "congressionally designated performer-specific 
research and development (R&D) projects not included in agency budget requests" 
(American Association for the Advancement of Science [AAAS], 2003, p.l). These earmarks 
are controversial because they sidestep traditional grant and contract funding processes 
through federal granting agencies. Teich (2000) wrote, "Funding academic research through 
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earmarks weakens the case for federal support of science on the basis of excellence and 
undercuts the role of the research community in allocating that support" (p. 10). Conversely, 
proponents say that earmarks allow institutions that are not "traditional" recipients of federal 
research funding to build the infrastructures necessary to compete for peer-reviewed funding 
(Payne, 2002), or they provide a necessary alternative to help worthy projects that federal 
funding agencies have wrongly rejected or misjudged (Brainard & Borrego, 2003). 
Representative C.W. "Bill" Young, a Florida Republican who was chair of the House 
Appropriations committee, has argued that congressional members have a better 
understanding of the needs of their districts than do civil servants working for federal 
departments (Burd, 2002). 
The CAromc/g of (CAromc/e) reported that federal lawmakers 
provided $2,012 billion in earmarked funding to universities and colleges in fiscal year (FY) 
2003 (Brainard & Borrego, 2003). This represented a 10% increase in earmarked funding 
over FY 2002, and a 680% increase over the $296 million that Congress provided in 1996 
(Brainard & Borrego) (see Figure 1). To demonstrate the effect earmarking has had on 
existing federal research programs, consider that in January 2005 it was announced that the 
Education Department canceled its "annual grant competition for the Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) because Congress [had] devoted the bulk 
of the program's $163.6-million budget to pork-barrel projects" (Field, 2005, p. A33). 
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Ffgwre 7. ToW CoMgrg&woW fo [/& fo^ffecow/ary 
Congressional Earmarking 
Total Amounts Allocated to U.S. Post-Secondary Institutions 
$270 
|$490 1991 
$68 1992 
1993 
$650 1994 
$600 1995 
$300 1996 
1997 
$52» 
$800 1999 
$1,040 2000 
2001 
$1,840 2002 
2003 $2,000 
$750 $1,000 $- $1,500 $2,000 
(CAroMzc/e, 2003) 
In 1983, the first publicly recognized earmarking activities occurred when the 
Catholic University of America and Columbia University each attracted $5 million to 
construct research buildings (Savage, 1999). Academic professional organizations reacted by 
condemning these actions as counter to the ideals of peer review, which funds research based 
on merit. University presidents agreed with the professional organizations, but over time they 
felt pressure to seek and/or accept academic earmarked funds. This conflict has resulted in 
"hypocritical" (Savage, 2002, p. 103) actions on the part of institutional presidents, who 
espouse the value of peer review on one hand while accepting politically motivated funding 
on the other. 
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Savage (1993,1999,2002), Payne (2002,2003a), and de Figueiredo and Silverman 
(2002) have studied the effects of academic earmarks on postsecondary institutional activity. 
Savage contributed to the understanding of academic earmarks in his book, FwWmg Skie/zce 
m ^mer/ça (1999), which is cited throughout this study. Through extensive qualitative 
descriptive research and quantitative summary statistics on academic earmarks, Savage 
(1999) proposed three arguments that legislators and institutions make in support of the 
pursuit of earmarks for an institution: (1) to improve a region's capacity for economic 
development, (2) to provide the necessary research space to increase research and 
development activity, and (3) to provide an institution with the support necessary to increase 
research activity (Savage, 1999). Savage (2002) found in 1998, after $8 billion was funded 
for earmarking over a period of 20 years, that only 6 institutions improved their NSF 
rankings by 5 or more positions, 35 remained the same, and 7 experienced a loss of five or 
more ranks. These findings support his conclusions that academic earmarking does not create 
a multiplier effect causing institutional improvement in relation to other institutions (Savage, 
2002). 
Payne (2002,2003a) demonstrated that academic earmark funding was linked to an 
increased quantity of academic publications at Carnegie Research I and II universities, but 
found that the quality of those publications decreased because they were published in less 
prestigious journals and there were fewer citations per article. De Figueiredo and Silverman 
(2002) demonstrated that institutions in states with congressional representation on 
influential appropriations subcommittees have a substantial return on investment in lobbying 
expenses through the receipt of earmarked funding. 
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These major research contributions help develop an understanding of the influence of 
earmarked funding on research quality that can be extended to provide additional 
understanding for the arguments made about academic earmarks (Savage, 1999). Payne 
(2002) identified the need for further research to address how earmarks affect an institution's 
ability to attract research and development funding. 
An important conceptual framework with which to advance the study of federal 
funding earmarks is provided by Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs. Bowen's theory is 
specific to postsecondary education institutions, and it contains the following "laws." 
1. The dominant goals of institutions are educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence. 
2. In quest of excellence, prestige, and influence, there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of money an institution could spend on seemingly fruitful ends. 
3. Each institution raises all the money it can. 
4. Each institution spends all it raises. 
5. The cumulative effect of the preceding four laws is toward ever-increasing 
expenditure. (Bowen, 1980, pp. 19-20) 
Statement of the Problem 
Postsecondary research institutions attracted over $2 billion in FY 2003 in academic 
earmark funding (Brainard & Borrego, 2003), and this amount has increased dramatically 
over the previous 10 years. Beyond anecdotal inferences and the illustration of specific 
instances, research has been limited in substantiating or challenging the arguments made in 
support of academic earmarking. Proponents, such as Representative Young of Florida or 
John Silber, claim that academic earmarking provides funding to postsecondary institutions 
6 
that are overlooked by federally funded national foundations (Burd, 2002; Silber, 2002). 
Others say that earmarking undercuts the role of the research community (Teich, 2000) and 
undermines the peer review process (Feller, 2004a; Savage, 1993,1999,2002). 
Research Purpose 
The research conducted for this dissertation measured the influence that academic 
earmark funding had during the research study period (1993 to 2002) on the ability of public 
Camegie-defined Doctoral/Research Extensive and Doctoral/Research Intensive institutions 
(Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching [Carnegie Foundation], 2000) to 
develop a research infrastructure as indicated through research expenditures. As a policy 
research project focused on research infrastructure, it continued in the direction proposed by 
earlier research on academic earmarking (Payne, 2002; Savage, 1999,2002) and determined 
whether arguments in favor of academic earmarks held under multivariate statistical testing. 
Bowen's revenue theory of costs provided support for seeing academic earmarks as a 
revenue stream that supports an institution's need to develop "excellence, prestige, and 
influence" (Bowen, 1980, p. 19). 
This dissertation studied the research questions concerning academic earmarking 
using a positivistic approach and a multivariate statistical analysis methodology. This policy 
research sought to inform higher education policy analysts who influence and develop future 
policy concerning higher education revenues and costs. Research is a mission area for many 
public four-year postsecondary institutions, and this study was designed to contribute to the 
higher education academic community through its focus on funding for research. Finally, this 
dissertation provides an additional understanding to the broader higher education community 
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that has followed the development of academic earmark funding for over 20 years in the 
C&romc/e o/" 
Research Questions 
The core research question of this study was: Did congressional academic earmarks 
provide public research institutions with increased academic R&D expenditure? The question 
originates from Savage's (1999) work and from Payne's (2002) suggestions for further 
research concerning academic earmarks. Two additional questions that are posed when 
identifying an appropriate structural equation path model are: (1) What impact did EPSCoR 
affiliation have on institutional ability to develop R&D expenditure? (2) What impact did 
institutional ranking by federal expenditures at the beginning of the study have on the ability 
to develop R&D expenditure? 
Significance 
The proposed research had three innovative and significant aspects: (1) studying 
academic earmarking as an important policy initiative, (2) developing a model to use as a 
springboard for more complete testing of arguments made in favor of earmarks, and (3) 
applying a path model using structural equation methodology. The study of academic 
earmarks provides for additional information on a controversial topic important to 
understanding the patterns and dynamics of higher education revenue. 
The emergence of academic earmarking conflicts with the practice of awarding 
research through peer review, resulting in a change to the way that postsecondary institutions 
seek R&D funding from the national government. Savage (1999) identified peer review as a 
"dominant policy regime" (p. 9) and academic earmarking as a challenge to this regime. 
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Changes in the way research funds are allocated have required institutions to duplicate efforts 
to attract funding, which he called "double-dipping" (p. 13). Institutions now must be 
politically savvy with members of Congress, in addition to coordinating strong research 
proposals from experienced faculty. Over the course of the past 23 years, several higher 
education professional and policy organizations actively have opposed academic earmarks, 
including those listed in Table 1.1. 
7.7. 77%# Qppoje .EwmwAmg 
Academic Professional and Policy-Oriented Organizations 
American Council on Education American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities 
Association of American Colleges and Association of American Universities 
Universities 
National Academy of Sciences National Association of State Universities 
and Land Grant Colleges 
National Science Board 
This study concerned the development of research infrastructure and research 
competitiveness, as defined by increases in research expenditures and the resulting ranking in 
relation to peer institutions. The results of this research contribute to a better understanding 
of the influence of academic earmarking on research productivity. 
TkjgwcA on jdcxWemzzc jEwmw&fM# SfWy 
A baseline structural equation path model was developed that can be refined for 
further testing to include more variables associated with academic earmarking. This research 
created a foundation to further address Savage's (1999) additional arguments (not included in 
this study) in favor of academic earmarks: (1) to improve a region's capacity for economic 
development, and (2) to provide the necessary research space to increase research and 
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development activity. Additional issues relevant to this study that emerge with the 
consideration of other variables are identified in the methodology discussion in Chapter 3. 
.SfrwcfwraZ Egwafzon faf/z if 
A path model analyzed using structural equation methodology provided the research 
with the capacity to incorporate additional variables associated with developing R&D 
expenditures. Structural equation modeling allows the calculation of several multiple 
regression formulas simultaneously and reports on the degree to which independent variables 
have direct and indirect effects on the endogenous variable(s), as well as whether there is a 
spurious effect on the dependent variables. Structural equation modeling controls for 
measurement error in observed variables. Previous statistical research on academic 
earmarking has been limited to single-equation multiple regression and descriptive statistics. 
Assumptions 
This analysis is predicated on the assumption that the data received from the 
C&roMzc/e and the National Science Foundation (NSF) are accurate and reliable. A second 
assumption is that the institutions that submitted data to NSF understood the questions that 
were asked and submitted correct data. Finally, it is assumed that the variables chosen for 
this study were appropriate for understanding how academic earmarks affect public research 
institutions. These assumptions are discussed further in Chapters 2 and 3. Unfulfilled 
assumptions are limitations, and they are discussed both in the following section and in 
greater detail in Chapters 3 and 5. 
Delimitations and Limitations 
The most notable delimitation of this study is that it proposes to include only public 
Carnegie Foundation-defined Doctoral/Research Extensive and Doctoral/Research Intensive 
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(public research) institutions in the United States. This includes 165 institutions out of more 
than 3,900 postsecondary institutions (Carnegie Foundation, 2000). Despite the relatively 
small population size in comparison to the total population of postsecondary institutions in 
the U.S., this set of institutions attracted the majority of earmarks during the study period 
(1993-2002). The findings of this study applied to public research institutions may not be 
generalizable to private institutions, Master's I and Master's H institutions, community 
colleges, or other specialized institutions. This topic is considered further in Chapters 3 and 
5. 
The study of the influence academic earmarking has on postsecondary institutions is 
relevant to: (1) research space, (2) regional economic development, and (3) research activity 
(Savage, 1999). This study focused solely on research activity, to prepare a basic model that 
can be used for future studies. Current data on research space were not available during this 
study (January-April 2005). Economic development data were not collected by a federal 
source, but were surveyed by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). 
The AUTM survey was not considered for inclusion in this study because it did not contain a 
sufficient number of institutions, but it is suggested for future study. 
Audience and Implications 
Because this study concerned academic earmarking as related to research 
productivity, several audiences were considered target groups for these results, including 
academic researchers, politicians, institutional planners, institutional researchers, institutional 
presidents, lobbyists, and TTze CAromc/e journalists who provided their database for this 
study. 
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As stated earlier, postsecqndary earmark support has been justified as a mechanism to 
provide opportunities for research institutions to develop research competency or funding of 
overlooked research projects that do not fit within an agency's research agenda. This research 
sought to study this issue objectively, to contribute to a greater understanding and either 
refute or support these claims. 
The findings from this study may have implications for policy analysts, members of 
Congress, institutional presidents, and lobbyists. It is beyond the power of one study to 
change the deep-rooted practice of academic earmarking in Congress. However, the study 
may demonstrate more clearly the implications of the practice of earmarking. Through 
pursuing answers to research questions that are derived from poignant arguments, the study's 
implications may lead to a renewed discussion on how R&D is funded at public research 
institutions. 
Summary and Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation was designed to demonstrate the impact of congressional earmarking 
on R&D infrastructure measured through institutional development of expenditures over a 
ten-year period at postsecondary public research institutions in the United States. Academic 
earmark funding for higher education has increased dramatically. From 1996 to 2003, 
academic earmarks rose to $2,012 billion, a 680% increase (Brainard & Borrego, 2003). 
Advocates have argued that academic earmarking provides institutions of higher education 
with the opportunity to build research infrastructure (Silber, 2002; Brainard & Borrego, 
2003) and provides funds to worthy research projects overlooked by federal agencies 
(Savage, 1999; Silber, 2002; Burd, 2002). Opponents have argued that earmarking undercuts 
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the research community's role in national research foundations and relies on politicking 
(Savage, 1999, 2002; Teich, 2000). 
To discover the impact of this revenue mechanism, this study analyzed institutional 
data acquired from national surveys conducted by the NSF and the C&romcZe to address 
relevant institutional research performance indicators. This research specifically studied 
public postsecondary institutions that are Carnegie Doctoral/Research Extensive or Intensive 
institutions (i.e., public research institutions) and the influence academic earmarking had on 
their research productivity. The core quantitative method was structural equation path 
analysis. 
Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs provided a theoretical perspective that 
guided the project. This theory grounded the study through an understanding that 
postsecondary institutions seek an ever-increasing amount in revenue from external 
organizations and spend all the funds they attract, in a continuous struggle to demonstrate 
excellence, prestige, and influence. 
In Chapter 2, the research topic will be considered through a review of literature that 
results in a theoretical path model for study. Chapter 3 develops a research approach from the 
theoretical path model developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 presents the results of the statistical 
tests that were conducted. Chapter 5 summarizes the results, discusses contributions to 
existing literature, considers implications for academic R&D, and proposes additional 
avenues for study and scholarship. 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of a literature review is to provide a background and to describe formally 
the theoretical framework of a study (Long, Convey, & Chwalek, 1985). The core research 
question that drove this study was: Did academic earmarks provide public research 
institutions with an increased academic research and development (R&D) expenditure? This 
review broadens the consideration of academic earmarks beyond the discussion in Chapter 1 
and lays out the considerations for this study, which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. As the heart of a research paper, the literature review forms the foundation for the 
credibility of the research project to be conducted (Krathwohl, 1998). 
This chapter begins with a recent review of two competing arguments regarding 
academic earmarks from two individuals who are aligned on opposite ends of the academic 
earmark debate. This is followed with a developed definition of academic earmarking, and a 
recounting of its long history in U.S. politics and its relatively recent history in postsecondary 
institutions. A review of theoretical, empirical, and qualitative research studies provides a 
basis for how academic earmarks have affected postsecondary institutions and the methods 
for financing academic research. To provide insight into the pursuit of academic earmarks by 
public institutions, a conceptual model is proposed at the end of this chapter that 
demonstrates the pressures affecting institutional leaders. 
Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs was the theoretical framework for 
consideration of academic earmarks in this study. This is a novel application of Bowen's 
theory, as it was used originally to describe costs associated with student education. Bowen's 
theory will be described here in its original context and updated using recent research and 
review of relevant theory. This chapter provides a description for how Bowen's theory was 
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applied to academic research by describing each of the Ave "laws" that form the basis of the 
theory in an academic research context. 
Two Opposing Views 
One of the many professional academic organizations that has been an active 
opponent and tracker of academic earmarks is the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS). In 2002, AAAS published their annual Science aW 
Tec/zWogy TewAoot, which included four chapters on academic earmarks. John Silber and 
James Savage wrote two chapters in the yearbook with opposing views. Silber, the former 
president of Boston University, supported the practice of academic earmarking, whereas 
Savage, a higher education faculty member and assistant vice president for federal relations 
at the University of Virginia, wrote in opposition to the practice of academic earmarking. 
Summaries here of the salient points provide a context for considering academic earmarks as 
a revenue source for postsecondary institutions. 
Swpporf yôr v4cmdef»fc Ear/MarAs - 'a f erspecffve 
Silber (2002) argued that academic earmarking has been at the root of some of the 
most important research funding, contributing to great progress in the United States. 
Congress earmarked funds for the development of the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
the National Institutes of Health, the Manhattan Project, and much of the post-World War II 
research funding. This funding is not dissimilar to the current research funding practices that 
attract funds to build research infrastructure at postsecondary institutions. 
Earmarking, however, represents only a small percentage of the total amount of R&D 
funding that is allocated to institutions (Silber, 2002). In 1999, total funding for R&D was 
$15.6 billion, and earmarked funds were $797 million (Silber). 
Earmarking is said to undermine peer review, but to Silber peer review is a flawed 
system: "Members of the in-group are in a favored position to receive funds" (Silber, 2002, 
p. 107). Silber supports this statement through a 1987 Sigma Chi survey showing that 62.8% 
of scientists agreed that the ability to receive federal funds for research depends on "who you 
know" (p. 108). "By anybody's definition that is an 'old boy' network" (p. 108). 
The peer review process is further called into question because top research 
universities receive a disproportionate share of federal research funding (Silber, 2002). In FY 
1999, when federal research funding totaled $15.6 billion, the top 10 institutions received 
22% of the total, and the top 20 institutions received 37% (Silber). According to Silber, 'Sve 
can conclude from this information that peer review is understandably and inevitably biased 
in favor of established programs whose faculty dominate the review process" (p. 108). These 
top institutions, largely members of the American Association of Universities (AAU), have 
condemned earmarking, but refuse to acknowledge the errors inherent in the peer review 
system (Silber). 
Earmarking supports first-rate science at Boston University and other institutions 
(Silber, 2002). Earmarks have developed an infrastructure for excellent research that has 
benefited Boston University's community, and a fairer distribution of Rinding than the peer 
review system (Silber). At the same time, earmarks have increased the amount of peer-
reviewed funds that Boston University received for physics, biology, chemistry, and 
engineering, from $1.2 million in 1975 to $31.2 million in 2000. This increase was possible 
through academic earmarks for state-of-the-art facilities and equipment (Silber). 
OppoazfioM fo j fgrapecfryg 
Savage (2002) suggests that earmarks have the capacity to undermine the role of 
academic science. He supports this claim through providing five reasons to oppose 
earmarking. First, earmarking undermines the peer review process (Savage, 2002). Peer 
review is an important and valuable part of academe that provides a mechanism for 
promotion, tenure, publishing, rewards, and honors. The peer review structure is 
compromised by a system of politicization of funding to academic research through 
earmarking. 
Second, while peer review has been shown to be biased, so has the process of 
earmarking (Savage, 2002). The top 10 institutions attract 22% of total research funds from 
federal sources through peer review (Savage). The same institutions attract approximately 
21% of the total allocated through earmarked dollars. Savage claimed, "If peer review is 
biased and concentrates resources, so too does earmarking" (p. 100). 
Third, earmarked funds are wasteful and spent poorly (Savage, 2002). Part of the 
argument for earmarking is that it creates a multiplier effect. Within this argument is the 
notion that earmarks provide an institution with a research infrastructure that attracts 
scientists, and that in turn allows an institution to compete for increased peer-reviewed grants 
(Savage). This assertion has not been supported. After 20 years, and more than $8 billion in 
earmarked funds, only six institutions (that have received more that $1 million) have been 
able to improve their NSF rankings by five or more positions. So if a university uses 
improvements in rankings as a justification for seeking earmarks, universities are not 
accountable for the money attracted in earmarked funds because they had no impact on the 
institutional ranking (Savage). Fourth, earmarking creates an opportunity cost by removing 
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funds that may have been administered through peer review (Savage, 2002). There is no way 
to measure this opportunity cost; however, if one-eighth of the more than $8 billion funded in 
academic earmarks was diverted from peer reviewed research, that is $1 billion lost to 
scientists applying for funds through peer review (Savage). 
Fifth, earmarking promotes hypocrisy in science (Savage, 2002). According to 
Savage, institutional presidents, "the ethical leaders of our campuses" (p. 102), were opposed 
; 
to earmarking when it began. Through time, nearly all presidents have violated their own 
resolutions. To support this statement, Savage quoted frw» journal (the journal for the 
American Society for Engineering Education): "On the one hand, university presidents and 
academic organizations condemn the practice on a theoretical level, but on a practical level 
they hire lobbyists, chase down the money, fawn over politicians, and cash the checks" (p. 
103). 
iSb/MfMW}' q/" 
These two perspectives present a synopsis of the arguments that support or oppose 
academic earmarking. Themes in this review are present throughout this study, and will be 
referenced to strengthen a position or an argument. Table 2.1 summarizes Silber's (2002) and 
Savage's (2002) points. 
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Silber's (2002) arguments for earmarking 
Earmarking has been at the root of important governmental research projects 
Earmarking represents only a small percentage of total R&D funding 
Peer review is a flawed system 
The top institutions receive an excessive percentage of federal peer-reviewed funding 
Earmarking creates a fairer distribution than that under peer review 
Earmarking provides infrastructure to increase peer-reviewed funding 
Savage's (2002) arguments against earmarking 
Earmarking undermines the peer review system 
If peer review is biased, so, too, is academic earmarking 
Earmarked funds are wasteful and spent poorly 
Earmarking creates a peer review opportunity cost 
Earmarking promotes hypocrisy in the academy 
History and Background of Academic Earmarks 
.Re/evanf Term# 
The term "earmark" often is used with a host of other terms and phrases such as "pork 
barrel spending" or the pressure for politicians to "bring home the bacon." Although the 
terms earmarking and "pork barreling" are used interchangeably in this literature review, the 
term earmarking is noticeably absent in political science literature. For purposes of this 
study, the term academic earmarking is used throughout except regarding the political 
science literature, which uses the term "pork-barrel funding" exclusively. 
The terms "pork-barreling" and "earmarking" reference pigs or cattle, and date back 
to the 19* century (Bacon, Davidson, & Keller, 1995). "The earliest known reference to the 
term pork-barrel was in 1863, and it was not until the turn of the (20*) century that the term 
'pork-barrel' became a common political expression" (Bacon et al., 1995, p. 1569). During 
the War of 1812, an army-contract pork-packer in Troy, New York, named Uncle Sam 
Wilson, stamped his barrels of pork "U.S.," which stood for "Uncle Sam." The term became 
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a reference to the federal government itself (National Pork Board, 2004). The phrase "pork 
barrel" is derived from the pre-Civil War practice of distributing salt pork to slaves from 
huge barrels. In the 19* century it became a reference for when Congress would dip into the 
"pork barrel" to obtain funds for popular projects in their home districts (National Pork 
Board, 2004). What is implied by the National Pork Board's history of Uncle Sam and pork 
barreling is that slaves would receive benefits or preferences in the form of pork from Uncle 
Sam's pork barrels. 
Earmarks originally referred to the mark made on the ear of pigs or cattle to designate 
to whom they belonged or for whom they were designated. The term "bringing home the 
bacon" was a reference to sending a congress member to Washington, DC, to bring home 
pork-barrel funding for local projects (National Pork Board, 2004). 
Pork-barreling has been a part of Congress since its inception (CoMgrg&siofzaZ 
1999). References are made to this legislative behavior (not the term-pork 
barreling) as early as 1825 during John Quincy Adams' presidency when Congress ignored 
the President's recommendations for funding and instead passed legislation that benefited 
specific constituents, such as land grants and stock subscriptions (Josephy, 1975). 
Christiansen (1996) wrote that during the 49* Congress, President Grover Cleveland had 
poor relations with Congress because of his "prolific use of the veto power" (p. 215) in a vain 
effort to end a misuse of public funds. Historically, pork-barrel legislation was designated for 
public works projects such as post offices, parks, road construction, bridges, and dams, but in 
contemporary times it has been expanded for additional political benefits including corporate 
tax breaks, environmental cleanup projects, and university research grants (CoMgresszoW 
gwarferfy). 
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The earmarking process became institutionalized in the modem Congress, where 
members supply requests to subcommittee chairs through a formal annual process (Frisch, 
1998). Appropriations subcommittees, in particular, are areas where politicians seek pork-
barrel funding of programs on an annual cycle (Savage, 1999). The earmarks typically are 
generated in committee reports at the request of a member or group of members of Congress 
and appear as single-line items on the resulting bill, which usually pass easily (Frisch). 
CoMgr&MiofKzZ gwarferfy (1993) quoted Representative Douglas H. Bosco as saying, "It isn't 
easy to vote to cut one of these bills because a lot of times you're fearful that the next time 
you go asking for something, the door will be slammed in your face" (p. 299). Pork-barreling 
is very much related to the political process. 
The process of pork-barreling or distributive politics does more than provide benefit 
to a specific region or organization; it also serves to "buy" votes, pass legislation, and 
demonstrate influence within Congress (Evans, 2000). When devising a coalition to pass a 
bill, the bill can pass simply on its merits, or a member of Congress can "maximize support 
by giving to anyone who asks, in which case the tendency over time would be toward a 
supermajority of projects, far more than needed to pass the bill" (Evans, pp. 243-244). 
Because of the special opportunities afforded to members of appropriations subcommittees, 
influence is wielded through assignment as a committee member (Savage, 1999). 
Congressional Quarterly (1999) quoted Representative Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania as 
saying, "Those with the clout use the clout to get what they want, and merit selection never 
enters into the thinking" (p. 343). 
Through this enculturation of distributional politics, many presidents have found 
earmarking difficult to eliminate. All of the recent presidents since President Reagan have 
made speeches in opposition to earmarks (Savage, 1999). President Clinton was successful in 
securing the line-item veto, which allowed him to eliminate many earmarks in the late 1990s 
(Savage). The line-item veto was supported by the Republican-led Congress through its 
Contract with America. Note on Figure 1, in the previous chapter, that annual academic 
earmarking decreased over the three-year period 1993-1996, from $760 million to $300 
million. Subsequently, the line-item veto was found to be unconstitutional, and earmarks 
returned (Savage). Less than three years later, academic earmarks rebounded to exceed the 
previous 1993 record-level. 
Fir# .Ear/marAs 
In 1983, two institutional members of the elite AAU, The Catholic University of 
America and Columbia University, lobbied for earmarked funding. This was the first publicly 
identified time AAU institutions lobbied for funding, although Tufts University had obtained 
a $10 million earmark in 1977 (Savage, 1999). The Catholic University of America and 
Columbia University attracted $5 million each to construct a research building and a 
chemistry building, respectively. This created a stir within the AAU organization, leading 
nearly immediately to a resolution that asked universities and members of Congress "to 
refrain from the actions that would make scientific decisions a test of political influence 
rather than a judgment on the quality of work to be done" (Savage, p. 52). Part of the 
immediate action and response by the AAU was that this funding was assumed to create a 
$10 million opportunity cost for research funding that could not be administered through peer 
review (Savage). Since 1983, more than $12 billion has been allocated to postsecondary 
institutions as academic earmarks (Savage). (Note that Catholic University of America was a 
founding member of the AAU, but withdrew membership in 2002 [CAromcZe, 2002].) 
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An academic earmark is an alternate form of funding academic R&D, facilities, and 
other projects. Whereas academic earmarks may refer to funding from any number of 
sources, in this study it will refer to earmarked funding from the federal government, via a 
congressional mandate for funding for a specific purpose. Academic earmarks avoid peer 
review through special designation by Congress for appropriated funds through a federal 
agency to recipient organizations. As an attachment to a bill, earmarks are given a 
"legislative provision that designates special consideration, treatment, funding, or rules for 
federal agencies or beneficiaries" (Savage, 1999, p. 6). Funds are allocated as pass-through 
monies and are managed by a federal center or department such as the Department of Energy 
(DOE), National Science Foundation (NSF), or United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). Essentially these agencies serve as pass-through organizations, because they have 
little, if any, discretion over the funding and often do not receive overhead for managing the 
grant or contract, thereby allowing Congress to circumvent agency discretion (Payne, 2002). 
Research and Literature 
There is an existing and growing literature on academic earmarking. However, 
beyond Savage's contributions, little research has been conducted by higher education 
scholars. Further, there has not been a sufficient study of academic earmarks identifying 
postsecondary institutions as the unit of analysis. 
Savage began research and publication on academic earmarking in the 1980s and 
continues today. His main contribution, FwWmg m America; CoMgrg&r, L/mvgrMfz&y 
aw/ f/ze /Wzfz&y of f&e Academic fort Barre/ (1999), provided a synthesis of the existing 
literature and an understanding of popular sentiment about academic earmarks. The book 
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presented research findings on data he collected on academic earmarks and provided a 
framework for considering the pressures on postsecondary institutions through the 
application of collective action theory. The current study is indebted to his thorough work, as 
it relies heavily on his writings and attempts to contribute further to questions posed in his 
research. 
Three more research initiatives, external to the higher education field, also have 
contributed to the literature on academic earmarks. Payne, an economist, conducted studies 
concerning the role of congressional committee membership on academic earmarks (2003a) 
and the impact of earmarks on the research function at universities (2002). De Figueiredo and 
Silverman (2002), economists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conducted a 
study of the financial returns to lobbying for academic earmarks. Fellows (1995) provided 
thick, rich qualitative description of the practice of academic earmarking. 
Several higher education scholars and C&romc/e writers have written about the 
impacts of academic earmarking. The major contributors from the higher education field 
include Feller (2000,2004a, 2004b), a professor at Pennsylvania State University and Fellow 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Teich (2000,2001, 
2002), the current president of AAAS, and Silber (2002), the former president of Boston 
University. Two prominent CAromc/e writers who have reported regularly on academic 
earmarking and maintained a database of earmarked funds to universities are Cordes (in the 
1980s and 1990s) and Brainard (1990s to present). 
A review of research literature demonstrates that, while some excellent research has 
been conducted, very little is known about the impact of earmarks on public research 
institutions. More specifically, there has not been enough research either to support or refute 
the claims made in support of academic earmarks from members of Congress, lobbyists, or 
institutional leaders. The research and scholarship by Savage (1999), Payne (2002,2003), 
and de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) is summarized in this chapter. Contributions from 
the other writers are interwoven throughout, to strengthen various positions relevant to 
academic earmarks. The following sections include discussions on the collective action 
approach, the impact of earmarks on research output, and congressional influence on 
earmarks. 
CoZ/ecfive acfzo/z approach 
Savage (1999) characterized the process of funding research by peer review and 
academic earmarking as competing for dominance within a federal policy regime. After 
World War H, the federal government institutionalized peer review as the dominant policy 
regime, and it has served as the accepted paradigm through which academic researchers have 
received funds for projects that meet the federal government's needs (Savage). Academic 
earmarking, as a counter-policy regime, represents a collective action problem, or a problem 
that occurs "when members of a group, acting in their own interest, undermine the group's 
ability to enjoy some shared benefit" (Savage, p. 13). Institutions that support peer review 
collectively as a dominant policy regime strengthen the effectiveness of that regime. As they 
engage in counter-activities, such as earmarking, they act as "free-riders" (Savage, p. 13) 
benefiting from the group membership without bearing the costs, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of the group. 
Within a collective action approach, free-riders generally are punished or coerced into 
acceptable group behavior, but an effective group punishment has not been discovered to 
counter the anti-group behavior of academic earmarking. The AAU led an effort to address 
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the development of academic earmarking with the assistance of the National Association of 
State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC), the National Academy of 
Sciences, the American Council on Education (ACE), the Council of Scientific Society 
Presidents, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the National 
Science Board, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the 
American Physical Society, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, 
and the Council of Graduate Schools (Savage, 1999). Despite the efforts of the AAU and 
these other leading associations, punishments resulting from academic earmarking have not 
been severe enough to discourage the practice (Savage). According to Savage, there is an 
absence of "meaningful rules and sanctions to prevent self-interested defection" (p. 15) from 
the policies initiated by the professional organizations to prevent earmarking. Some 
institutions have been rewarded for seeking earmarked funds through their admission to elite 
organizations, including the AAU, as a result of increases in research funding. Savage 
indicated that earmarking was held in check through belief in the dominant policy regime 
(i.e., peer review), and he felt that earmarking was a "small revolution" (p. 191) that 
represents a small percentage of the research funds rewarded (Savage). 
Savage's (1999) collective action problem serves as a useful heuristic for analysis of 
a policy approach (i.e., academic earmarking) that runs counter to the predominant approach 
(i.e., peer review). His statements were based on a view of academic earmarks using data 
from 1980 to 1996; the downturns in academic earmarks between 1994 and 1996 may have 
influenced his views. The collective action approach provides a social understanding of the 
earmarking problem, and views institutions as individuals within a population interested in 
seeking prestige through the acquisition of research funds. An institution that "double-dips" 
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(Savage, p. 13) through the receipt of funds from both peer-reviewed and earmarked funds 
should be punished, to avoid the problem of free riding. Institutional presidents have 
thwarted retribution for academic earmarking by continuing to "say one thing and do 
another" (Savage, p. 194). The percentage of research funded through earmarks has increased 
to approximately 10% in 2003 (Brainard & Borrego, 2003), an increasingly significant 
amount of funding for research activities. Member institutions still have not acted effectively 
to protect the collective anti-earmarking perspective. Through this inaction, academic 
earmarking now may represent a secondary policy regime that is silently accepted by the 
collective group of leading associations. 
/mzpacf ofEwfMarAs TferewcA 
Payne (2002,2003a) conducted two quantitative studies that served to further 
Savage's work and to further validate his findings. Payne (2002) examined whether 
congressional earmarks for postsecondary institutions increased research output and if set-
aside funds attracted through NSF's Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive 
Research (EPSCoR) impacted the quality of research (2003a). The EPSCoR program started 
in reaction to earmarking (Savage, 1999), to provide a better distribution of funding that 
historically had been "concentrated in a few universities located in a few states" (Payne, 
2003a, p. 12). 
Payne (2002,2003a) found a relationship between funding from earmarked 
appropriations and an increased number of academic publications; however, she also found 
there was a decreased quality of publication as measured by citations per publication. Payne 
found that the quality of publications increased with EPSCoR funding, but the number of 
publications decreased (Payne, 2003a). Payne's contributions are important because they 
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support Savage's assertions that academic earmarks undermine research productivity. Her 
findings further strengthen NSF's EPSCoR policy by demonstrating an increased quality of 
research output by institutions that are traditionally underrepresented with regard to research 
funding. In total, this further demonstrates that other policy initiatives exist that politicians 
and federal agencies can pursue to distribute funding more broadly beyond academic 
earmarking. 
Payne (2002,2003a) admitted that both studies are limited by measuring research 
output as defined by academic publications (Payne, 2002,2003a). She indicated that 
additional study is needed to determine how earmarks have affected (1) research activities 
beyond publications, (2) economic growth, and (3) the competitiveness of universities in 
seeking other types of federal research funding (Payne, 2002, 2003a). 
Cofzgr&MWz/ Jw/Zwencg on EwmwAy 
Academic earmarks are acquired through influence and activity by institutional 
leaders, lobbyists, and members of Congress. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) and Payne 
(2003b) studied the processes associated with lobbying for and the politics involved with 
receiving earmarked funding. De Figueiredo and Silverman studied the returns from lobbying 
for earmark funds; they demonstrated that universities with representation by Senate or 
House of Representatives members on an appropriations committee saw a return of $11 to 
$36 for each dollar spent on lobbying. The return to those institutions that did not have 
congressional membership on appropriations committees was approximately zero (de 
Figueiredo & Silverman). 
Payne (2003b) studied congressional appropriation committee membership and the 
returns to both the politicians' alma mater affiliations and their home districts. She found 
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there was a closer relationship between funding to an appropriation committee member's 
alma mater than to institutions located in their home district (Payne, 2003b). It is important to 
note that her study did not specifically consider earmarks as a variable, but identified 
earmarks as a major contributor to the results because of the political process involved with 
earmarked funding. 
Both studies underscored the role of the political process in research funding and 
demonstrated that funding to institutions occurred through the favor of those members on 
appropriations committees. These results support Savage's (1993,1999) findings that 
congressional appropriations subcommittees possess the power to block or promote funding 
for academic earmarks. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) pointed out that the large 
majority of institutions that have congressional membership did not lobby and thus are not 
taking "full advantage of their representation in Congress" (p. 2). This suggests that, as 
institutions understand more fully the role that their congressional members can play in 
institutional funding, there will be further academic earmarking. 
Positive and Negative Pressures that Affect Academic Earmarking 
A number of elements provide direct and indirect pressure for the pursuit of academic 
earmarks, while other elements provide reason to avoid the practice of earmarking. This 
section considers the pressures placed on leaders at postsecondary institutions. Figure 2.1 is a 
conceptual model that visually demonstrates these pressures and provides a guide for this 
section of the chapter. Each arrow to academic earmarks in the theoretical model 
demonstrates a positive or negative influence in brackets and is labeled with a code from A to 
G. The codes structure the following sections. 
29 
Fzgwrg 27 CoMcepfzW Mbdle/ q/Wcaf/e/mc Earmark /n/ZwgMcg^ 
D. Shifting 
Costs 
C. Increasing 
Costs 
E. State 
Pressures 
B. Peer 
Review 
F. Research 
Pressures 
Academic 
Earmarks 
G. Federal 
Perspectives APrestige 
A Pr&yfzge 
Literature on higher education leadership is rich with theories and research that 
demonstrate the pressure institutions feel to achieve and maintain prestige (Bok, 2003; 
Bowen, 1980; Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Morphew & Baker 2004; Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). In response to this phenomenon of prestige-
seeking, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and Learning (Carnegie 
Foundation) changed its system for classifying postsecondary institutions in 2000 by 
eliminating research funding from the classification criteria and committing foundation 
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resources to study further how to differentiate among institutions without defining prestige 
(Carnegie Foundation). 
Governing boards, potential students, current and potential faculty members, and 
others evaluate institutions by their ability to demonstrate effectiveness through a show of 
prestige. Prestige may be demonstrated through a ranking by the Mew# PPbrk/ 
jfgporf, TheCenter at the University of Florida, surveys by NSF, acceptance into prestigious 
associations such as the AAU, or other measures such as research funding or student-to-
faculty ratios. Shulman (Carnegie Foundation, 2000) indicated that the Carnegie Foundation 
chose to change the way it classified institutions because it was being used increasingly as a 
tool to define institutions within a "pecking order" (p. VII) and not as it was intended (i.e., as 
a method to demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of institutional missions). 
Brewer, Gates, and Goldman (2002) defined an emerging taxonomy of institutional 
prestige based on a two-year qualitative study of 26 institutions. The three types of 
institutions identified were prestigious institutions, prestige-seeking institutions, and 
reputation-based institutions. Prestigious institutions have an "enhanced revenue-generating 
ability" (Brewer, et al., p. 135) stemming from one or more prestige-generating categories, 
including the quality of incoming students, amount of federal research funding, and athletics 
programs. Prestige-seeking institutions are institutions that are driven to improve their 
standing in the higher education hierarchy, as demonstrated by investment in prestige-
generating categories. Reputation-based institutions have not accumulated a high level of 
prestige, are not invested in accumulating prestige, and are focused on maintaining a 
reputation through meeting the identifiable needs of a specific population of customers. 
When prestige-seeking institutions take on substantial investments, an uncertain payoff 
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results in hard choices that challenge the institutions' ability to remain sustainable and 
healthy financially. However, prestige-seeking behavior promotes "excellence as schools are 
continuously driven to improve specific aspects of quality in order to improve their standing 
in the higher education hierarchy" (Brewer et al., p. 135). 
Aldersley (1995) defined upward drift as the "tendency for institutions to introduce 
higher-level programs, causing a marked increase in the overall numbers of research and 
doctoral institutions" (p. 51). Morphew and Baker (2004) investigated this phenomenon 
among institutions that aspired (i.e., aspirational institutions) to be classified as Research I 
institutions using the Carnegie Foundation classification system of 1994. Morphew and 
Baker concluded that institutions moving from a Research II status to a Research I status saw 
increased proportions of spending on institutional support for administrative activities. In 
other words, institutions that sought to increase the perception of prestige through movement 
in the Carnegie Foundation classification system experienced greater costs. As discussed 
earlier, institutions that seek earmarked funds may justify their initiatives by indicating the 
incredible costs associated with building research infrastructure. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) created a reference point, mimetic institutional 
isomorphism, for understanding postsecondary aspirational institutions. When goals within 
an industry are ambiguous, or when there is symbolic uncertainty, organizations model (e.g., 
mimic) other organizations that are deemed to be successful using the available standards. 
This mimicry results in institutions becoming more similar to one another, which over time 
forms a more homogenous array of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell). The typical mission 
for a postsecondary institution includes education and teaching, research, and service. 
Objective measures such as profit, cost savings, return on investment, or shareholder value 
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that are used in the private for-profit world do not describe success within postsecondary 
institutional mission areas effectively because these mission areas are more motivated 
idealistically and more difficult to measure (Winston, 1997). Through uncertain goals, 
postsecondary institutions attach to available "shared mental models" (Winston, p. 33) and 
seek to benchmark practices from those institutions that are deemed to be prestigious. 
Earmarks may have played a key role as a method for funding these prestige-seeking 
initiatives. 
The pressures associated with seeking institutional prestige provide support for the 
practice of academic earmarks. Academic earmarks represent another funding source that 
provides additional resources to an institution. Ranking systems that use R&D expenditures 
as a variable do not subtract funds spent from academic earmarks. In the pursuit of prestige 
through R&D expenditures, the pursuit of earmarked funding has become a legitimate 
practice. 
A Peer JkWew 
Earmarking conflicts directly with academic peer review, which is the system of 
determining merit in academe. Peer review (i.e., merit review) is the way that faculty and the 
products of their work are evaluated. It is pervasive throughout faculty members' careers, 
including review of their research for funding and review for promotion and tenure, public 
presentations, and publications (Savage, 1999). Academics define good research through this 
process of agreement among peers in the profession, college, department, and/or association 
(Fellows, 1995). 
The process of peer review of federal grants can be traced to Vannevar Bush, the 
director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, who proposed broadening the 
33 
federal research program after World War II (Bush, 1945). Bush (1945) developed five 
"fundamentals" that supported his postwar plan. The fourth fundamental principle was that 
"support of basic research in the public and private colleges, universities, and research 
institutes must leave the internal control of policy, personnel, and the method and scope of 
the research to the institutions themselves. This is of the utmost importance" (Bush, 1945, p. 
27). Bush's program, which later was supported and expanded, called for the expansion of 
basic research and for funding research through contracts and grants that require peer review 
in place of the distribution of research money through formula grants and institutional awards 
(Savage, 1999). 
Today, federal grant-making by national centers and foundations utilizes academics 
to assist with the review of research proposals. Congress appropriates funds to federal 
agencies for specific research programs (e.g., the National Institute for Mental Health 
[NIMH], within the National Institutes of Health [NIH]). The responsible institute or center 
then creates a series of requests for proposals and submits those within deadlines to the 
academic community. After research proposals are received, they are assigned to experts in 
the field to determine which proposals merit funding. The program officer uses this peer 
review to make final decisions and then negotiates with selected researchers for the award 
amount and the terms of the award contract. 
Earmarking and peer review are in conflict because they represent two different 
approaches to ensuring research quality. The process of funding earmarks is decided 
politically by members of Congress and through interaction with lobbyists and others 
(Savage, 1999). When a proposal is reviewed by peers for merit, it helps ensure that "an 
objective standard of quality has been demanded and that scientific expectations have been 
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articulated at the beginning" (Noonan, 2002, p. 125). Most earmarks, however, are not 
reviewed for merit as the funding is awarded in Congress. The research content of grants and 
programs identified through earmarked funds are more a function of legislative influence 
than a reflection of proper research as defined by disinterested experts (de Figueiredo & 
Silverman, 2002; Feller, 2004a; Payne, 2002; Savage, 1999). Feller (2004a) suggested that a 
system of peer review "not only contributes to the most efficient use of public funds but also 
encourages learning by both individuals and institutions about what it takes to be 
competitive" (p. B7). 
From a faculty perspective, peer review is the process by which faculty members are 
promoted and evaluated. Peer review is a process by which scholarly books and articles are 
selected for publication, and "its violation is commonly regarded as a serious transgression" 
(Savage, 1999, p. 11). Earmarking presents a conflict to faculty members because funds 
received may be for good purposes, but the work taken on by the faculty researchers has not 
been judged by the researcher's peers. 
From a legislator's perspective, peer review may provide an efficient allocation of 
funds, as suggested by Senators Jeff Bingaman, William Proxmire, and John Danfbrth 
(1986). 
If decisions about who shall do research and where it shall be done are made by 
Congress, with ... almost complete indifference to the relative quality of the work, we 
will be well on the road to mediocrity, at best, in our research enterprise, (p. 5) 
An opposing comment from Representative Tom Bevill on the floor of the House of 
Representatives demonstrates the way some members of Congress see the peer review 
process. 
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With regard to this business of peer review that we hear about, nobody ever knows 
where the peers come from. We are being asked for Congress to delegate its 
responsibility to these peers... I think it is ridiculous for us to sit up here and let the 
administration tell the Congress where the money has to go and how it has to be 
spent. (Savage, 1999, p. 168) 
These two arguments illustrate opposite understandings that members of Congress have 
about the way that academic research funds are allocated through peer review. 
It is through a system of peer review that researchers and their institutions have been 
rewarded with grants, centers, and national laboratories. Because of this process, top research 
institutions that employ prolific researchers have received a significant amount of research 
funding. A "pecking order" has been established among universities as defined by their 
prestige (Carnegie Foundation, 2000; Teich, 2000). Prestige and research funding are 
interwoven because research funding often is one of the criteria that institutions use to 
demonstrate prestige. The AAU, an association of 62 elite institutions, bases admission into 
the organization on many factors, including research funding (Savage, 1999). Out of about 
3,600 institutions of higher education, the top 100 institutions accounted for approximately 
80% of all R&D expenditures in 2001 (National Science Board, 2004). 
One of the main arguments for earmarking has been that the peer review system is 
biased in favor of elite universities (Fellows, 1995; Savage, 1999,2002; Silber, 2002). 
Earmarked funds are intended to assist aspirational institutions with funding they might not 
have attracted otherwise through a peer review process. From this perspective, earmarking 
represents a better distribution of funding to correct the historical problems with peer review 
whereby top research institutions received an unreasonable amount of the research funding 
(Silber). Teich (2002) suggested that elite institutions receive more funding because they 
recruit the best researchers and set higher standards of research productivity for those faculty 
members. 
Peer review has both a positive effect and a negative effect on academic earmarks. 
Institutional leaders feel pressure to seek earmarks in addition to peer review. At one time, in 
the not-so-distant past, they might have avoided this practice, but now it has become another 
common way of attracting institutional resources (Savage, 2002). 
C. /fzcreoM/zg Cas# 
Higher education is a costly enterprise that operates differently than other enterprises. 
It uses a highly trained workforce, including faculty with terminal degrees and administrators 
that typically have at least an undergraduate, if not a master's degree. Higher education also 
is a costly industry because of the R&D activities that require specialized equipment and 
facilities. Johnstone (2001) questioned the concept that costs were "out-of-control" (p. 145); 
he concluded that higher education unit costs will continue to increase at rates in excess of 
the cost of living because of the labor intensive nature of the industry, the "legitimately 
multiple yet hard-to-measure products; and the essentially professional nature of its principal 
producers (the faculty) who have control over their own time and considerable, but highly 
inefficient, involvement in all decision-making" (Johnstone, p. 173). The cost of higher 
education has increased at a different rate than other industries for many years and has 
resulted in the development of the higher education price index (HEPI) to substitute for the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a measure of higher education cost increases. As an 
illustration of the need for the HEPI, the Commonfund Institute (2004) reported that from 
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1980-2000, the price of goods and services purchased by colleges increased by 154% while 
inflation measured by CPI increased by 118%. 
Universities have looked to research funding as a way to meet increased costs 
(Shackelford, 2004; Teich, 2000), which inherently includes the pressure to consider 
academic earmarks as a viable source of funding. The practice of seeking additional research 
to cover increasing costs provides support to earmarking activity. From a resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), institutional funding has created a higher 
criticality of resources. This means that revenue has not kept pace with costs and that the 
revenue must be "stretched." It is a natural consequence that institutions seek new and 
additional funding, thereby providing a support to the practice of academic earmarking. 
D. Cas# 
Additional administrative costs require new or additional revenue. Undergraduate 
students increasingly have absorbed these additional costs through tuition increases 
(Ehrenberg, 2000). There has been a shift in college costs occurring in terms of percent of 
revenue received. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the percent distribution of revenues, by source, to 
public institutions (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2003). The figure 
demonstrates that a shift in revenue occurred from state government to tuition revenue. Over 
the 20 years studied, there was a 10% decrease in funds from states and a 5.2% increase in 
revenue from tuition and fees. 
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Because institutional costs to undergraduates are increasing faster than the consumer 
price index (Johnstone, 2001), Congressman Howard P. (Buck) McKeon introduced 
legislation to penalize colleges and universities that raise their tuition by excessive amounts, 
defined as twice the rate of inflation or more (Burd, 2003). McKeon's concerns were 
supported by a congressional report he co-authored with Representative John Boehner 
(2003), in which they asserted that college costs are outpacing the rate of inflation, and that 
the increases are not tied to a poor economy. They also included citizens' opinions about 
education spending, including a belief that institutions are "wasteful" (p. 2) and 
unaccountable to consumers. 
Astin (2004) considered the issue of increased cost to students in a C/zrof%zc/g editorial 
and pointed out that the cost to each student is only a percentage of the total cost of the 
education a student receives. When costs increase naturally through inflation, if additional 
revenue from sources such as the state or federal financial aid is not available, institutions are 
forced to increase tuition at a rate greater than the consumer price index. The net effect is that 
students have to pay a greater portion of the total cost of their education. 
Although McKeon's bill was withdrawn (Burd, 2004), the bill demonstrated the 
pressure that higher education leaders face to maintain costs and to find new sources of 
revenue. The Boehner and McKeon report (2003) shows the public misunderstanding about 
higher education and the public scrutiny toward institutions when they raise revenue through 
tuition increases. This pressure provides support to the practice of earmarking, because this 
funding is believed to offset the effect on student tuition. 
& fre&ywrej 
Funding from states to public institutions has continued to decrease as a percentage of 
total revenue, and decreased overall in 2004 (Amone, 2004). Appropriations of state tax 
funds for higher education have continued to increase, but the percentage of the increase was 
less than in previous years (The Grapevine, 2004). In 2004, the actual amount allocated to 
public institutions throughout the 50 states decreased as a whole (The Grapevine). 
McGuinness (1999) outlined five broad trends that affect the relationship between 
states and higher education, and that contribute to the decrease in funding (see Table 2.2). 
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7h6/g 22. D-gMdk fAaf &fwca/!OM 
Trend Description 
Escalating demand States require more from universities. These demands 
extend to virtually every dimension of higher 
education, including research and service. 
Severe economic constraints There will be continuing financial constraints due to a 
number of factors including competing priorities for 
funds, public anger about rising student costs, and 
overall decreases in state revenues. 
Academy's inherent resistance to There is a public frustration with the academy's 
change inability to respond to major societal needs, but 
institutional awareness is slow and changes take time. 
Negative climate of public opinion Despite great value for higher education from the 
general public, the public believes that it is being 
directed by an internal agenda disconnected from 
major societal priorities and inaccessible to the 
public. 
Instability of state political Major changes in state political leadership affect the 
leadership relative stability of the memory for state higher 
education policies and priorities. 
(McGuinness, 1999) 
McGuinness' (1999) second point relates to competition for funds. He suggested that 
one of the options for higher education is to expand state revenues by taking resources from 
other basic public services such as elementary and secondary education, health, public safety, 
and the environment. To consider this proposal, it is necessary to understand the complexity 
of increasing resources through cuts in primary and secondary education, health, public 
safety and the environment. For example, No Child Left Behind is an underfunded program 
that has required elementary and secondary education to increase efforts for measuring 
accountability, resulting in rising costs (Simpson, LaCava, & Gamer, 2004). A growing 
population and more expensive drugs have put pressure on Medicaid and prescription drug 
programs that affect state health costs (Fischer & Avem, 2003; Miller & Weisert, 2004). 
State costs also are affected by an exponential population growth in state run prisons 
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(Zimring, 2001). McGuinness' (1999) proposal is not a practical solution because of the state 
pressures to fund the other important programs. 
Another option that McGuinness (1999) suggested was "to raise additional revenue 
from other sources" (p. 205). This option provides another argument for institutional leaders 
to consider academic earmarks. 
There are great pressures on institutions to increase research activity, to be 
competitive with other institutions, but not all research costs are reimbursed by funding 
organizations. There also is pressure to build new or renovate existing research space, to 
make room for additional research activities. The increasing cost of research and the needs 
for research space places pressure on institutional leaders to seek earmark funding. 
Car#. Public research institutions have expanded their research functions greatly, but 
have found that there are additional unreimbursed costs associated with an expanded research 
function (Feldmann, 2004). Government and private organizations that fund university grants 
and contracts generally reimburse a percentage of the overhead, or indirect costs, which more 
properly are called facilities and administrative (F&A) costs. Unfortunately F&A costs are 
not fully recoverable, and institutions may take on a greater burden when increasing their 
research functions. The President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
indicated that, if resources are not provided fully to sponsor research by federal agencies 
effectively, universities must cover the remaining costs from other sources (OSTP). 
University administrators have cited state and federal regulatory burdens, as well as the 
unreimbursed costs of conducting scientific research, as contributors to the rapid growth in 
the cost of attending college (Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 1997). 
A study conducted by Andersen LLP (2000) revealed that F&A costs often are not 
covered by the revenue from the institutional F&A rate, which is negotiated with the federal 
government. A small medical university with a robust research function asked the firm to 
conduct a study to determine the perceived increase in the F&A costs and the potential F&A 
rate due to the completion of a building to be used specifically for research activity. The 
F&A costs were forecast to increase from $15.8 million in FY 1999 to nearly $21 million in 
FY 2002 (see Table 2.3). 
Indirect Cost Pools FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 
Total Indirect Costs $ 15,817,314 $ 16,809,077 $ 19,034,163 $ 20,992,927 
Modified Total Direct Costs $ 34,402,338 $ 36,810,502 $ 39,387,237 $ 42,144,343 
Facilities & Administrative Cost Rate 45.98% 45.66% 48.33% 49.81% 
(Andersen LLP, 2000) 
As illustrated in the table, the F&A rate would need to increase from 45.98% in FY 
1999 to 49.81% in FY 2002 to continue to support the anticipated F&A cost increases in 
research. Since construction on the research building had already started, the university was 
dependent on two actions: (a) it planned on a renegotiated F&A rate and (b) it needed to 
attract $7.7 million in additional research in four years. A renegotiation, however, is unlikely 
to result in an additional four percentage points (Feldmann, 2004). The institution did not 
have a clear plan on how to generate the additional $7.7 million in research that would be 
needed to meet the break-even point. Presumably, the university would attract new 
researchers, who would bring research with them to the new research building, thus 
providing additional direct and indirect research funding (Andersen LLP, 2000). This 
example illustrates the risks that research institutions take in the effort to attract more 
research funding. 
Facz/zff&y. Reimbursement for F&A costs is one of two ways that postsecondary 
institutions receive funding for facilities from the federal government; the other is through 
institutional grants (Savage, 1999). While indirect pressures for academic earmarks (e.g., 
increasing costs, state pressure, rising tuition) have been discussed in this section, the 
problems associated with F&A costs and inadequate facilities for research and development 
contribute directly to the call for academic earmarks. These two issues are central to the 
debate surrounding earmarks because institutions seeking and maintaining prestige through 
the expansion of R&D must provide space to house a growing research function. 
Delayed facility maintenance has occurred to cut costs and make revenue available 
for other area, but this practice has caused facilities deteriorate to a point where they are no 
longer useable for cutting-edge research (Christovich, 2002; Savage, 1999). A division has 
occurred between institutions that have an established research function and those that are 
trying to build a research program (Fellows, 1995). Those without sufficient research 
facilities need to develop research facilities, to compete for research funding. Many 
institutions with existing research programs need to renovate existing space and build more, 
to continue to compete for prestige. Brewer et al. (2002) have contributed to understanding 
prestige-seeking institutions. Using this emerging taxonomy, institutions that are seeking to 
build competitive research programs may be considered prestige-seeking institutions and 
may have substantial administrative costs associated with this activity. 
The federal government has had a role in the development of higher education 
facilities for research and development since the end of World War II, through institutional 
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grants and grants-in-aid through the National Cancer Institute Act of 1948, the National 
Science Foundation Act of 1950, and the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 (Savage, 
1999). These acts provided funds for the construction of new buildings and the renovation of 
existing buildings through the late 1960s, but funds dwindled during the 1970s, when higher 
education funding moved from institutional grants to funding individual students directly, 
principally in the form of financial aid (Savage). Savage reported that this change in funding 
led Columbia University and The Catholic University of America to seek the first earmarks 
in 1983 for the construction of two research buildings. 
A report from NSF, aW Engfrnegrmg TkaearcA Facf/Mea. 2007, illustrated 
Savage's (1999) concerns. The report indicated that, in 2001, on average, only 28% of public 
institutional science and engineering (S&E) space was adequate for research conducted at 
research institutions (Christovich, 2001). The survey defined adequacy as having a sufficient 
amount of space to support all the needs of the current institutional S&E research program 
commitments (Christovich). In addition to the existing 28% of adequate research space, 
public research institutions would need an additional 28% of its existing space to meet 
current and planned research program commitments (Christovich). For all of the institutions 
that responded to the survey, only 18% had sufficient space to meet program demands, and 
51% of the institutions surveyed needed to increase their space by more than 25% to meet 
program demands (Christovich). 
It is useful to illustrate this issue with a hypothetical example, such as a consideration 
for the University of Louisville. The University of Louisville had 572,000 net assignable 
square feet of research space in FY 2001 (University of Louisville, 2001), which equates to 
approximately 10 football fields (a football field is approximately 57,600 square feet). If the 
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University of Louisville were one of the 51% listed in the NSF study (hypothetical^ for this 
example), it would need to build two and a half more football fields' worth of assignable 
square feet simply to meet program demands. 
The pressures placed on institutions to meet the costs and the facilities needs of 
conducting research provide support for the practice of seeking earmarked funding. Because 
the costs of research have increased, facilities need to be built and renovated, and additional 
funding needs to be leveraged to meet additional costs. 
G. FedenzZ 
The pursuit of academic earmarks has drawn support and criticism from U.S. 
presidents, members of Congress, agency bureaucrats, and postsecondary institutions. 
Responsibility for funding the federal government is delegated to the legislative branch, thus 
members of Congress have and believe they should maintain control for designating funds 
(de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2002; Feller, 2004a, 2004b; Payne, 2002; Savage, 1999). Given 
this distributive perspective, members of Congress justify pork spending in seven ways 
described in Table 2.4 (Savage, 1999). 
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7a6fg 2 V. /ôr CoMgrgMfowa/ fort S^gwfmg 
Justiûcation Explanation 
1. Strengthens reelection Through distributive politicking, members of Congress can 
chances claim credit for obtaining visible public works (e.g., bringing 
home the bacon) and justify their reelection bid. 
2. Makes good policy New money or projects will enhance economic development. 
3. Federal funds are Through congressional intervention, federal funds for 
distributed inequitably academic research are dispersed more equitably. 
4. Constitutional right Congress has the right and obligation to play a direct role in 
allocating federal monies. 
5. Show of power Earmark allocation on appropriation committees demonstrates 
congressional prestige and power. 
6. Buying favors Providing earmarks to colleagues buys favor and allegiance of 
other members of Congress. 
7. Personal motives Earmarks represent a personal desire to fund an institution to 
which the member of Congress feels allegiance, such as their 
alma mater or an institution that is affiliated with their 
religious organization. 
(Savage, 1999) 
The first and third justifications in the table can be grouped under the heading of 
distributive politics, or the concept that politicians seek to maximize "district specific 
benefits in order to pursue the central goal of reelection" (Frisch, 1998, p. 140). The premise 
of the distributive politics theory is that politicians must increase spending as a strategy, 
despite the recognition that this causes inefficient government spending that ultimately leads 
to deficits (Shepsle & Weingast, 1984). To illustrate this concept, the following saying has 
been illustrated by many researchers, "There is no such thing as a 6seal conservative when it 
comes to his [sic] district or his [sic] subcommittee" (Frisch, 1998; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 
1985; Shepsle & Weingast, 1984; Stockman, 1975). Subsequent research on this topic has 
found that distributive politics introduces distortions in equity of public benefits and has the 
capacity to reduce growth (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). These two justifications identify the 
47 
premise of this study concerning the merit of distributive politics with regard to 
appropriations for public postsecondary institutions. 
Academic earmarking is not a favored approach by department and agency 
bureaucrats. Agencies that fund R&D projects use a goal-based planning and budgeting 
system (Noonan, 2002). When the administration or Congress changes an agency budget 
either by reducing it or including unrequested earmarks, the agency must modify or sacrifice 
important activities that have been chosen specifically to achieve its goals. This occurred in 
January 2005, when the Department of Education canceled its annual grant competition for 
the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) because Congress 
devoted the bulk of the program's $163.6-million budget to pork-barrel projects (Field, 
2005). Moreover, earmarks have to be fit into the goal-based structure and often that is not 
easy (Noonan, 2002). Earmarks generally do not include expenses for agencies that must 
manage a contract resulting in unfunded overhead costs (Noonan, 2002; Payne, 2002). 
Revenue Theory of Costs 
The principal theory that guided this study of academic earmarks was Bowen's 
revenue theory of costs, which says simply that institutions raise all the money they can and 
than spend it on worthwhile activities (Bowen, 1980; Breneman, 2000; Johnstone, 1999). 77# 
Cos# offfig&er Edwcafzo/z (Bowen) developed a framework for looking at higher education 
costs. The work developed five "laws" of higher education costs. He further provided a 
demonstration of the financial differences between postsecondary institutions when divided 
by quartiles using institutional educational costs per student full time equivalency (FTE). 
Bowen used this differentiation to show that institutions with significantly more revenue, 
resources, and support had significantly higher unit costs in the delivery of education. Bowen 
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indicated that more affluent institutions use their advantage '^to spend a smaller portion of 
their budget for instructional functions and more on nonacademic staff and purchases of 
goods and services" (p. 150). 
The most affluent institutions engage in a kind of inefficiency. Institutions that gain 
additional resources create "overlays of administrators, secretaries, clerks, assistants, 
counselors, office equipment, travel, stationery, and supplies, in relation to the amount of 
resources devoted directly to education" (Bowen, 1980, p. 150). While the most affluent 
institutions do spend more dollars on instruction than other institutions, their pattern of 
spending greater shares of their wealth on "overlays" needs to be questioned in the same way 
as higher education's efficiencies through measures like student-faculty ratios and average 
class size. 
Unlike other productive enterprises, higher education lacks any meaningful 
production function; thus, it is unable to tie variations in production costs to prices of inputs 
and prevailing technologies (Johnstone, 1999). Unit-cost variations, especially among 
supposedly similar institutions are likely due to variations in available revenue (Bowen, 
1980). The implication is that the only way to limit costs is to limit revenues (Breneman, 
2000). A further consideration is that very high unit costs are discretionary, meaning they are 
more avoidable, which leaves them more open to criticism (Gose & Geraghty, 1997). 
Bowen's revenue theory of costs was supported by DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) 
institutional isomorphism, as well as concepts by Winston (1997). Institutional isomorphism 
(considered earlier in this chapter) states simply that in the absence of objective measures for 
success (e.g., profit), institutions identify symbolic measures (e.g., research activity) and 
mimic those institutions that are subjectively judged to be successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 
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1983). Winston's concepts (also previously discussed) relate to DiMaggio & Powell's and 
demonstrate that objective measures such as profit, cost savings, or return on investment do 
not effectively describe success within postsecondary institutional mission areas, because 
institutional missions are motivated by ideals and are more difficult to measure. Bowen 
(1980) and Winston (1997) both suggested that the lack of objective performance indicators 
results in postsecondary institutions that demonstrate educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence by modeling after institutions that have been determined subjectively and popularly 
to be benchmark institutions (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). The result of this "positional arms 
race" (Winston, 2000, p. 1) is a competition to demonstrate high institutional quality or 
prestige, rather than to compete on price (Winston). More simply put, institutions engage in a 
complicated version of what many neighbors do when they try to "keep up with the Jones'," 
and in the process there is no limit to the amount of revenue they will seek, and the amount 
they will expend to demonstrate prestige. 
of TTzeo/y 
Bowen's theory (1980) and Winston's contributions (1997, 2000, 2001) on higher 
education costs have expanded an understanding of higher education revenue and 
expenditures. This research was motivated by a desire to show costs from the perspective of 
educating students, not necessarily the costs and revenues associated with conducting R&D 
activity. Specifically, Bowen's work defined unit costs using student PTE as the unit of 
measure. This research project broadens Bowen's revenue theory of costs to understand 
institutional pressures to consider academic earmarks from the U.S. Congress. 
Bowen supported his revenue theory of costs through the definition of five "laws" 
(Bowen, 1980, pp. 19-20). Table 2.5 restates Bowen's laws in the left column, and develops 
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the law in the context of higher education research in the right column. Following this table 
is a discussion of recent literature that supports the application of this theory to the 
institutional mission area of research. 
TaZVe 2. J. v4#p#ca#0M of Bowen 'a jkve/mg TTzeo/y of Cos# fo ^esearcA Ffmance 
No. Bowen's "Laws" (pp. 19-20) Developed Laws for Research 
1. The dominant goals of institutions are 
educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence. 
2. Each institution raises all the money it can. 
3. Each institution spends all it raises. 
4. In quest of excellence, prestige, and 
influence, there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of money an institution could 
spend. 
5. The cumulative effect of the preceding four 
laws is toward ever-increasing expenditure 
A measure of institutional excellence, 
prestige, and influence is demonstrated 
through research grants and contracts. 
Institutions raise all the money they can for 
research projects and infrastructure. 
All research funds are spent. 
In quest of excellence, prestige, and 
influence, there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of money an institution could spend 
on research activities 
The cumulative effect of the preceding four 
laws is toward ever-increasing expenditure 
on research. 
#owe%'s "law "7 - Twfzfwfzow exce/Zence, /v&sfzge aW m/Zwence. 
Postsecondary institutions demonstrate prestige through the expansion of research contracts 
and grants (Bok, 2003; Brewer et al., 2002; Lombardi, Capaldi, Reeves, Craig, Gater, & 
Rivers, 2003; Morphew & Baker, 2004; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), and this has resulted in an 
academic hierarchy or a pecking order (Carnegie Foundation, 2000; Teich, 2000). An 
emerging taxonomy for prestige from researchers at the RAND Corporation considers three 
types of institutions: prestigious, prestige-seeking, or reputation-building (Brewer et al., 
2002). The two types of institutions germane to this study are prestigious institutions, which 
are conservative and focused on maintaining their reputation, and prestige-seeking 
institutions, which are focused on developing a research infrastructure to be considered 
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prestigious institutions (Brewer et al.). Institutions of higher education seek research funding 
as a way to demonstrate or maintain excellence, prestige, or influence (Brewer et al., 2002). 
Bower;'s "law"2-TWffwfzoMSraisea/Z/AefnoneyfAeycan^?rresearch^rq/ecfs 
aW z/^asfrwcfMre. Most institutions that conduct research reported greater research and 
development expenditures in FY 2002 than in any of the prior six years (Machen, 2004; 
Shackelford, 2004). On the whole, total U.S. academic R&D was more than $36.3 billion in 
FY 2002, which was an increase of 10.9% over the FY 2001 figure of $32.8 billion, and 
nearly 50% higher in FY 1997 (Machen; Shackelford). 
Using the NSF/Division of Science Resources Academic Research and Development 
Expenditures: Fiscal Year 2002 (Machen, 2004), Table 2.6 demonstrates the total university 
and college R&D expenditures from 1957 to 2002. During this time institutional R&D 
expenditures increased 1,284% in 2002 constant dollars (adjusted using the Consumer Price 
Index [U.S. Department of Labor, 2002]). A 1,284% increase in constant dollars supports the 
claim that institutions raise all the money they can for research projects and research 
infrastructure. 
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7h6/g 2.6 TbfaZ expgfK&fwres af WMfvgrszfzgj oW co//gggs 7PJ7-2002 (% Consfa»/ 2002 
Mf/Z;ow of DoZ/ws) 
Fiscal year Total 
2002 Constant Dollars 
% Change 
from base Year (1957) 
1957 2,625 -
1962 5,385 105% 
1967 10,347 294% 
1972 11,319 331% 
1977 12,073 360% 
1982 13,654 420% 
1987 19,246 633% 
1992 24,129 819% 
1997 27,315 941% 
2002 36,333 1284% 
Source: R&D e^enditures at universities and colleges, by source of funds: fiscal 
years 1953-2002 (Machen, 2004) 
Bowg/z 'a "law " j-JwfzfwffOMs spgW o/Z fAg)/ rowg. To maintain or build prestige, it is 
necessary to expend research funds (Amone, 2003; Lombardi et al., 2003). Two of the 
measures, used by TheCenter (Lombardi et al., 2003) from the University of Florida in 
ranking the top American research universities, are total research and federal research 
expenditures. This annual rankings report, created by TheCenter, stressed that, "Research 
universities must improve, not only measured by what they did last year but also in 
comparison to their counterparts and competitors" (Lombardi et al., 2003, p. 5). Consider the 
adage that the difficulty with being number one, is that you have competitors who want to be 
there as much as you do. A problem with prestige defined through rankings, is that the 
institution has competitors that want to be ranked highly as much as the prestigious 
institution want to hold or improve its rank. This results in the pressure to spend. 
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Another consideration of this law is that contract and grant funds are allocated and 
spent on project-oriented activities. Typically, the awards stipulate how the funding is to be 
used and it is defined in project terms. Federal funds for contracts and grants, in particular, 
are governed by a cognizant agency, such as the Department of Health and Human Services 
or the Office of Naval Research, and must be spent on approved budget categories and billed 
to the awarding agency within an established contract period (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2004). Funds that are not spent within the contract period cannot be saved or spent 
on other items; thus institutions must spend all they raise. 
f 4— TTiere Wrfzm/fy »o /wmf fo f&e amzozmf of money an msfzfwfio» 
cowW speW 0» acffwfzej. In a C&romc/e article, Amone (2003) detailed the 
difficulty that institutions have in achieving higher status in the JVews awf PFbrM 7?e^orf 
rankings or to be ranked as a top 50, top 20, or top 10 institution by the National Research 
Council. Feller was interviewed for the article about the trend to seek increased ranking, and 
pointed out that these institutions may find there is "a lot of chuming-momentary, isolated 
gains-but the institution doesn't really change much" (p. A19). The effort that many 
institutions must go through to achieve a higher ranking or status translates to exponentially 
increased research expenditures. To demonstrate this, using 2000 data, the University of 
Colorado Health Sciences Center will be considered. The institution, which was ranked 
number 25 in terms of federal grants for research (at the time of the article), needed to 
increase its grants by 64.5% (from $119.6 million to $196.7 million) to be one of the top 10 
institutions (Amone, 2003). This example assumes that other institutions will remain static, 
which is unlikely. The University of Colorado Health Sciences Center would have had to 
increase grant expenditure by more than 64.5% because other institutions probably will 
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continue to increase research funding. 
Bow/en 'a "Imf " J—TTze cwwiwZafzve e^êcf q/"fAg ^rece^zMg/bwr /mvs # ever-
zMcrgasmg gxpgWf/we o« rejewcA. As Bowen indicated, these laws are cumulative, 
meaning that they are supported from earlier findings. To further illustrate ever-increasing 
expenditure, Table 2.6 demonstrated a 1,284% increase in higher education research 
expenditures (using constant 2002 dollars). To compete for prestige, an institution must 
continue to increase its research revenue and spend these funds to satisfy a contract 
obligation (Office of Management and Budget, 2004), but also demonstrate a level of 
research expenditures that is measured for rankings (Carnegie Foundation, 2000; Lombardi et 
al., 2003; C/& TVewj aW PPbrWTZeporf, 2004). 
Model Considerations from the Literature 
The core research question that drove this study was: Did academic earmarks provide 
public research institutions with an increased academic R&D expenditure? This study 
considered public research institutions as the main unit of interest. From an institutional 
perspective, the research project sought to determine whether total earmarks that an 
institution received had a discernible effect on institutional differences in R&D expenditures, 
and, as a result, on the institutional peer rankings. The three main variables that emerge by 
institution are: (1) total academic earmarks for a period of time (independent variable) that 
would influence (2) change in total research and development revenue (dependent variable) 
and (3) change in institutional ranking (dependent variable). 
A significant relationship between total institutional academic earmarks and the two 
dependent variables would not indicate causation, only correlation, which is why other 
variables should be considered to account for potentially spurious or mediating effects. As 
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identified at the beginning of this chapter, top research institutions historically have 
maintained a substantial percentage of the federal funds allocated for R&D (Savage, 2002; 
Silber, 2002), and since have attracted a greater portion of earmarked funding (Savage). A 
relationship between earmarked funding and total R&D revenue may be found to be spurious 
because of institutional ranking. A spurious relationship is "an association between an 
independent and a dependent variable that disappears when a third variable is included in the 
analysis" (Kendrick, 2000, p. 639). (See the following Figure 2.3 for an example.) 
Ffgwe 2 J De/MOMf/rafioM of a .Re/afzoWzip 
I 
Fire Intensity # of Fire Fighters 
X • Y -
Consider the relationship between an independent variable, fire fighters on the scene 
of a fire (Y) with a dependent variable, fire damage caused by a fire (Z). Undoubtedly, there 
will be a significant relationship between these variables, but the association would be due to 
another independent variable, fire intensity (X). Fire intensity (X), which occurs first in the 
example, causes the fire damage (Z), not the number of fire fighters on the scene of the fire 
(Y). Fire intensity (X) also affects the number of Are fighters (Y). 
Two variables from the literature that were considered to have the potential to 
demonstrate a spurious relationship with change in R&D funds were institutional ranking 
based on R&D expenditures, and NSF EPSCoR designation. Savage (2002) identified that 
highly-ranked institutions, based on their R&D expenditures, had a higher likelihood for 
V 
Amt of Fire 
Damage 
• Z 
attracting academic earmarks. Additionally the National Science Board indicated that 80% of 
the federal research resources are received by the top 100 institutions. 
EPSCoR designation was reviewed in Payne's (2003a) research on earmarks and set-
aside funding. The EPSCoR program started in reaction to academic earmarking (Savage, 
1999), as a program expressly interested in developing infrastructure for institutions from 
states that traditionally have not been competitive. 
After consideration of the new variables related to earmarking, two more research 
questions were formulated for this study: (2) What impact does EPSCoR affiliation have on 
institutional ability to develop R&D expenditure? and (3) What impact does institutional 
ranking by federal expenditures at the beginning of the study have on the ability to develop 
R&D expenditure? 
Given the need to be inclusive of variables that may influence R&D expenditures, the 
presence of an accredited engineering program and presence of a medical school (human 
medicine) were two more independent variables added based on recent research regarding 
relationships to research expenditures (Powers, 2003). Engineering and medical faculty are 
active researchers and often maintain large research projects. For example, the Department of 
Health and Human Services provides the greatest funding for academic research to 
postsecondary institutions (Bennof, 2004), primarily for medical research. Powers included 
both of these variables in his multiple regression research on resource effects on the 
technology transfer function. He found significant positive correlation between institutional 
R&D expenditures funded by federal sources and those institutions that have medical schools 
(r = .43, j? < .01) and engineering schools (r = .19, p < .05). 
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Figz/re 24 Ewmartz/ig f afA A/bde/ 
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Medical school 
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program at start 
of study (ENG) 
EPSCoR status 
at start of study 
(EPSCoR) 
Figure 2.4 presents a working model for this study. The variable at the center of 
Figure 2.4, total academic earmarks accumulated ten years (Earmarks), represents the key 
independent variable, which is influenced by whether an institution has the EPSCoR 
designation (EPSCoR), whether the institution has an engineering program (ENG) or medical 
school (MED), and which ranking it occupied at the beginning of the study period with 
respect to total research revenue (Ranking). This model evolved with the literature review in 
order to study these variables independently and together, to determine the impact on a 
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public research institution's change in total research and development funds (CRD), and the 
resulting ranking in comparison to other peer institutions (RNKCHG). 
This study was somewhat exploratory because little has been written about the 
relationships among the key variables and their relationship to academic earmarking. The 
other variables are discussed independently and as they relate to one another. There is a 
developing literature on academic earmarking (deFeguierdo & Sullivan, 2003; Feller, 2004a, 
2004b; Payne, 2002,2003a, 2003b; Savage, 1999), but little has been researched or written 
about the relationships identified for this study. One exception is Savage's (1999, 2002) 
findings that earmarks have not contributed to a rise in rankings. Given these conditions, the 
literature review focused on the key variable of interest and the external and internal/local 
pressures that have demonstrated influence on the practice of academic earmarking. With 
regard to variables that affect academic earmarking, Figure 2.4 demonstrates a theoretical 
path model that considers the forces documented in the literature that have either positive or 
negative impacts on academic earmarking. 
Summary 
This literature review provided a background discussion on academic earmarking by 
the U.S. Congress to postsecondary institutions. It demonstrated the pressure on institutions 
to seek earmarked funding, perspectives on why they are acceptable and why they are not, 
and a content theory to use for distance and perspective (St. John & Parsons, 2004) about 
academic earmarking. 
Study on academic earmarks has been done principally by Savage (1993,1999, 
2002), with more sophisticated multivariate analysis and study by Payne (2002, 2003a, 
2003b) and de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002). The multivariate research largely has 
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supported Savage's arguments that earmarking undermines the role of peer review (Payne, 
2002,2003a), decreases research productivity (Payne, 2003a), and provides funds for 
institutions with congressional representation on the right committees or the right influence 
(de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2002; Payne, 2003b). These researchers have not conducted 
multivariate analysis in regard to three recurring arguments made in support of academic 
earmarks: (1) to improve a region's capacity for economic development, (2) to provide the 
necessary research space to increase research and development activity, and (3) to provide an 
institution with the support necessary to increase research activity. 
Academic earmarking has grown out of a need for additional institutional funding. 
Need for additional funding has been fueled by a need for prestige (Bowen, 1980; Brewer et 
al., 2003), increasing costs (Bowen, 1980; Johnstone, 2001), shift of administrative costs to 
students (Ehrenberg, 2000), and the resulting pressures to maintain tuition costs (Burd, 2003; 
Johnstone, 2001). Institutional actions to pursue academic earmarks undermines the peer 
review process (Feller, 2004a; Savage, 1999,2002), a process important to academe that 
provides a mechanism for promotion, tenure, publishing, rewards, and honors (Savage, 
2002). Research costs and inferior research facilities produce an additional incentive to seek 
earmarked funds. A congress that views the allocation of funding as a right, and questions 
peer review, also supports the practice of earmarking, despite governmental agency 
opposition to the practice. 
Bowen (1980) produced his revenue theory of costs based on costs for providing 
education to students. The simplified model states that institutions raise all the money they 
can and than spend it on worthwhile activities without a discernible product (Bowen; 
Brenneman, 2000; Johnstone, 1999). The current research project applied Bowen's theories 
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to research revenues and costs. It was hypothesized from Bowen's theory that research 
institutions seek research revenues in pursuit of prestige, and spend this funding on research, 
but there is not a discernible product in research infrastructure. 
From this literature review, a model was developed to study whether academic 
earmarks provide an institution with the research infrastructure necessary to increase research 
expenditure (e.g., Savage's third recurring argument). The model was designed to measure 
the effect institutional academic earmarks have on the change in institutional R&D 
expenditure and as a result the institutional peer ranking. Four independent variables were 
hypothesized to have a relationship with academic earmarks and R&D expenditures, 
including institutional EPSCoR affiliation, presence of an accredited engineering program, 
and presence of a medical school (human medicine), and institutional research expenditure 
ranking with peer institutions at the start of the study period. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
A study was conducted to determine whether academic earmarking had an effect on 
institutional change in R&D expenditures, and as a result an effect on peer rankings (that are 
based on R&D expenditures). Opponents of academic earmarking call academic earmarking 
a funding practice that undermines the role of peer review (Savage, 1999,2002; Teich, 
2000), is biased toward those in power (deFegueiredo & Sullivan, 2002; Fellows, 1995; 
Payne, 2003b; Savage, 1999,2002), is wasteful because it does not meet the stated goals 
(Savage, 2002), creates an opportunity cost by diverting funds from peer reviewed research 
(Feller, 2004b, Savage, 2002), and promotes hypocrisy in academic science (Savage, 2002). 
Alternately, proponents of academic earmarking state that it provides directed funding that 
aids institutions to rise in the rankings (Silber, 2002), represents only a small amount of R&D 
funds appropriated (Silber, 2002), promotes excellence in research (Silber, 2002), and 
develops the necessary infrastructure to compete for research funding (Silber, 2002). Three 
arguments that have emerged in support of the pursuit of specific academic earmarks for an 
institution are that earmarks (1) improve a region's capacity for economic development, (2) 
provide the necessary research space to increase research and development activity, and (3) 
provide an institution with the support necessary to increase R&D activity (Savage, 1999). 
This research project was designed to test the third point regarding the effect earmarking has 
on the development of R&D activity, as indicated through institutional changes in R&D 
expenditures over a ten year period, 1993-2002. 
This chapter presents the framework for a study to determine whether academic 
earmarks met the goal of increasing institutional R&D infrastructure. The study included the 
development of two structural equation path models informed by literature, a review of the 
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relevant variables, the instrumentation for the collection of the data, a statistical approach, 
and a review of the limitations to the method. 
General Methodological Approach 
A deductive, positivistic methodological approach informed this quantitative, 
economic research project. The approach was consistent with previous economic research (de 
Figueiredo & Silverman, 2002; Savage, 1999) on earmarks and followed a similar approach 
taken by Payne (2002) who called for additional research on how earmarked funding effects 
research productivity. This policy research project used secondary data sets spanning the 
years 1993-2002. It was appropriate to assume that within the data, and based on previous 
literature, there was an objective reality to be discovered (Krathwohl, 1998). Hence, the 
general methodological approach clearly was a quantitative, deductive, positivistic approach. 
Theoretical Approach and Hypothesized Model 
Bowen's revenue theory of costs depicts postsecondary institutions as organizations 
that raise all the funds they can in pursuit of excellence, prestige, and influence. These 
institutions spend all they raise, resulting in great cost differences among institutions with 
similar outcomes (Altbach, 1999; Bowen, 1980; Breneman, 2000). Bowen's theory was 
applied to the institutional mission area of research to establish a theoretical case that 
research is pursued for prestige, and that institutions raise all the money they can for the 
research function. It was proposed that institutions spend research funds from earmarks 
purposefully, but the amount spent did not produce a discernible product when compared to 
other institutions that pursue research. 
Given the need to determine the influence of earmarking on R&D infrastructure, 
which is inherent in an "impact" study, structural equation path modeling was determined to 
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be an appropriate statistical technique. Structural equation path modeling "analyzes 
correlations among variables in order to examine a pattern of causal relationships" (Mertler 
& Vannatta, 2002, p. 343) and has the capacity to incorporate unobservable, latent variables. 
A structural equation allows a researcher to estimate several concurrent regression equations. 
To consider the role of influential exogenous variables (e.g., EPSCoR status) in addition to 
the academic earmarking variable, it was necessary to show simultaneous relationships 
among all of the variables. 
TfesewcA gwesfzow 
Bowen's theory laid the groundwork to test a hypothesis that academic earmarks were 
a revenue function that did not demonstrate a discernible impact on an institution when 
compared to other institutions with relatively more or less earmarked funding. The following 
research questions structured the study (see Table 3.1). 
Primary research question Do academic earmarks provide public research institutions with 
an increased academic R&D expenditure? 
Secondary research What impact does EPSCoR affiliation have on institutional 
question ability to develop R&D expenditure? 
Secondary research What impact does institutional ranking by federal expenditures 
question at the beginning of the study have on the ability to develop R&D 
expenditure? 
AfbdeZ Dg/WfioM 
Two structural equation path models were developed for analysis. Model #1 (see 
Figure 3.1) was a model composed of seven variables, including four exogenous independent 
variables, two endogenous dependent/independent variables, and one dependent variable 
(i.e., ranking change over the period). Model #2 (see Figure 3.2) had the same variables with 
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exception to the earmarking variable. The purpose of using two models was to determine, by 
comparison of the two models, whether an academic earmarks variable belonged in a 
causational model that caused change in R&D expenditures and resulted in change in an 
institution's ranking. 
The three prominent variables in the study were the total academic earmarks a public 
research institution attracted over a 10-year period, 1993-2002 (Earmarks, or Y%), the percent 
change in total R&D expenditures over the same 10-year period (CRD, or Yg), and the 
institutional change in ranking alter the ten-year period using R&D expenditures (RNKCHG, 
or Y?). Institutional designation as an EPSCoR institution (EPSCoR, or X|), presence of an 
accredited engineering program (ENG93 or X2), presence of a medical school (MED93 or 
X3), and ranking on R&D expenditures at the beginning of the research period (Ranking, or 
X4) were exogenous variables that were assumed to effect the dependent variable (CRD) and 
to have a spurious effect on Earmarks (Y5). EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93 and Ranking are 
exogenous variables that were defined before the study period, 1993-2002. 
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Figure j. 7. TTzeorizecf SYrwcfwnzZ Afbck/ #7 
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Figure 3.2. Theorized Structural Equation Model #2 
IVIodel #2 
"D 
Change In 
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(X3 = Med 93) 
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Research 
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Ranking (X4 = 
Ranking) 
Engineering 
School 
(X,-Eng93) 
Structural equations form the statistical understanding of the model and are used to 
demonstrate correlational relationships among variables. Table 3.2 demonstrates the formulas 
and hypotheses for both the models. 
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3.2 &r%cfwra/ /ôr TTzgorzze^ AfbJg/ #7 a/W AYbckZ #2 
Model #1 
Y; = P51X1 +P52X2 +P53X3 +P54X4 + PgyU 
Ho: Variables Xi, X%, X3, X4, have no effect on Y;. 
Ha: Variables Xi, X2, X3, and/or X4 did have an observable effect on Y;. 
Y& = PeiXi +P62X2 +P63X3 +P64X4+P65Y5 + PgyV 
Ho: Variables X%, X2, X3, X4, Y; have no effect on Yg. 
Ha: Variables X%, X2, X3, X4 and/or Y$ did have an observable effect on Y&. 
Y? = P75Y5 + P?gY6 + P?wW 
Ho: Variables Yg, and Yg, have no effect on Y?. 
Ha: Variables Y5, and/or Y@ did have an observable effect on Y4. 
Model #2 
Yg = PgiXi +P62X2 +P63X3 +P64X4+ PevV 
Ho: Variables X%, X2, X3, X4, have no effect on Y*. 
Ha: Variables Xi, X2, X3, and/or X4 did have an observable effect on Y&. 
Y? = PygYg + P?wW 
Ho: Variable Y& has no effect on Yy. 
Ha: Variable Yg has an observable effect on Y?. 
Method 
fqpw/afzo/; aW Dafa 
The population of interest was all Carnegie Foundation-defined public 
Doctoral/Research Extensive and Doctoral/Research Intensive institutions (DREI) in the 
United States (Carnegie Foundation, 2000). The Carnegie Foundation designed the 
classification of institutions to group institutions by their academic missions and to serve as a 
research tool for scholars of higher education (Basinger, 2000). Using the 2000 Carnegie 
Foundation Classification, there were 165 institutions in the population, of which 163 had 
sufficient data to be included in the sample. Two institutions did not report complete data to 
the National Science Foundation and were omitted. Because the starting sample consisted of 
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163 institutions (e.g., 98.8% of study population), it had more than sufficient statistical power 
for the generalization of results. 
A definition from the Carnegie Foundation (2000) for Doctoral/Research Extensive 
institutions follows: 
Doctoral/Research—Extensive institutions typically offer a wide range of 
baccalaureate programs, and they are committed to graduate education through the 
doctorate. During the period studied, they awarded 50 or more doctoral degrees per 
year across at least 15 disciplines, (p. 1) 
Following is a definition from the Carnegie Foundation (2000) for Doctoral/Research 
Intensive institutions: 
Doctoral/Research Universities—Intensive: These institutions typically offer a wide 
range of baccalaureate programs, and they are committed to graduate education 
through the doctorate. During the period studied, they awarded at least 10 doctoral 
degrees per year across three or more disciplines, or at least 20 doctoral degrees per 
year overall, (p. 1) 
It should be noted that definitions of the Carnegie Foundation institutional 
classifications did not indicate the role of research in the description, which is the focal area 
for this study. As noted in the previous chapter, the Carnegie Foundation (2000) grew 
concerned that a "pernicious effect" (p. VIII) was occurring that caused a tendency for 
institutions to emulate the model of a large research university. 
Absent a more finely delineated system for identifying institutions with a research 
focus, it was decided that the Carnegie DREI institutions met the criteria as research 
institutions based on a review of salient characteristics, including (1) whether they previously 
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were classified as a research institution, and (2) whether they demonstrated a research 
mission through receipt of research revenue. First, a review was completed of the DREI 
sample institutions looking at their 1994 Carnegie classification. Table 3.3 shows that all of 
the institutions that were classified as Research I, Research II, and Doctoral I institutions 
were included in the 2000 DREI classification, which were used in this study (Carnegie 
Foundation, 2000). All but one of the 1994 Doctoral II institutions were included in the 2000 
DREI classifications. Fourteen of the 249 classified as Master's I institutions in 1994 were 
included, and two institutions from the specialized institutions categories moved into the 
DREI classification in 2000. 
1 j Compw&FOM q/Y&e fqpw/afzoM fo f&e 7994 Carnegie 
Cfo&yi/zcafzoM 
1994 Carnegie Institution Types Total in 1994 Carnegie 1994 Classification of 
Classification* DREI Institutions 
(Research Pop.)*' 
Research universities I 59 59 
Research universities II 26 26 
Doctoral universities I 28 28 
Doctoral universities II 38 36 
Master's (comprehensive) 
universities and colleges I 249 14 
Medical schools and medical 
centers 30 1 
Schools of engineering and 
technology 7 1 
Total 437 165 
* The column represents the total number of institutions in each Carnegie category in 1994. 
^ The column represents how the DREI institutions were classified in 1994. 
Second, a review of the institutional R&D revenues as a percent of total revenues was 
conducted for the period of the study. Table 3.4 displays descriptive statistics for DREI 
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institutions selected for this subset (NCES, 2004). The summary statistics demonstrate that 
the subset of DREI institutions attract at least 6% of their revenue from R&D revenue, with 
an overall average of 21%. The 1994 Doctoral I category had the lowest mean of 14%. The 
percent of revenue that the DREI institutions received for R&D activity demonstrated that 
they met the assumption of having a research mission. 
J. 4 Deacrzpffve /or 2000 DJŒf j&wTzfwfzofts'.' Percemf q/foW revenwe/rof» 
1994 Carnegie 
Classification Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Research I 24% 58 0.07 9% 42% 
Research II 20% 26 0.05 12% 29% 
Doctoral I 14% 28 0.04 6% 22% 
Doctoral II 22% 36 0.07 9% 42% 
Masters I 19% 14 0.07 10% 32% 
Medical school 42% 1 42% 42% 
Engineering and technology 35% 1 35% 35% 
Total 21% 164 0.07 6% 42% 
Note. Data for 163 institutions came from the NCES, Integrated Postsecondary Data Education System, 2002 Finance 
survey 
DREI institutions are appropriate institutions to study to understand the impact of 
earmarking because these institutions received the majority of the earmarks awarded during 
the period of study. A review of the CAromc/e database (CArowc/e, 2003), supplied for this 
study, demonstrated that DREI institutions attracted 63% of the total number of earmarks, 
which was 57% of the total amount of earmarked funding. All public research institutions are 
listed in Appendix A by both their 1994 and 2000 Carnegie classifications. 
/or 
As previously noted, this study used structural equation path modeling as a method 
for analyzing data. The value of structural equations is that, unlike regression analysis, it 
provides a "mechanism for explicitly taking into account measurement error in the observed 
variables" (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2000, p. 7) and to measure direct, indirect, spurious, or 
mediating effects present in the model. 
Understanding whether spurious or mediating effects were present in the model was 
important for the design, to test the impact of earmarks on the dependent variables after 
accounting for the other exogenous variables. The hypothesis of the study was that academic 
earmarks did not have an impact on institutional ability to develop R&D infrastructure as 
determined by R&D expenditures. The literature review challenged assumptions about 
academic earmarks and indicated that the research should meet the null hypothesis, which is 
that earmarks did not have a discernible effect on institutional change in R&D expenditures. 
Structural equations provide researchers with a method to draw causal inferences 
from correlational data using paths of logically ordered variables (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). 
Variables are ordered by time, and arrows are drawn to indicate an effect that one variable 
has on another. For example, in the research Model #2, a path drawn from EPSCoR, to the 
dependent variable CRD, was based on the assumption that, beyond a correlation between 
the two variables, there is a relationship indicating causality of EPSCoR status on 
institutional ability to develop R&D funding; this is based on literature that supports this 
assumption (see Payne, 2003a). 
The EPSCoR (X%), ENG93 (X%), MED93 (X3), and Ranking (X4) variables were 
observed and treated as independent exogenous variables, or variables that are not 
determined within the model. It was expected from the literature review that the variables 
would have a significant and positive relationship with the dependent variables, CRD (Yg) 
and RNKCHG (Y7), and that Earmarks, an endogenous variable, would not "fit" into the 
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model. To determine whether Earmarks belonged in the model, the two models, Model #1 
and Model #2, were devised. Model #1 includes Earmarks, while Model #2 excludes 
Earmarks. The more appropriate model was the one that had the better St after comparing the 
coefficient of determination (r^) values, parameter estimates, /-values for each path, and the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Another way to demonstrate "fit" of the 
Earmark variable was to analyze the residuals, which were standardized and reviewed to 
determine whether variables were mis-specified in each model. The RMSEA statistic 
indicates whether a model is a reasonable approximation to the data when it is measured at 
less than .05 (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2000). 
A chi-square statistic is one way to determine the "goodness-of-fit" (among several 
other techniques). It was determined that if one or both of the models had a 
disproportionately high chi-square statistic or insignificant RMSEA statistic, it would 
indicate a weak model and could be eliminated from consideration. A weak model that 
included the Earmarks variable could demonstrate conclusively that Earmarks did not impact 
an institution's ability to attract research funding and did not lead to increased ranking, 
thereby supporting Bowen's revenue theory of costs as adapted for research funding. 
Linear Structural Relationships (LISREL) 8.71 Student (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2004) 
and SAS 9.1 for Windows (2003) statistical analysis software packages were used to conduct 
the data analysis. Previous research on academic earmarks included multiple regression 
equations (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2002; Payne, 2002), and summary statistics (Savage, 
1999), but not structural equation path analysis. The approach using structural equation path 
modeling, as calculated with LISREL software, was strengthened by the inclusion of other 
variables in a model that demonstrate direct, indirect, and spurious effects, and accounts for 
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measurement error in the observed variables. Aside from the key Earmarks variable, this 
method allowed for simultaneous testing of other research questions including the effects of 
the EPSCoR and Ranking variables on the Earmarks and CRD. 
Data Collection by Model Variable 
The data for the seven variables in the study were gathered from four established 
sources of data that were available for secondary data analysis. These sources included the 
National Science Foundation (1995, 2004a, 2004b), TTze C&romc/e 
(2003), TheCenter at the University of Florida (2005), and categorical data from the 
American Council on Education (1997). This section will discuss data collection for each of 
the variables included in the study. 
C/za/zge m TbfaZ JZesearcA aW DeWqp/MgMf Fw/%6 fC&OA 7P92 jReaearcA Expefw&fwre 
jfan&Mg aW CAangg m 
The CRD, Ranking, and RNKCHG variables were calculated 6om NSF data adjusted 
by TheCenter, a research institute at the University of Florida (2005), for reasons explained 
below. Specifically, the data were from the Total Research: 1993-2002 (in Constant 1983 
Dollars) tables that were corrected data from the 1993 and 2002 NSF Surveys of Research 
and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges, Table 32 (NSF, 1995,2004a). 
NSF collects science and engineering expenditures for separately budgeted R&D 
activities annually from institutions of higher education (NSF, 1995, 2004a). 
The term separately budgeted R&D expenditures includes all funds expended for 
activities specifically organized to produce research outcomes and commissioned by 
an agency either external to the institution or separately budgeted by an 
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organizational unit within the institution. Expenditures are funds actually spent by an 
institution during its fiscal year. (1995,2004, p. 1). 
The sample for the survey includes master's or bachelor's granting institutions that expend at 
least $150,000 in R&D. Data was collected from 625 institutions in 2002 (NSF, 2004a) and 
681 institutions in 1993 (NSF, 1995). The whole population of DREI institutions was 
included in the population surveyed; however, two institutions in this study subset did not 
submit data for 1993. Survey item two, on both the 1993 and 2002 surveys, requested total 
and federally financed current fund expenditures for separately budgeted R&D activities by 
detailed science and engineering fields (NSF, 1995, 2004a). Technical notes for both surveys 
are excerpted in Appendix B. 
Use of the NSF R&D data have an advantage over using institutional finance data 
from NCES because they were collected for the expressed purpose of studying R&D 
activities. They were not directly affected by the accounting changes such as the change to 
the Government Accounting Standards Board 34/35 system. Data from NSF are taken from 
audited institutional accounting statements, thereby making the use of deceptive practices 
unlikely (TheCenter, 2005). 
The use of the data directly from the NSF study, as reported, were not appropriate for 
this study because many of the institutions reported as institutional systems. For example, 
Indiana University did not delineate between Indiana University at Bloomington, and the 
other seven Indiana University institutions. This created a problem with comparability among 
institutions, making national comparisons unreliable. Using NSF data would have required 
the exclusion of 42 institutions irom the subset, thereby decreasing the study's validity. 
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To address this problem, corrected NSF data from TheCenter at the University of 
Florida were used (TheCenter, 2005). TheCenter is an organization that has created an annual 
ranking of research universities since 2000. TheCenter recognized the problem of system-
wide reporting and corrected for this by adjusting the data for use with their annual rankings 
of Top American Research Universities. Following is a passage from TheCenter's data notes 
that discusses how adjustments were made to correct for the problem of system reporting. 
To increase the validity and usefulness of these data, TheCenter adjusts the original 
reported figures, when necessary, to ensure that all data represent the strength of a 
single-campus institution. Adjustments are based upon information gathered from the 
reporting agency or from the university itself. In cases where the published data 
represent a single campus, we do not adjust the data. When the data represent more 
than one campus, we first attempt to obtain a figure directly from NSF (for research 
expenditures and postdoctorates), from the institution itself, or from the university 
system office that submitted the data. If unavailable from those primary sources, we 
use an estimated or substitute figure derived from information found on the 
institution's website. As a last resort, we will use prior year data as a substitute. 
(TheCenter, 2005, p. 1) 
Data from TheCenter were matched with the original NSF data. A comparison of data 
from single institutions (i.e., those that would not have reported as systems and adjusted by 
TheCenter staff) indicated that TheCenter's data matched NSF. TheCenter's advisory board 
includes prominent higher education finance researchers, including Arthur Cohen, D. Bruce 
Johnstone, and Gordon Winston, who lent credibility to the use of these data. Permission to 
use TheCenter's data is included in Appendix C. 
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The Ranking variable was determined by adjusting TheCenter's R&D expenditure 
data from 1993 to 2002 constant dollars, using the higher education price index (HEPI) 
(Commonfund Institute, 2004), and rank ordering institutions. Institutions with a low ranking 
(e.g., one to five), had the most in R&D expenditures, while those with the highest rankings 
had the least in R&D expenditures. 
The CRD variable was determined by comparing the 1993 R&D expenditures with 
the 2002 R&D expenditures to determine the percent change over the 1993 baseline (see 
Figure 3.3). 
Fzgwre j.3 Egwafzo» /ôr CAarzge m jReaearc/z owf Deve/qpmgfzf fŒD) 
Percent Change in Research 2002 R&D Expenditures - 1993 R&D Expenditures 
and Development c c 
Expenditures (CRD) 1993 R&D Expenditures 
This equation allowed institutions with vastly different R&D expenditure starting points to be 
comparable. This adjustment was similar to what Bowen did in his 1980 review of 
institutions to address the issue of unstandardized units that caused a problem of 
comparability (1980). The use of a percent change over the ten years allowed institutions to 
be comparable, and helped to induce normality. 
The change in rank (RNKCHG) variable was calculated by ranking the 2002 R&D 
expenditures, using the same process as described for the 1993 R&D expenditure data, and 
subtracting the difference between the two years. A negative RNKCHG datum would 
represent an institution that rose in the rankings. For example, the University of California at 
Los Angeles was ranked ninth in 1993 and first in 2002, resulting in a RNKCHG of minus 
eight. Alternately, Colorado State University decreased in the rankings from number 32 in 
1993 to number 44 in 2002, resulting in a RNKCHG of plus twelve. 
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7bfa/v4 cade/mc Earmark? 7PPJ-2002 (Earmark 
Academic earmark data were taken from the C&romc/g database on Congressional 
Earmarks for Higher Education, 1990-2003 (C&romc/e, 2003) and adjusted each year to 2002 
constant dollars using the HEPI inflation adjustment (Commonfund Institute, 2004). The 
C&rofHc/e staff gathered the data annually by federal fiscal year (October 1-September 30) 
(C&romc/e, 2003). Earmarks were funds designated by Congress that were not requested in 
presidential budget proposals (CAromc/e). For most appropriations listed in the database, 
federal agencies did not sponsor open, merit-reviewed competitions to determine which 
institutions should receive funding. Congress usually named specific institutions as 
recipients. Appendix D provides a full listing of the total earmarks received from 1993 to 
2002 in constant 2002 dollars for all institutions in the study. Permission to use C&romcfe 
data is included in Appendix C. 
Other researchers (de Figueiredo & Sullivan, 2002; Payne, 2002,2003a) have used 
the C&romc/e database on congressional earmarks to contribute to a greater understanding of 
the impact earmarks have on institutions. Payne (2002,2003a) used the C&romc/e database 
in combination with Savage's database (1999) to demonstrate that institutions that received 
earmarked funding increased the number of peer-reviewed publications, although the 
publications were considered to be of lower quality. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) 
used the database to demonstrate the returns on lobbying expenditures based on an 
institution's congressional membership. 
Some academic earmarks listed in the C&roM?c/e dataset were shared among a group 
of postsecondary institutions or with other organizations. There was no indication of the 
division of the revenue. To correct for this in this study, the earmark amount was divided 
evenly by the number of organizations sharing the earmark. This is the same process Payne 
(2002) used to account for this problem when building her earmark dataset. 
ERSCo/f (EfSCo#) 
The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) began in 
1979 as an initiative by the National Science Foundation (NSF). It is an effort to build 
research capacity in less competitive states (Lambright, 2000). Since 1980, it has added states 
by cohort, with nine different cohorts identified in different years from 1980 through 2004. 
Currently, 25 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territory of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands participate in EPSCoR (NSF, 2004b). This is a categorical variable that served to 
demonstrate the impact of those institutions with EPSCoR affiliation in comparison to those 
not in the program. The purpose of the program is to build a competitive research 
infrastructure, which is the same purpose given by proponents of academic earmarks to 
justify academic earmark funding. Given the similarly stated purpose to build infrastructure, 
EPSCoR affiliation was included to determine the relative success of the alternate program. 
United States EPSCoR-afRliated institutions had EPSCoR affiliation in the 1992 
cohort or earlier. Forty institutions from 17 states had an EPSCoR affiliation before the start 
of the research period. They were coded "1" to indicate EPSCoR membership, while the 
other institutions were coded "0." Only U.S.-based institutions were included, thereby 
omitting institutions from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Territory of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. A listing of EPSCoR states and institutions is in Appendix E. 
^ccredïfed Engineering Program? (EM3P aW AfedfcaZ &?&ook fMEDPJ) 
Two additional categorical variables were the presence of an accredited engineering 
program (ENG93) and the presence of a medical school that reports to the institution 
(MED93). They were included to provide control for R&D expenditures and to isolate the 
effects of other variables such as Earmarks. Like the other exogenous variables, they were 
added as variables that potentially could explain a relationship between Earmarks and CRD. 
Engineering and medical faculty are often active researchers that maintain large 
research projects. These science and engineering areas represented a large portion of R&D 
expenses in the NSF survey. In 2002, engineering and the life sciences represented 15.1% 
and 31.7% of total R&D expenditures, respectively (NSF, 2004a). These variables also 
represent departments or schools that are not on all campuses. Powers (2003) included both 
of these variables in his multiple regression research of resource effects on institutional 
technology transfer and found significant positive correlations between institutional R&D 
expenditures funded by federal sources and those institutions that have medical schools (r = 
.43,/; < .01) and engineering schools (r = .19,/? < .05). 
The data on engineering programs and medical schools were obtained through a 
review of the book C/mver.Mff&s' oW CoZ/ggea, produced by the American Council 
on Education (ACE). There are 22 accredited engineering programs. An institution was 
included if it had at least the civil or electrical engineering programs accredited at a 
baccalaureate level. Engineering technology curricula were not considered for the ENG93 
variable. Medical school affiliations were identified if the institution was listed in the ACE 
book, and if the medical school was administered by the institution. For example, 
Pennsylvania State University at College Park was listed as having a medical school by ACE, 
but was not included in the medical school affiliation because it was determined that the 
medical school was administered separately. 
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Limitations 
Private institutions were not included in this study; therefore these results may not be 
generalized to those institutions. Private institutions also experience pressures to earmark, but 
were omitted from the study because they have different motivations to pursue revenue and 
there are different implications for their use of public funds. Private institutions receive a 
small percentage of their revenues from state governmental sources (1.9%), whereas public 
institutions receive on average 35.6% of their funds from state governmental sources (NCES, 
2002). 
Carnegie Foundation-defined Master's I, Master's II, Master's Comprehensive, and 
Liberal Arts institutions were not included in this study. Many of these institutions receive 
earmarked funding, and there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the importance of 
conducting research on these institutions (Savage, 1999); however, they were omitted 
because their missions often are different than the DREI institutions. Furthermore, data 
submitted to federal sources from these institutions generally are not as complete as the data 
submitted for DREI institutions. By excluding these institutions, conclusions for the DREI 
institutions are strengthened because of the high relative number of institutions in the subset 
in comparison to the population (i.e., 98.8%). 
The C&romcZe database has been constructed over a period of 14 years using the best 
data available (C&roMzc/e, 2003). Two limitations in the data include sharing of individual 
earmarks among two or more institutions, and the possibility for incorrectly identifying 
earmarked funding because of "vague or jargon-filled" (C/zrowc/e, 2003, p. 3) congressional 
language. To correct for shared earmarks, the total award was divided evenly among the 
recipients. The database was trusted because it has been used for other peer-reviewed 
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research (de Figueiredo & Silverman, 2002; Payne, 2002,2003a), thereby demonstrating 
validity through application. It also has been reported and accepted by the higher education 
community through publication for over 14 years in TTze CAromc/e. Payne (2002) used both 
CAromc/e earmark data and Savage's (1999) data collected over most of the same time 
period. Despite some minor differences, the results using both datasets were comparable 
overall (Payne, 2002). 
Summary 
This study concerns the effect of academic earmarking on the research function at 
U.S. public research universities. Of the 165 institutions in the population, 163 provided 
enough information to be considered for the models. Two path models were identified to 
determine the effect of earmarked funding (Earmarks) on institutional change in R&D 
expenditure (CRD) and change in ranking (RNKCHG) after controlling for EPSCoR 
affiliation (EPSCoR), presence of an accredited engineering program (ENG93) and/or a 
medical school (MED93), and R&D expenditure rankings (Ranking). Structural equation 
path modeling was used to estimate regression equations simultaneously, determine direct, 
indirect, and spurious relationships of the independent variables on the dependent variables, 
and account for measurement error. Two models were proposed: Model #1, with all of the 
previously identified variables, and Model #2, omitting the Earmarks variable. By developing 
two models, the research was able to determine the significance of Earmarks within the 
model, and to determine which model was better through chi-square, /^-values for each path 
in the model, the RMSEA, and the coefficient of determination (r^). This policy research 
project was designed to show whether causality exists through structural equation path 
analysis, and to inform future policy regarding considerations for academic earmarks. 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The purpose of the study was to determine whether academic earmarking had a 
discernible effect on institutional research and development (R&D) expenditure at public 
research institutions and the resulting ranking based on R&D expenditure. It was 
hypothesized from the literature review that academic earmarking does not have a discernible 
impact on institutional R&D expenditure, and a methodology was designed to test the 
hypothesis. The data analysis and results contained in this chapter demonstrate the execution 
of the methodology and answer the research questions. 
There are six major sections to this chapter, based on the five major steps taken for 
structural equation path analysis followed by a chapter summary. First, the preliminary 
analysis of the data, including a review of the variables, outliers, and the transformation of 
variables is presented. Second, the models are specified and assumptions are considered. 
Third, the models are estimated using structural equation path models and LISREL 8.71 
Student Edition (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2004). Fourth, the model total effects are decomposed 
to demonstrate the direct and indirect effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variables. Fifth, the models are evaluated, a decision is made about the role of earmarking as 
a variable in the model, and post hoc analyses are described. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a summary of the results structured by the three research questions guiding this study. 
Preliminary Analysis 
The preliminary analysis consisted of an initial review of the variables. This section 
includes a descriptive analysis and a listing of relevant frequencies. Histograms generated for 
the study are included to graphically demonstrate how the institutions changed over the ten-
year study period, 1993-2002. A case analysis was performed to determine the institutions 
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that needed to be eliminated as outliers, and which variables met the assumptions of path 
analysis using structural equation modeling. Finally, the variables that violated the 
assumptions of regression were identified and transformations made to meet model 
requirements. 
FanaW&y Measured 
The variables in this study are listed in Table 4.1 along with brief definitions and their 
source. All financial variables were converted to 2002 constant dollars. 
7a6/e 4.7 .R&searcA Farfa6Z&? 
Variable Short Name Description Source 
EPSCoR National Science NSF 
Foundation (NSF) 
EPSCoR state cohorts for 
1992 and earlier 
ENG93 Presence of accredited American Council on 
engineering programs in Education 
1993 
MED93 Presence of accredited American Council on 
engineering programs in Education 
1993 
Ranking Ranking of Institution in TheCenter adjusted NSF 
1993 based on R&D Data, 1993 
Expenditures 
Earmarks Total academic earmarks The Chronicle of Higher 
1993-2002 Education 
CRD Percent Change in Total TheCenter adjusted NSF 
R&D Funds 1993-2002 Data, 1993 and 2002 
RNKCHG Change in Institutional TheCenter adjusted NSF 
Ranking from 1993 to Data, 1993 and 2002 
2002 
The population for the study was 165 Carnegie-defined Doctoral/Research Extensive 
and Intensive public institutions (public research institutions). The subset of the population 
included 157 institutions of the 165 in the total population of public research institutions 
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(95.2 %). Two institutions, The University of Arkansas at Little Rock and the University of 
Colorado at Denver, did not supply enough data to be included. Case analysis of the 
remaining 163 institutions was completed including the determination of the studentized 
residual by each equation in Model #1, to determine the institutions that were outliers 
(Weisberg, 1985). Six institutions were eliminated because they were considered outliers, 
including University of Alaska Fairbanks, University of Northern Colorado, University of 
Hawaii at Manoa, Jackson State University, University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus, and East 
Tennessee State University. See Appendix F for a discussion on the use of the test for 
outliers (Weisberg). 
Figure 4.1 displays the 1993 R&D expenditure distribution for institutions in the 
subset as adjusted for higher education inflation using the higher education price index 
(HEPI) to 2002 dollars (Commonfund, 2004). The figure considers quartiles based on a 
division of the subset of institutions based on 1993 R&D expenditures. The percent of total 
expenditures for each quartile is listed. 
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Quartile 4 (Q4), the bottom quartile, accounted for 2% of total R&D expenditures in 
the public research institution dataset, while the top quartile (Ql) accounted for 68.1% of 
total expenditures. The data appeared skewed, which is why they were combined with other 
variables to control for variation and to allow for comparability across the subset. The data 
were used to determine the institutional ranking at the start of the study, the change in R&D 
expenditures when compared with 2002 R&D expenditures, and the change in ranking as a 
result of the 2002 ranking. 
Figure 4.2 displays the total amount of earmarks received over the ten-year period by 
institution. This figure visually depicts how academic earmarks are skewed, making it 
difficult to achieve meaningful interpretations for statistical analysis assuming heterogeneity 
of variance. 
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Fzgwre 4.2 q/"fAe TbW q/^Ew/Mart? &y Myfffwfzo». 
Total Academic Earmarks, 1993 - 2002, In 2002 Millions of Dollars 
60 
Mean = 29.4569 
Std. Dev. = 32.54864 
N = 157 
30.00 60.00 120.00 150.00 0.00 90.00 
Total Academic Earmarks 1993-2002 
Table 4.2 considers total academic earmarks awarded by quartile. The différences among the 
quartiles in percent of total and average earmark are distinct. 
TbMe 4.2 CompwiJOM q/\Ea/7»w&y gwwfz/e 
Quartile N Mean S.D. Percent of Total 
Ql 39 $44.3 million 34.0 37.4% 
Q2 39 $41.1 million 38.4 34.7% 
Q3 39 $21.8 million 22.6 18.4% 
Q4 40 $11.0 million 20.4 9.5% 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate total earmarks awarded by year and those institutions 
that did not receive earmarks by year, respectively. Figure 4.3 shows the total amount of 
earmarks awarded by year from 1993 to 2002. The dip between 1994 and 1999 was 
consistent with what Savage (1999) reported. 
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Figwre 4.3 TbfaZ Ear/Mar^/or f w6/;c j(gfgarcA Atyfzfwfzow 6y Tew m Con^roMf 
2002 MfZ/io/w q/^Do/Zarj 
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Figure 4.4 displays the number of public research institutions by year that did not 
receive any earmarks in comparison to those had received them. A non-earmarking 
institution was defined as one that did not receive earmarked funds in that year or any of the 
previous years. Once an institution received an earmark, it was removed from the non-
earmarking institution group. The non-earmarking group changed from 60 institutions in 
1993 to six institutions in 2002. 
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Note. Non-Earmarking institutions are those institutions that had not received earmarks in the listed year or any of the 
previous years. 
Figure 4.5 displays a histogram depicting percent change in research and 
development expenditures from 1993 to 2002. This variable appears to be more normally 
distributed. 
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Figure 4. J Dfj/rzAwfzoM of C/zange z» 7(&D &pg»(/zfwrg^ (C/(D) 
Distribution of Change in R&D Expenditures, 1993-2002 In 2002 Constant 
Dollars 
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Table 4.3 displays CRD summary statistics by quartile. Institutions in the bottom 
quartile (Q4) experienced the highest average increase in R&D, 59.7%. It also is noteworthy 
that the standard deviations are high in all quartiles, and particularly high in Q4, indicating 
great within group variance. 
TaMe 4. j Companion q/"C&D gwarfz/e 
Quartile N Mean S.D. 
Ql 39 33.9% increase .248 
Q2 39 34.4% increase .287 
Q3 39 44.3% increase .545 
Q4 40 59.7% increase .745 
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Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of another dependent variable, the change in ranking 
from 1993 to 2002 for all institutions in the dataset. This is a more normally distributed 
variable, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 10. 
Change In Institution R&D Ranking, 1993-2002 
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ET 20— 
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Table 4.4 provides the variable means, standard deviations, ranges, and frequencies 
for each model variable. After conversion of 1993 and 2002 R&D expenditures to constant 
2002 dollars using the HEPI (Commonfund Institute, 2004), there was a mean increase in 
R&D expenditures of 0.43. In other words, there was an average 43% increase in R&D 
expenditures for all institutions after controlling for higher education inflation for public 
research institutions over the ten years of the study. Of the 157 institutions, seven did not 
receive academic earmarked funding during the study period. Most of the institutions (» = 
117) had accredited engineering programs, about one third (» = 46) had an accredited 
Mean = 2.8449E-16 
Std. Dev. = 9.74351 
N = 157 
-20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 
Rank Change 
20.00 30.00 
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medical program (human medicine), and about one quarter (» = 37) were EPSCoR-affiliated 
institutions. The RNKCHG variable had a mean of zero, and standard deviation of ten, 
meaning that most institutions had rank changes within ten ranking spots, as indicated in 
Figure 4.5. For example, Florida State University was within one standard deviation, with an 
increase in rank of nine places, from 61 in 1993 to 52 in 2002. 
Variable Mean S.D. Range (min.-max.) Frequencies 
1.EPSCoR 
2. ENG93 
3.MED93 
4. Ranking 
5. Earmarks* 
6. CRD" 
7. RNKCHG' 
0.24 0.43 
0.73 0.44 
0.29 
79 
29.46 
0.43 
0 
0.46 
45 
32.55 
0.51 
10 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0.00 
-0.48 
-24 
1 
157 
143.43 
2.54 
34 
37 Institutions have 
EPSCoR status 
115 Institutions 
have Accredited 
Engineering 
programs 
46 Institutions 
graduated M.D.s 
Seven insitutions 
did not receive any 
academic earmarks 
* Numbers reported are in constant 2002 millions of dollars 
Calculation completed using constant 2002 dollars 
" A positive rank change indicates an institution lowering its rank, and a negative rank change indicates a 
raising of the rank. For example, Iowa State University was ranked 24 in 1993 and 38 in 2002. The resulting 
rank change is -14. 
Table 4.5 displays correlations among the variables, which provided early indicators 
of which variables may be significant in the structural equation path models. A particularly 
significant relationship was seen between the CRD and RNKCHG variables (r = .894). It 
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also was noted that Earmarks were not significantly correlated with either of the two 
dependent variables, CRD and RNKCHG. 
J Cwre/afm» 
Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I.EPSCoR 1.000 
2. ENG93 0.064 1.000 
3. MED93 -0.028 0.136 1.000 
4. Ranking 0.128 -0.445 -0.439 ** 1.000 
5. Earmarks 0.233 0.366 ** 0.178 * -0.428 ** 1.000 
6. CRD 0.150 -0.035 0.027 0.183 * -0.014 1.000 
7. RNKCHG 0.155 -0.056 0.098 0.107 0.013 0.894 1.000 
M)fg : * p<.05; ** f < 01 
Model SpeciScation 
This section specifies the variables used in both models and the steps taken to 
eliminate specification error through meeting assumptions of regression and path analysis. 
The process demonstrated in this section prepared the two models to be estimated, 
decomposed, and analyzed in the following sections. 
Specification of the two models was begun in Chapters 2 and 3, through identification 
of variables from literature, and development of a framework for the research study. 
Specification resulted in the development of three research questions listed in Table 4.6, the 
equations for both models in Table 4.7, and two structural equation path models shown in 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8. 
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Research Question #1. Do academic earmarks provide public research institutions with an 
increased academic R&D expenditure? 
Research Question #2. What impact does EPSCoR affiliation have on institutional ability to 
develop R&D expenditure? 
Research Question #3. What impact does institutional ranking by federal expenditures at the 
beginning of the study have on the ability to develop R&D 
expenditure? 
4 7 .SfrwcfM/Yz/ _/ôr AfbaW #7 aW Afbde/ #2 
Model #1 
Y; = P51X1 +P52X2 +P53X3 +P54X4 + P;yU 
Ho: Variables X%, X%, X3, X4, have no effect on Y$. 
Ha: Variables X%, X2, X3, and/or X4 did have an observable effect on Y;. 
Y@ - PgiXi +P62X2 +P63X3 +P64X4+PggY5 + P@vV 
Ho: Variables Xi, X2, X3, X4, Y; have no effect on Yg. 
Ha: Variables Xi, X2, X3, X4 and/or Y; did have an observable effect on Yg. 
Y? = P75Y5 + PveYg + P?wW 
Ho: Variables Y;, and Yg, have no effect on Y?. 
Ha: Variables Yg, and/or Yg did have an observable effect on Y4. 
Model #2 
Ye = PglXl +P62%2 ^63X3 +P64X4 + PgyV 
Ho: Variables Xi, X2, X3, X4, have no effect on Yg. 
Ha: Variables Xi, X2, X3, and/or X4 did have an observable effect on Yg 
Y? = PygYg + P?wW 
Ho: Variable Yg has no effect on Y?. 
Ha: Variable Yg has an observable effect on Y?. 
The formulas provided a basis for statistical testing and to demonstrate relationships. 
X) through X$ are the independent variables (EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93, and Ranking). Y; 
through Y? are the dependent variables (Earmark, CRD, and RNKCHG). P51 through P?g are 
the paths, or the parameters of interest, in the model from the independent variables to the 
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dependent variables. The capital letters U, V, and W are the error terms. P;uU, PevV, and 
P?wW are the residual paths from the error terms to each dependent variable. 
P l 2  
Change in 
Ranking 1993-
2002 
(Y,-RNKCHG) 
Total Academic 
Earmarks 1993-
2002 
(Y,-Earmark) 
Change in Total 
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fzgwre 77:eorgf;ca/ ^frwcfwra/ EgwafzoM Afb^e/ #2 ^pecz/?e(f 
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Corrgcf/om /or Error 
Specification error refers to errors that may occur at the planning stage of a 
multivariate research study because the data are inadequate and/or inconsistent with respect 
to the objectives of the study (Gonzalez, 1988). Attention to specification error is important 
because if a model is not consistent with the empirical data, then the research may report 
misleading conclusions (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). 
Path analysis, using structural equation modeling, is essentially an extension and 
application of multiple regression analysis. Path analysis is the estimation of simultaneous 
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regressions and the identification of error through the use of a model. Structural equation 
modeling was used because it had the capacity to calculate the models, error, and variable 
effects simultaneously. 
To ensure the data were specified correctly, the model variables were reviewed using 
the following six assumptions of multiple regression (Lorenz, 2004), listed in Table 4.8, and 
five assumptions for path analysis (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002), listed in Table 4.9. 
of Mw/fzp/g .Rggre&MOM 
1 There exists no multicollinearity 
2 The independent variables are fixed values 
3 Independence of observations 
4 Heterogeneity of variance 
5 Normal distribution of residuals 
6 The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
is linear, (i.e., follows a straight line) 
1 The model must accurately reflect the actual causal sequence 
2 The structural equation for each endogenous variable includes all variables that 
are direct causes of that particular endogenous variable (i.e., variables that are 
not included in the model, and whole effects are therefore assumed to be 
"captured" by the residuals, are also assumed not to be correlated with any of 
the predictor variables 
3 There is a one-way causal flow in the model (i.e., there can be no reciprocal 
causation between variables). 
4 The relationships among variables are assumed to be linear, additive, and 
causal in nature; any curvilinear relations, etc., are to be excluded. 
5 All exogenous variables are measured without error 
To meet these assumptions, some assumptions were tested statistically, while other 
assumptions were satisfied through a combination of theory and literature review. For 
example, items one through three in the assumptions for path analysis are theoretical (Mertler 
& Vannatta, 2002) and were satisfied through the study's literature review and methodology. 
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Afeefing f&e v4ssw/np/ions qf AWfip/e degression 
The following sections discuss each assumption of multiple regression and the 
methods taken to avoid specification error. 
vdsswmpfion of regression #7 - no /nw/iicoZZineari/y. The correlation matrix in Table 
4.5 served as an initial check of multicollinearity for independent variables in the models. 
Some of the independent variable correlation parameters were significant (p < .01), but the 
correlation estimate did not approach the critical value threshold of 0.8 (Lewis-Beck, 1980). 
There were no concerns about multicollinearity. 
visswmpfion of regression #2 - independenf varWVes ore vo/wes. If values 
change under different conditions within the model, the model is not stable and is considered 
misspecified. The independent variables were fixed values because they were based on either 
categorical data from 1992 or reported financial data that were collected using formal 
methodologies and reported by reputable sources (e.g., The CAronic/e and NSF). See Chapter 
3 for a more complete discussion on the data identification and collection. 
v4ssw#zpfion of regression #3 - independence. Each independent variable was 
collected from different sources and represented different categories of variables. For 
example, the EPSCoR institutional status and the Ranking variable for 1993 are two 
completely different indicators for an institution. See Chapter 3 for a more complete 
discussion on the variables and their independence. 
v4ss%/Mpfzo%s of regression #4 - /zeferogeneify of variance. To determine the 
heterogeneity of variance, Levene's t-test was conducted, where the continuous independent 
variables were regressed against the dependent variables. The Earmark and the CRD 
variables violated the assumption of heterogeneity of variance; therefore a square root 
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transformation was performed on these variables to overcome this violation (Cohen, Cohen, 
West & Aiken, 2003). 
^ssw/np^ions qf rggr&Mvo/z #J - norma/ d;sfri6wfion of residwa/s. The Looney-
Gulledge test for normality of residuals (Looney & Goolledge, 1985) was computed for all 
continuous independent variables regressed against the dependent variables. The Earmark 
and CRD variables violated the assumption of normal distribution of residuals. The square 
root transformation, which was performed to induce homogeneity of variance), also corrected 
for lack of normality (Cohen et al., 2003). 
/4ssw#zpffon qf regression ## - f&e s/raig/zf-/ine assw/npfion. Residual scatterplots for 
all the relationships were reviewed and provided an initial test of the straight-line 
assumption. After transformation to address the previous violations of assumptions, the 
relationships among variables appeared to be linear. 
Meefzng f&e /4ss%7npfions qf faf/z v4na/ysis 
The following sections discuss each assumption and the methods taken to avoid 
specification error. 
jdssw/npfion qfpaf/z analysis #7 - mode/ re//ecfs fAe acfwa/ cawsa/ segwence. This 
assumption was met because the sequence of the variables in the model reflected their 
occurrence in time. For example, the four exogenous independent variables were measures 
prior to the study period (1993-2002). The Earmarks variable was a sum of the activity 
during the period, which was followed by an indication of change in the CRD variable (i.e., 
percent change in research and development expenditures over the period). The final 
dependent endogenous variable, change in ranking, occurred last in the sequence of events. 
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^sswmpfzon qfpa/A ana/yszs #2 - f/ze sfrwcfwraZ e^wafzons znc/wde a// varzaWes f/zaf 
are dzrecf causes of ^ /ze endogenous varza6/es. As discussed in Chapter 3, the purpose of this 
study was to test the belief that academic earmarking had a discernible effect on institutional 
R&D infrastructure and ranking. The models were built to test this argument and to provide 
control variables to explain the effect of earmarked funds on R&D infrastructure. As a result, 
the literature review provided the background for the study, and the methodology identified 
the independent variables to explain the direct causes of the endogenous variables. 
jdssumpfzon qfpaf/z ana/yszs #3- a one-way causa//7ow m f/ze mode/. This assumption 
was relevant as to whether variables have reciprocal causation. One-way causal flow was 
assumed because of the logical ordering of variables through time. For example, institutions 
that started engineering programs during the study period are not considered in the ENG93 
variable because this may have reciprocal causation with the Earmark variable. For example, 
earmarks received by an institution may have been used for the development of an 
engineering program. 
vdssumpfzon qfpaf/z ana/yszs #4 - re/afzons&fps among varza6/es are /znear, addzfzve, 
and causa/ zn nafwre. This assumption was tested through the sixth assumption of regression, 
the straight-line assumption. Residual scatterplots generated after the transformation of the 
variables met this assumption. The variables were demonstrated to be additive and causal 
based on the literature review and development of methodology in the previous two chapters. 
v4ssump/zon qfpaf/z ana/yszs - exogenous varzaMes are measured wzf&owf error. 
Limitations of the study and discussion of the measurement of the variables are discussed at 
length in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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Model Estimation 
After satisfying the assumptions, the model was estimated using LISREL 8.71 
Student Edition (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2004). The structural equation path models are 
estimated in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. Table 4.10 displays the estimated equations, and Table 
4.11 displays the parameter estimates for comparison across equations. 
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7a6/e 4.70 &/w»a/ed Egwa/iow/or Mode/ #7 and Mode/ #2 
Model #1 
Ys = 2.07Xi +1.37X2 -0.18X3 -O.O3X4 
Yg = 0.05Xi +0.03X2 +O.O6X3 +O.OOX4+0.00Y; 
Y? = -0.04Y5 -44.2Y& 
Model #2 
Ye =0.05Xi +0.03X2 +O.O6X3 +O.OOX4 
Y? = -44.2Y& 
7a6/e 4.77 Mbde/s #7 a/?d #2 Co/Mparzsow 0» Esffmafed farame/ers 
Model #1 y= 6.46, df = 4,7ZMS&4 = 0.064 
Earmarks (Y5) CRD (Yg) RNKCHG (Y?) 
parameter (/-value) parameter (/-value) parameter (/-value) 
EPSCoR (Xi) 2.07 (4.80)" 0.046 (1.14) 
ENG93 (X2) 1.37(2.99)' 0.026 (0.64) 
MED93 (X3) -0.18 (-.41) 0.065 (1.70) 
Ranking (X4) -0.03 (-5.67)" 0.0011 (2.23)* 
Earmark (Y5) 0.0031 (0.44) -0.038 (-0.31) 
CRD (Ye) -44.20 (-25.12)*" 
r2 0.39 0.057 0.80 
error variance 4.94 0.037 18.63 
Model #2 = 6.50, df=4,7CMS&4 = 0.064 
CRD (Ye) RNKCHG (Y?) 
parameter (/-value) parameter (/-value) 
EPSCoR (Xi) 0.052(1.40) 
ENG93 (X2) 0.030 (0.77) 
MED93 (X3) 0.064(1.69) 
Ranking (X4) 0.0011 (2.26)* 
CRD (Yg) -44.2 (-25.19)*** 
/ 0.056 0.80 
error variance 0.037 18.64 
* /? < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 
After estimating both models as hypothesized, they were found to have non­
significant values of the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA); when its p-
value is less than .05, RMSEA indicates a model that is a reasonable approximation to the 
data (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2000). This finding indicated that both models were weak, 
despite small, non-significant chi-square test results that demonstrate a good fit relative to the 
number of degrees of freedom. Essentially, this means that the independent exogenous 
predictor variables and the Earmark variable were not accurate predictors of development of 
institutional R&D expenditure or the resulting change in ranking among peer institutions. 
The null hypothesis for the primary research question, relative to academic 
earmarking, was satisfied because there was no statistical support for the Earmarking 
variable in either model. Although this finding supports the premise of the study, it was not a 
surprising result as the Earmark variable had very small correlations with CRD (r = -.014) 
and RNKCHG (r = 0.013). 
The four exogenous independent variables (EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93, and Ranking) 
were selected for the model to help explain any impact Earmarks might have on the 
dependent variables CRD and RNKCHG. These four variables were not needed in this 
capacity because the Earmark variable was not significantly related to the dependent 
variables. An unexpected result was that the four exogenous variables were not found to be 
significant contributors to the change in R&D infrastructure. Three of the four variables 
(EPSCoR, ENG93, and Ranking) had a significant relationship to the Earmarking variable, 
accounting for 39% of the variance (r^= .39). 
Another finding was the significant relationship between CRD and RNKCHG (f-
value for the parameter estimate - -25.19). This is not a surprising finding, as both variables 
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are determined using R&D expenditures in 1993 and 2002; however, RNKCHG considers 
the expenditure data in relationship to the other institutions in the dataset. 
Model Decomposition 
Decomposition demonstrates the total, direct, and indirect effects the independent 
variables have on the dependent variables in the model. This is an important step in path 
analysis (Mertler & Vannatta, 2003; Lorenz, 2004), but the importance was limited in this 
study, given the nonsignificant estimates of the exogenous and Earmark variables. Table 4.12 
displays the direct and indirect effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variables. There was no need to investigate spurious relationships because of the 
nonsignificance of the effects of the independent variables on CRD or RNKCHG. 
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4.72 Dgcompos/fm/z ofMbdeZs #7 w%7 #2 
Model #1 
Dependent Independent Total = Direct + Indirect 
Earmark (Y;) EPSCoR (Xi) 2.07 -2.07 
ENG93 (Xz) 1.37 = 1.37 
MED93 (X3) -0.18 = -0.18 
Ranking (X4) -0.03 = -0.03 
CRD (Yg) EPSCoR (X,) 0.05 = 0.04 + 0.01 
ENG93 (X%) 0.03 = 0.03 + 0.00 
MED93 (X3) 0.06 = 0.06 + 0.00 
Ranking (X4) 0.0011 = 0.0011 + 0.00 
Earmark (Yg) 0.0031 = 0.0031 
RNKCHG (Y?) EPSCoR (Xi) -2.38 = 0.00 + -2.38 
ENG93 (Xz) -1.40 = 0.00 + -1.40 
MED93 (X3) -2.83 = 0.00 + -2.83 
Ranking (X4) -0.04 = 0.00 + -0.04 
Earmark (Yg) -0.18 = -0.04 + -0.14 
CRD (Y&) -44.20 = -44.20 
Model #2 
Dependent Independent Total = Direct + Indirect 
CRD(Yg) EPSCoR (Xi) 0.05 - 0.05 
ENG93 (Xz) 0.03 = 0.03 
MED93 (X3) 0.06 - 0.06 
Ranking (X4) 0.00 = 0.00 
RNKCHG (Y?) EPSCoR (Xi)-2.30 = 0.00 -2.30 
ENG93 (Xz) -1.34 = 0.00 -1.34 
MED93 (X3) -2.84 = 0.00 -2.84 
Ranking (X4) -0.04 = 0.00 -0.04 
CRD (Yg) -44.20 = -44.20 
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Model Evaluation 
Model evaluation is the process of critically reviewing the statistical model and 
considering changes to the model to demonstrate goodness-of-fit. Refinements to the models 
were not explored because there was not significant evidence of a relationship among any of 
the independent variables and the principal dependent variables that demonstrate institutional 
R&D infrastructure (CRD) or change in rank (RNKCHG). Additionally, the study purpose 
was met through failing to reject the null hypothesis regarding the impact of academic 
earmarking on institutional R&D infrastructure. 
fosf ffoc AWfzp/e Jkgre&Mo/z y4Ma(yszs of Earmark ParzaMe 
The structural equation path analysis indicated that the three variables that were 
significant indicators of variance in the Earmark variable were EPSCoR, ENG93, and 
Ranking. An analysis was conducted that involved comparisons of six multiple regression 
equations to determine whether any of the four exogenous variables was mediated by each 
other, and whether there was a significant interaction effect observed among the EPSCoR 
and ENG93 categorical variables. Further investigation was needed to determine the 
relationship of MED93 to Earmarks. Table 4.13 is a table of means for Earmarks when 
divided by the categorical variables, EPSCoR and ENG93. 
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4.7J qfEar/mart A/earnr 6y EFS'Cod aw/ EM7Pj (7% corufanf 2002 7Mz//fow) 
Accredited Engineering Program 
in 1993 (ENG93) 
EPSCoR Institutional Affiliation (EPSCoR) 
Yes No 
Yes 47.97 (» = 29) 32.81 (» = 86) 36.64 (% = 115) 
No 25.38 (n = 8) 6.13 (» = 34) 9.80 (» = 42) 
43.09(M = 37) 25.25 (« = 120) 29.46(M = 157) 
Note. In each cell the number on the left is the Earmark mean given the categorical variables and the number on the right is 
the n or the number of institutions in the condition. For example, the upper left box contains information on institutions that 
are both EPSCoR institutions and that had an accredited engineering program in 1993. The Earmark variable was not 
transformed for this categorical description as it was with the path models and regressions. 
Table 4.13 demonstrates a possible interaction between the EPSCoR and ENG93 
variables. Institutions that were both EPSCoR affiliated and that had an accredited 
engineering program had a mean of $47.97 million in total earmarks, whereas institutions 
that were not EPSCoR affiliated and did not have an engineering program had a mean of 
$6.13 million. 
SAS 9.1 for Windows (2003) was used to complete partial F-tests to determine the 
effect each variable had when controlling for the other variables. To determine whether an 
interaction was significant between the EPSCoR and ENG93 variables, experiment-wise 
orthogonal comparisons of the four unstandardized regression equations was conducted using 
partial-F-test comparisons. This statistical method served to partition variance within the 
categorical variables. Table 4.14 shows the regression equations and Table 4.15 demonstrates 
the summary statistics for each regression equation from the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
tables and the slope (P) variables. 
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4.74 TZegressfOM Egwafiow/or fosf 77bc v4»a(ys;s o» fAg Ewmark Fdrza6/e 
Models Regression Variables 
Model 1: Y; =Po+P 1X1+^2X2+^3X3+6, 
Model 2: Yg =Po+P 1 Xi+^2X2+^4X4+6; 
Model 3: Yg =Po+p 1X1+^3X3+^4X4+6; 
Model 4: Yg =^0+^2X2+^3X3+^4X4+6; 
Model 5: Yg =Po+P 1X1+^2X2+^3X3+^4X4+6, 
Model 6: Y; =Po+P 1X1+^2X2+^4X4+^5X1X2+6; 
EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93 
EPSCoR, ENG93, Ranking 
EPSCoR, MED93, Ranking 
ENG93, MED93, Ranking 
EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93, Ranking 
EPSCoR, ENG93, Ranking, Interaction 
Variable 
7%6/e 4.7J /or fosf /Tbc 0» f&e Ear/Mark Fdrza6/e 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Po 2.23*** 5.40*** 7.04*** 5.43*** 5.52*** 5.29*** 
P1X1 1.64** 2.06*** 2.25*** 2.07*** 2.57** 
P2X2 2.53*** 1.39** 1.68** 1.37** 1.52** 
P3X3 0.89* -0.28 -0.09 -0.18 
P4X4 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
PsXiXz -0.66 
SSR 331.78 494.04 449.56 378.04 494.89 496.21 
SSE 933.28 771.02 815.50 887.03 770.17 768.86 
MSR 110.59 164.68 149.85 126.01 123.72 124.05 
MSE 6.10 4.04 5.33 5.80 5.07 5.06 
F 18.13*** 32.68*** 28.11*** 21.74*** 24.42*** 24.52*** 
R^ 0.2623 0.3905 0.3554 0.2988 0.3912 0.3922 
*/? < 0J; **jp < .07; ***/? < .007 
The MED93 variable, which had a significant relationship with Earmarks when 
considered alone, was eliminated from the calculation because it was not significant after 
controlling for the other variables (i.e., EPSCoR, ENG93, Ranking). This means that it was 
mediated by the other three independent variables (partial F„_4=0.04). The other three 
variables, however, were found to be significant predictors of earmarks after testing for 
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mediating effects (EPSCoR Partial F„_4 = 5.77, < .01; ENG93 n-4= 2.24, j? < .05; Ranking 
Partial F„-4 = 8.05,/; < .01). Despite the obvious differences in means in Table 4.13, there 
was not evidence of an interaction efïect between EPSCoR and ENG93. This was 
demonstrated by using a Partial F-test to compare models five and six (Partial F»^= 0.003). 
The regression equation that best predicted earmarking activity was the equation in 
Model 2, which contained the three significant variables identified through the structural 
equation path model. This meant that public research institutions that were EPSCoR 
affiliates, had an accredited engineering program, and that were well ranked (i.e., had a low 
rank) were more likely to generate greater earmarks over the period of the study. 
Summary 
The current research concerned a study of academic earmarks through the analysis of 
two structural equation path analysis models built to determine the impact of earmarking on 
institutional R&D expenditures and, as a result, the institutional change in ranking in relation 
to other public research institutions. Both models were rejected because Earmarks and the 
other endogenous independent variables (EPSCoR, ENG93, MED93, and Ranking) failed to 
provide significant indication of institutional change in R&D expenditures. The path models 
did demonstrate significant relationships between change in R&D expenditures (CRD) and 
change in ranking (RNKCHG), and a regression analysis accounted for 39% of the variation 
in Earmarks. 
.Summary qf deW# deaearcA gw&sTzon 
The purpose of this study was to answer three research questions that concerned the 
practice of academic earmarking as it relates to the development of institutional R&D 
110 
expenditures and change in peer rankings. The research questions (listed in Table 4.4) are 
used to organize the findings that were presented in this chapter. 
de^earc/z guejfzofz #7 — academic earmarks. Academic earmarks did not provide an 
institution with an increased capacity to develop research infrastructure, and they did not 
contribute to an institution's ranking with regards to R&D expenditures. The null hypothesis 
for the primary research question, relative to academic earmarking, was satisfied because 
there was no statistical support for the Earmarking variable in Model 1. The structural 
equation path analysis provided no support for the Earmark variable for causation or as an 
indicator of variance to the CRD variable (P# = .003) and to the RNKCHG variable (P75 = -
.038). 
The structural equation path analysis did yield an unexpected understanding for 
institutional conditions that predict variance in the Earmarking variable. Institutional 
EPSCoR affiliation, presence of an accredited engineering program, and the R&D 
expenditure ranking accounted for 39% of the variance in total earmarks received over the 
study period. 
deaearcA gwejfzo/? #2 - ERSCaR a^zZzafzow. EPSCoR affiliation did not predict 
change in institutional R&D expenditures; however, it was found to be one of three 
significant indicators of institutional earmarking variance. An independent samples t-test 
showed that institutions with EPSCoR status generated, on average, $17.8 million more than 
institutions that were not affiliated with the EPSCoR program (p = .003). 
ZfeaearcA gweafzorz #3 - da/z&zfzg o/z expe/idz/wrea m ZPP3. Institutional ranking did 
not predict change in institutional R&D expenditures. The increase in R&D expenditures was 
43% on average across the dataset, regardless of institutional ranking. Figure 4.1 
I l l  
demonstrated that institutions in the top quartile expended 68.1% of the total R&D 
expenditures, while institutions in the lowest quartile were responsible for only 2%. This 
great variation in institutional R&D expenditures at the start of the study did not affect 
institutional R&D expenditure change. 
Institutional ranking was found to be one of three significant indicators of earmarking 
activity. Analysis demonstrated that institutions ranked in the top quartile accounted for 
37.4% of all earmarks over the ten years of the study, while those institutions in the bottom 
quartile accounted for 9.5%. 
Further discussion of the results of the present study are provided in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 also connects the findings with previous research and presents ideas for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The final chapter of this dissertation restates the research problem and reviews the 
major methods used in the study. The major sections of this chapter summarize the results, 
discuss contributions to existing literature, consider implications for academic research and 
development (R&D), propose additional avenues for study and scholarship, and revisit the 
limitations of the study. 
Review of the Study 
As presented in the first chapter, postsecondary research institutions attracted over $2 
billion in academic earmark funding in FY 2003 (Brainard & Borrego, 2003), an amount that 
has increased dramatically over the previous ten years. Beyond anecdotal inferences and the 
illustration of specific instances, research on this topic has been limited. Specifically, there 
has not been sufficient research to substantiate or to challenge arguments made in support of 
the practice of academic earmarking. Proponents, such as Representative C.W. (Bill) Young 
of Florida and former Boston College president John Silber, claim that academic earmarking 
provides funding to postsecondary institutions that are overlooked by federally funded 
national foundations (Burd, 2002; Silber, 2002). Others argue this funding resource undercuts 
the role of the research community (Teich, 2000) and undermines the peer review process 
(Feller, 2004a; Savage, 1993,1999,2002). 
This research study was designed to test the argument that academic earmarks 
provide an institution with increased R&D infrastructure as indicated through the 
development of R&D expenditures over a ten-year period. Three research questions were 
developed from the review of literature (see Table 5.1). 
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TaMe J. 7 dg^earcA gweaffOMf 
Research Question #1. Do academic earmarks provide public research institutions with an 
increased academic R&D expenditure? 
Research Question #2. What impact does EPSCoR affiliation have on institutional ability to 
develop R&D expenditure? 
Research Question #3. What impact does institutional ranking by federal expenditures at the 
beginning of the study have on the ability to develop R&D 
expenditure? 
Savage (1999) suggested that members of Congress and other institutional leaders 
have defended the practice of earmarking because it provided support for institutions to build 
the research infrastructure necessary to compete successfully with peers for external grants 
and contracts. This study's primary research question grew from Savage's argument. 
Although institutional motivation to increase in peer rankings was not reflected in the 
primary research question, this was considered because prestige is associated with rankings, 
and rankings have been included in previous research on academic earmarks (Savage, 1999, 
2002). The second research question addressed the National Science Foundation's (NSF) 
Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) and was included 
because previous research found EPSCoR-afRliated institutions contributed to research 
productivity (Payne, 2003a). Inclusion of EPSCoR affiliation also was interesting in a 
theoretical sense because of the conflict between EPSCoR and academic earmark funding 
(Savage, 1999). The third research question concerned the relative influence of institutional 
ranking on R&D expenditures (Savage, 2002; Silber, 2002) and was formed from previous 
research that found the top 100 institutions accounted for approximately 80% of all R&D 
expenditures (National Science Board, 2004). 
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Data from public research institutions were analyzed to determine whether academic 
earmarking had an effect on institutional change in R&D expenditures and, as a result, an 
efïect on peer rankings, which are based on R&D expenditures. The period of the research 
study was from 1993 to 2002, when annual total academic earmarks increased 142%, from 
$760 million to $1.84 billion (C&romc/e, 2003). Endogenous variables, selected to control for 
the effects of earmarked funds, were: EPSCoR affiliation, presence of an accredited 
engineering program, presence of a medical school (human medicine), and institutional rank 
on R&D expenditures at the start of the study. Structural equation path analysis, using 
LISREL 8.71 Student Edition (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2004), was employed because it 
permitted the study to conduct simultaneous regressions, determine causality among 
variables, calculate measurement error, and determine direct and indirect effects. 
The dataset was built using data from the National Science Foundation (NSF), TTze 
C&romcZe of Mg&er fdwcafzo/z (C&romc/e), TheCenter at the University of Florida 
(TheCenter), and the American Council on Education (ACE). Total academic earmark 
amounts for public research institutions were determined from a dataset created by 77;e 
C&romc/g from 1990 to 2003. Institutional R&D expenditures came from the TheCenter's 
adjusted NSF R&D expenditures dataset for all research institutions in 1993 and 2002. The 
institutions were rank ordered by the 1993 and 2002 R&D expenditures for the 1993 
rankings, 1993 quartiles, and 1993-2002 change in R&D variable. ACE definitions for 
institutions were used to define the categorical variables, which were the presence of an 
accredited engineering program and presence of a medical school for human medicine. 
The subset of institutions for the study included 157 public Carnegie Foundation 
defined Doctoral/Research Extensive and Doctoral/Research Intensive institutions out of a 
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total population of 165. Two institutions were eliminated because of insufficient data, and six 
were eliminated as outliers. This study subset represented 95.2% of the population. 
All the financial data in this study were controlled for higher education inflation and 
reported in 2002 constant dollars using the higher education price index (HEPI) 
(Commonfund, 2004). The R&D data from 1957 to 2002 were controlled using the consumer 
price index (CPI) (U.S. Department of Labor, 2002) because the HEPI adjustments were not 
available for data prior to 1960. 
Summary of Results 
This study demonstrated that the practice of congressional academic earmarking at 
public research institutions did not have an effect on change in R&D expenditures or an 
effect on peer rankings based on R&D expenditures. EPSCoR affiliation and institutional 
ranking also had no effect on change in institutional R&D expenditures, but both (in addition 
to the presence of an accredited engineering program) were found to be significant predictors 
of academic earmarks, accounting for 39% of the variance in earmarking. 
Change in institutional R&D expenditures was a dependent variable used to 
determine the degree to which an institution developed R&D infrastructure over the ten-year 
period. For example, the University of Louisiana at Lafayette (ULL) experienced a great 
increase (210%) in R&D expenditures (from $15.4 million in 1993 to $47.8 million in 2002), 
thus demonstrating substantial development of R&D infrastructure. In addition, ULL 
received $420,000 in academic earmarks, and it moved up 30 places in the rankings, from 
119 in 1993 to 89 in 2002. ULL is a model institution for this study, because it experienced 
great growth in R&D expenditures, with little assistance from academic earmarking. 
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There were great differences among the institutions when comparing them on 
quartiles over the period of the study. Institutions in the bottom quartile (Q4) accounted for 
2% of total R&D expenditures, while the top quartile (Ql) accounted for 68.1% (see Figure 
4.1 in Chapter 4). 
Additionally, the differences in earmark recipients by quartile were distinctly 
different. Institutions in Ql received 37.4% of the total amount of earmarks, while 
institutions in Q4 received 9.52%. This difference demonstrated that institutions with 
developed R&D infrastructure received academic earmarks at a greater rate than institutions 
with less developed R&D infrastructure. 
Beyond earmarking activity, categories such as ranking at the beginning of the study, 
EPSCoR affiliation, presence of a medical school, or presence of an accredited engineering 
program failed to predict change in R&D expenditures. Institutions had an average R&D 
expenditure change of 43% with a standard deviation of .51 after adjusting to 2002 constant 
dollars, despite differences within these variables. This means that approximately 68% of all 
of the institutions in the study had between an eight percent decrease and a 94% increase in 
expenditures, although the most extreme changes were a 48% decrease and a 254% increase. 
Institutions with medical schools and accredited engineering programs were 
overrepresented in the higher rankings. These institutions had a high negative correlation 
with the 1993 ranking, which means they often had higher relative R&D expenditures at the 
beginning of the study than at the conclusion, and they were in the top two quartiles. Because 
the presence of a medical school or accredited engineering program did not affect the change 
in R&D expenditures, these institutions remained in the top rankings. Of the 39 institutions in 
the top quartile, 34 had accredited engineering programs (88%), and 24 had an affiliated 
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medical school (62%). The 40 institutions in the bottom quartile contained 14 accredited 
engineering programs (35%) and four affiliated medical schools (10%). 
Change in R&D expenditures occurred at similar rates throughout the subset of 
institutions. As an illustration of how this was similar among all institutions, consider 
Northern Arizona University (NAU) and Rutgers State University of New Jersey at New 
Brunswick (Rutgers). NAU was in Q4 in 1993, with $12 million, while Rutgers was in Ql, 
with $203 million. NAU and Rutgers were similar because both had accredited engineering 
programs, were not affiliated with EPSCoR, and did not have a medical school that was 
administered directly through the main campus. Earmarks received by NAU over this period 
were $13 million, in comparison to $58 million at Rutgers. Both institutions increased their 
R&D at the same rate, approximately 40.5%, over the ten-year study period. These R&D 
increases resulted in no change in ranking for NAU, which remained at 126, but represented 
a slight slip in the rankings for Rutgers, from 22 in 1993 to 23 in 2002. Despite the 
differences between institutional rankings at the start of the study, the amount of R&D 
expenditures, and the amount received in earmarks, both institutions experienced similar 
changes over the study period in ranking and R&D change. This example demonstrates how 
the independent variables were not reflected in the dependent variables. 
Discussion of Results 
Results are discussed in the following section by research question. The sections are 
organized to consider rankings first, followed by EPSCoR affiliation and, finally, academic 
earmarking. 
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The two institutions discussed previously, NAU and Rutgers, appear very similar in 
this study based on the statistics identified; however, the changes that occurred at the 
institutions were quite dissimilar. R&D expenditure change was measured in relative terms to 
the institutional expenditure at the start of the study, which normalized the variable and 
allowed comparability. Both institutions increased R&D expenditures by about 40.5% over 
the study, but 40.5% at Rutgers equaled an approximate $83 million increase (1993 R&D 
expenditures = $338.7 million), while 40.5% at NAU equaled an approximate $5 million 
increase (1993 R&D expenditures = $12.3 million). This comparison demonstrates that, 
despite the appearance of similarity in the relative percent change statistic, Rutgers increased 
R&D expenditures at a rate almost 17 times that of NAU ($83 million/$5 million =16.6). 
Table 5.2 presents statistics for these two institutions. 
TaMe J. 2 Co/MparzsoM q/Worf&g/Tz [/MfverMfy /fwfger? L/Mfyerszfy af Mew 
NAU Rutgers 
Quartile 4 1 
EPSCoR Affiliation No No 
Accredited Engineering Program Yes Yes 
Medical School No No 
1993 Ranking 126 22 
2002 Ranking 126 23 
Rank Change 0 +1 
1993 R&D Expenditures $12,324,000 $202,921,000 
2002 R&D Expenditures $17,262,000 $285,768,000 
Total Earmarks Received '93-'02 $13,248,000 $57,501,000 
Percent Change in R&D Expenditures 40.1% 40.8% 
There was great stability in the rankings between 1993 and 2002 for all institutions. 
The mean and median change in rank for all institutions in the study was zero, or no change 
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at all, with a standard deviation of ten. This means that after ten years, approximately 68% of 
the institutions stayed within ten spots (plus or minus) from where they were ranked in 1993. 
The correlation between 1993 ranking and 2002 ranking (which was not reported in Chapter 
4) was r = .977, indicating a nearly perfect correlation and showing that rankings were stable 
over the ten-year study period; thus, there was little probability of moving substantially 
within the rankings. 
Two more case studies of institutions will be used to further understand the rankings. 
The University of Mississippi at Oxford (Ole Miss) and the University of Texas at Arlington 
(UTA) had the greatest positive and negative movements within the rankings, respectively. 
Table 5.3 presents statistics for these institutions. Ole Miss improved from a ranking of 122 
in 1993, to 88 in 2002 (an increase of 34 spots). Ole Miss more than doubled its R&D budget 
in 10 years and moved into the top 100 public research institutions. The movement was 
laudable; however, to move another 34 spots (to a 64 ranking) by 2012, Ole Miss would need 
to more than triple its R&D expenditures to an approximate level of $176 million. (See 
Appendix G for further explanation on this calculation.) This level of change would be 
difficult, and would take great commitment on the part of the university's faculty, 
administration, and community. 
Alternately, UTA dropped 24 spots, from a ranking of 105 in 1993 to a ranking of 
129 in 2002. Curiously, UTA did not receive any earmarks, while Ole Miss received 
earmarks more than seven times greater than Ole Miss's 1993 R&D expenditures. These data 
will be considered further in the section discussing earmarks. 
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7a6/g J. j CoTwpwMOM q/f&e q/"A/zj^wjiRpi of Ckç/ôrcf wzfA fAg UMivgr^zfy q/'Texaj' 
afv4r/z%gfoM 
Ole Miss UTA 
Quartile 2 3 
EPSCoR Affiliation Yes No 
Accredited Engineering Program Yes Yes 
Medical School No No 
1993 Ranking 122 105 
2002 Ranking 88 129 
1993 R&D Expenditures $13,935,000 $20,198,000 
2002 R&D Expenditures $47,892,000 $15,096,000 
Total Earmarks Received '93-'02 $101,567,000 $0 
Percent Change in R&D Expenditures 243.7% -25.3% 
Dwcw^^zoM OM 5"CoJ( v4^?/;affon 
If some institutions "double-dip" (Savage, 1999, p. 13) by seeking peer-reviewed 
funds and earmarks, then EPSCoR institutions would be triple-dipping. This study found no 
relationship between EPSCoR affiliation and change in R&D expenditures, but it did find 
that identification as an EPSCoR institution was a significant indicator of earmark funding. 
In other words, EPSCoR institutions are triple-dipping through pursuit of funds through peer 
review, set-aside funds through the EPSCoR program, and other funding through earmarks. 
The EPSCoR program was formed to serve as an institutional affirmative action 
program, unlike the practice of academic earmarking. The program has demonstrated that 
recipients utilized the funding for academic development as indicated by the quality of 
publications (Payne, 2002b), promoted research through long-term infrastructure grants 
(Hauger, 2000), and encouraged institutional and state level investment in research (Hauger, 
2000). Perhaps EPSCoR institutions, like others, use all the tools at their disposal in order to 
build an institutional capacity for success. In this case, success was defined through the 
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ability to build research infrastructure. EPSCoR afGliation is yet another tool that an 
institution may use to improve, or at least maintain, research infrastructure. It was an 
unexpected finding that EPSCoR affiliation had better statistical prediction for receipt of 
earmarks than for increase in R&D infrastructure. 
Non-significant regressions between the earmarking variable and two dependent 
variables demonstrated that academic earmarking did not have a discernible effect on the 
development of research infrastructure or change in institutional peer rankings. Typically, a 
research investigation seeks to determine significance in a theoretical model, and this study 
was no exception. This study was designed with the expectation that there would be a 
relationship between the academic earmarks received and changes in R&D expenditures. 
Other intervening variables were proposed to account for the changes expected in R&D 
expenditures. 
The evidence on academic earmarking for public research institutions included 
several trends. First, this study showed increasing amounts of academic earmarks awarded to 
public research institutions, an increase of 185% from 1993 to 2002, from $500 million in 
1993 to $926 million in 2002 (see Figure 4.3). Earmark amounts dipped to $192 million in 
1996, in the middle of the study period, and increased 482% in the last six years of the study 
period. Over the study period, earmark funding to public research institutions totaled $4.7 
billion. 
A second finding was that the $4.7 billion could be considered an opportunity cost 
because the funds may have been diverted from other research programs that rely on merit-
based peer review systems. The peer review process has been called biased and one that 
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concentrates resources in the top institutions. Nevertheless, it is a system for ensuring quality, 
which is more favorable than a distributive political system that relies on political favors and 
power distribution among the politically connected. It is likely that these earmarks were 
funds diverted from existing programs that were cut or under-funded. It also could be 
assumed that the earmarks caused difficulty for federal bureaucrats who had to manage the 
earmarks as contracts or grants without overhead to cover federal agency administrative costs 
(Noonan, 2002). A recent example of a program (outside this study period) that was cut as a 
result of increased earmarking activity was the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary 
Education (FIPSE) (Field, 2005). 
Another finding was that institutions in the top two quartiles received 72.1% of the 
earmarks. Underrepresented research institutions were not favored when earmarks were 
distributed. This supports Savage's statement: "if peer review is biased and concentrates 
resources...so too does earmarking" (2002, p. 100). Unlike the EPSCoR program, the 
practice of earmarking does not serve as an affirmative action mechanism to funnel funds to 
research institutions with small R&D operations. This finding also may explain the lack of 
significant statistical findings. If earmarks were targeted at underrepresented research 
institutions, then there would have been noticeable increases in R&D infrastructure and 
rankings. Ole Miss, an EPSCoR affiliate, increased its ranking by 34 spots and received 
about seven times its 1993 R&D expenditure budget ($102 million) in academic earmark 
funding. UTA is not an EPSCoR affiliate, decreased its ranking by 24 spots, and received no 
earmarked funding. Whereas the study shows no relationship between earmark funding and 
change in R&D funds, these two cases may indicate the possibility of greater earmark 
funding relative to the amount an institution has in pre-existing R&D expenditures. 
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Relationship of Current Study to Previous Research 
The following sections describe implications for the study to theories and research 
reviewed in Chapter 2. First, a summary of the findings in light of Savage's (1999) and 
Payne's (2002a) research on academic earmarks is provided. Second, Bowen's revenue 
theory of costs for research expenditures is further refined. Third, mimetic institutional 
isomorphism is reconsidered. 
The current study served to respond to Savage's (1999) statements for why leaders 
favor the practice of academic earmarking, and to respond to Payne's (2002a) request for 
additional research. Savage (1999) proposed that one argument made in favor of the pursuit 
of academic earmarks was that earmarks provide the support necessary to increase research 
activity. Payne (2002a) proposed that another topic for additional research was the "effect 
earmarked funding had on other types of university activities" (p. 16). This study's findings 
disputed the claim that academic earmarks provide the support necessary to increase research 
activity relative to other peer institutions. Additionally, this study supported Savage's (1999, 
2002) findings that academic earmarks do not affect institutional ability to move within 
rankings. 
Beyond Savage's (1999) and Payne's (2002a) research this study contributes more 
evidence to refute Silber's (2002) statement that earmarking provides infrastructure to 
increase peer-reviewed funding (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). Earmarking was not a 
discernible indicator of R&D infrastructure development relative to other peer institutions. 
This study demonstrated that R&D infrastructure development, as defined by changes in 
R&D expenditures over a ten-year period, was not affected positively by earmarked funds, 
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nor did it have a negative relationship with the development of R&D expenditures. 
Earmarking, therefore, had no relationship with the development of R&D expenditures. 
Silber may argue that if earmarking did not have a negative impact on the dependent 
variables, then it has contributed to the overall development of the institution. On the whole, 
and within the context of peer institutions, Silber's point is not supported; academic 
earmarking did not appear to provide infrastructure to increase peer review funding. Within 
the context of this study the $4.7 billion received by public research institutions during this 
study represented a peer review opportunity cost, because funds could have been used to 
support merit-based research as identified through a peer review system. 
Another contribution of this study is the identification of three variables (EPSCoR 
affiliation, presence of an accredited engineering program, and R&D expenditure ranking) as 
predictors of academic earmarks at public research institutions. A multiple regression 
equation, developed through a post hoc analysis of the structural equation path analysis, 
accounted for 39% of the variance in academic earmarks. This study, therefore, represents a 
start toward a better understanding of academic earmarks at research institutions. 
if eve# we TTzeory of Cayfj Tfeapp/fed 
This study supports Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs and supports the 
application of Bo wen's theory to research costs. Bowen formulated his theory when 
considering institutional costs related to student education; therefore this study supports the 
reapplication of Bowen's theory to research costs. Bowen's five laws included the following: 
1. The dominant goals of institutions are educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence. 
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2. In quest of excellence, prestige, and influence, there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of money an institution could spend on seemingly fruitful ends. 
3. Each institution raises all the money it can. 
4. Each institution spends all it raises. 
5. The cumulative effect of the preceding four laws is toward ever increasing 
expenditure. (Bowen, 1980, pp. 19-20). 
Zmw? Am. It may be assumed that the first two laws are satisfied through the 
pursuit of and development of R&D activity as a measurement of prestige and excellence. 
Research and development activity, including expenditures, commitments, and facilities are 
considered for admission into the American Association of Universities and for ranking by 
organizations, such as [/.& jVewa PPbrW .Reporf, NSF, and TheCenter at the University of 
Florida. 
law fArgg. This study supported the claim that institutions raise all the money they 
can, in this case through the pursuit of earmarks. Figure 4.4 demonstrated that the number of 
institutions receiving academic earmarks had increased. In 1993, 60 institutions in the subset 
had not previously received earmarks, but by 2002 the number was 6. This provides evidence 
that institutions feel pressure to receive (and likely seek) earmarked funding in order to raise 
all the money they can. When looking at data beyond the study period, 95 public research 
institutions in 1990 were without earmarks, while only 3 remained without earmarks in 2003. 
lawyôwr. This study did not research whether each institution spent all that it raised, 
because revenues and expenditures were not compared. It can be assumed safely, however, 
that public research institutions expended more than the revenues raised because total R&D 
expenditures at research institutions generally are greater than R&D revenues due to 
institutional contribution to R&D activity. In addition, most grants and contracts have a 
requirement to spend the funds awarded before they can be billed and received as revenue. 
This means that institutions must spend funds in order to receive them; thus this law appears 
to be satisfied with regard to academic R&D and earmarks. 
I m v T h e  c u m u l a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p u r s u i t  o f  r e s e a r c h  f u n d i n g  a s  a n  
indicator of prestige has been toward ever-increasing expenditures. Table 2.6 in Chapter 2 
showed that, between 1957 and 2002, R&D expenditures had increased 1,284%. This study 
showed that public research institutions increased their R&D expenditures, on average, by 
43%. The cumulative effect of pursuing excellence, prestige, and influence through the 
development of R&D is an ever-increasing expenditure for R&D without discernible 
differences among similar institutions. 
Mfmefzc TwTifwfzoMa/ Aomo/pAw;» 
A recurring argument regarding quality in higher education is why educational 
institutions are not run like "businesses." Application of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) 
definition of mimetic institutional isomorphism helps to explain why public research 
institutions are not run like businesses. Most importantly, goals within the higher education 
industry are ambiguous and often symbolic. Bowen (1980) suggested that the goals of 
institutions of higher education are reflected in activities that gain excellence, prestige, or 
influence. Given this condition, public research institutions model (e.g., mimic) their 
operations on other organizations that are deemed to be successful using the currently 
available or accepted standards. Through uncertain goals, postsecondary institutions attach to 
available "shared mental models" (Winston, 1997, p. 33) and seek to benchmark practices 
from those institutions that are deemed to be prestigious. This is why benchmarking 
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continues to be an important activity in higher education. The result is that institutions seek 
prestige and become similar to one another over time, forming a homogenous array of 
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
This study suggested that one goal identified, within the ambiguous state of higher 
education quality, is the strategy of building R&D infrastructure, which in turn affects peer 
rankings. An increase in peer rankings equates to a demonstration of excellence, prestige, or 
influence. R&D infrastructure or expenditures are considered when determining rankings. 
Within this study, the pressure to maintain R&D expenditures is equated to a pressure to seek 
earmarks. As the fight against the practice of earmarking eroded in the mid- to late-1990s, 
institutions felt pressure to seek earmarked funding as a measure of excellence, prestige, or 
influence. The concept of mimetic institutional isomorphism suggests that the practice of 
academic earmarking became accepted when it was considered to be a strategy that met one 
of the ambiguous goals of higher education, (i.e., to increase R&D expenditures). This study 
suggests that public research institutions modeled their earmarking practices on those 
institutions that were considered to be successful. 
Institutional Properties Related To Academic R&D Expenditures 
By any measure, the changes experienced by all public research institutions included 
in this study were remarkable. Many institutions more than doubled R&D expenditures 
during the ten-year study. After controlling for higher education inflation, the average 
institution increased R&D expenditure by 43%. Clearly, this was a period of exponential 
increases in R&D funding by public research institutions. Considering the history of R&D 
development since 1957, an increase of 1,284% is not a trend isolated to this ten-year period. 
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It has occurred for at least 50 years. Additionally, there is no indication from Congress that 
there will be declining support for academic R&D. 
This study demonstrated that public research institutions are increasing their R&D 
levels at variable rates by institution. One question that surfaced from the results of this study 
is why there was such little movement among the rankings. The combination of remarkable 
change in R&D expenditures, combined with little movement in the rankings, opens the 
possibility for considering two proposed higher education institutional properties called R&D 
Progression and Institutional Inertia. It is hypothesized that these institutional properties 
combine to explain the behavior of the dependent variables in this academic earmarking 
study. 
ikjgwcA a/W Deve/opfMgMf frogreawo/z 
Institutions have continued to increase total R&D expenditures for at least 50 years. 
R&D Progression has the two basic properties of being infinite and cumulative. R&D 
expenditure is infinite, as a reflection of the basic tenets of scientific inquiry and the nature of 
science. Research projects conducted in a finite period of time (e.g., two years) lead naturally 
to new research questions that explore that line of inquiry. In addition, from the revenue 
theory of costs perspective, as long as R&D remains a prestigious activity, a research 
institution must continue to seek additional funding in order meet the goals of excellence and 
prestige. 
R&D expenditure also is cumulative because it continuously seeks to build greater 
and greater research infrastructure. If an institution has a $50 million budget, then the 
institution must seek a greater amount in the foreseeable future. It is not a likely event for an 
institution to have $10 million in R&D expenditures in one year and to have a stellar cycle 
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where R&D expenditures total more than $100 million for a period of time, only to return 
back to $10 million. This is not likely, because a 1,000% increase for a small amount of time 
would be unmanageable and institutional infrastructure could not support research at this 
level. Institutions build R&D infrastructure in small increments that are generally increasing 
and cumulative based on previous years. Institutional research infrastructure is developed 
over time by recruiting researchers who attract funding, and by construction space to 
accommodate research. 
The property of R&D Progression is based on the combination of infinity and 
cumulativeness. R&D Progression derives from the mathematical concept of geometric 
sequence, where each successive yearly amount is estimated by multiplying the previous 
amount by a hypothetical ratio (Miller, Heeren & Homsby, 1997). The result is a 
successively growing R&D expenditure. 
/fwfzfwfzofzaZ 
The pressures that keep an institution within its current ranking, despite R&D 
Progression, formed the second institutional property called Institutional Inertia. Institutional 
Inertia is a latent factor that was observed in this study, and is yet to be defined. One obvious 
contributor to Institutional Inertia is the growing variance observed between institutions as a 
result of R&D Progression. 
One finding of this study was that institutions did not move substantially within the 
rankings. This may be due to many factors. Most important was the difficulty in identifying 
enough funds to increase R&D expenditures at a rate to be competitive with institutions 
ranked significantly higher. Public research institutions that were able to increase in the 
rankings more than ten spots (i.e., greater than one standard deviation) had an average 
percent change in R&D expenditures of 134%. For example Louisiana Tech University 
increased in the rankings by 11 spots, and had a 148% increase in R&D expenditures. This 
was not typical, because only 20 institutions (13%) were able to develop R&D infrastructure 
at this rate. 
Exp/anafzoM of Tf&D frogre&Ho» on TWffwfzofzaf T/zerfwz 
As institutions generate successively increasing R&D expenditures, the R&D base 
also becomes successively greater. As an institution's R&D base grows relative to previous 
years, it also grows relative to other institutions. Two fictitious universities will be used to 
demonstrate these two institutional properties. The two institutions increased R&D 
expenditures over a 15-year timeframe using changes observed in this study. 
The University of Montgomery Pass (UMP) and Spree Technical University (STU), 
both started R&D development in year one with an R&D expenditure base year of $10 
million (See Table 5.4). UMP grew R&D at a respectable annual rate of 3%, while STU, the 
more prodigious research university, grew R&D at a rate of 6%. After 15 years, STU built a 
sizeable $7.5 million difference over UMP that equated to 49% more in R&D expenditures. 
Annually, STU's expenditures grew 6% relative to its own base, which increased the distance 
between the two institutions. During the first 5 years, UMP may have had an opportunity to 
be competitive with STU. After 15 years, however, UMP would need an extremely 
aggressive strategy to be competitive with STU once again. It may not appear that $7 million 
is much, but a 49% difference is great. This is an example of what happened between many 
research institutions in this study. 
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ThWe J. 4 Dg/MOfwA-afzo» q/"/k/afrve jf&D frogrg^zoM (zn mz/Zmw) 
Years 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
UMP (3%) 10.0 10.3 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.3 12.7 13.0 13.4 13.8 14.3 14.7 15.1 
STU (6%) 10.0 10.6 11.2 11.9 12.6 13.4 14.2 15.0 15.9 16.9 17.9 19.0 20.1 21.3 22.6 
To explain this point further, a review was completed of the 2002 R&D expenditure 
dataset to determine the percent difference between institutions in their current rank and 
those ranked ten spots ahead. On average, the difference of ten rankings equaled 41.0% more 
in R&D expenditures. (Note that institutions that generated less than $3 million were omitted 
as outliers.) For example, Utah State University was ranked 56, with $122 million, and had 
41% less in R&D expenditures in 2002 than the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, which 
was ranked 46, with $171 million. Ironically, a 41% difference is close to the average 
percentage that institutions increased during the ten-year period (43%). This means that, if 
R&D expenditures continued to increase at the same rate, an average institution will take 
approximately ten years to reach the R&D expenditure level of an institution ranked ten spots 
ahead of where it is in 2002. If Utah State University has average R&D increases, it would 
take until 2012 to reach the R&D level the University of Nebraska at Lincoln had in 2002. 
Institutional Inertia describes this scenario because institutions can have a wide 
variety of change (20-60%) and not measurably gain or lose spots in peer rankings. Only an 
incredibly successful R&D expenditure campaign would cause an institution to increase 
greatly in peer rankings. 
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Suggestions for Additional Study 
Few previous studies have considered academic earmarks from the perspective of a 
postsecondary research institution. As a result, many questions resulting from this study and 
from previous research require further investigation. 
Further study could explore whether academic earmarks contribute to regional 
economic development or the development of science and engineering (S&E) space (Savage, 
1999). This study created a structural equation path model that may be used to study these 
arguments. One source of economic development data is the Association of University 
Technology Managers annual survey (Powers, 2003). A possible source on institutional S&E 
space is the NSF Survey of Scientific and Engineering Research Facilities (Christovich, 
2002). 
This study only considered public research institutions that were defined as Carnegie 
Doctoral/Research Extensive and Intensive institutions. Master's degree institutions that 
typically have fewer resources and that seek prestige would be a good population for study 
because they also experience pressure to seek prestige (Brewer et al., 2002; Morphew, 2002), 
and hence may seek earmarked funds. A study also may be broadened to include private (i.e., 
independent) research institutions to compare with public institutions and to determine 
whether there are additional differences noted by institutional control. 
Additional consideration should be given to the application of Bowen's (1980) 
revenue theory of costs to research finance. This dissertation presented cause for the 
application of this theory to the area of research finance, yet additional research and 
scholarship could provide further support for application of this theory to research finance or 
to other areas in higher education finance, including the areas of alumni development or 
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auxiliary enterprises. Further development of the revenue theory of costs may provide an 
understanding of the connection between prestige and purportedly prestige-generating 
activities including athletics, accreditation, and student quality (Brewer et al., 2002). 
Further research could be conducted on the differences among the institutions that 
were ranked in the top quartile (Ql) according to R&D expenditures. This study of 157 
public research institutions demonstrated that there are great differences between those that 
were placed in Ql and the other institutions in Q2, Q3, and Q4 (see Figure 4.1). Analysis of 
just the institutions in Ql may show similar differences between those institutions ranked in 
the top 10 and the other 29 institutions. 
Two institutional properties, R&D Progression and Institutional Inertia, were defined 
and need further refinement. R&D Progression should be developed into an equation that 
includes a function of the actual or perceived percent change over a period of time combined 
with the number of years intended for the prediction based on the principles of geometric 
sequence. Institutional Inertia could be developed into a latent variable for further structural 
equation analysis. Further definition could provide a better understanding of R&D 
Progression as a contributor to Institutional Inertia. Definition of these properties and their 
relationships with one another may provide a better understanding of how institutions may 
move up or down in the rankings of peer institutions. 
Policy Implications 
Federal government and professional organizational policy implications result from 
this study. This section considers the findings of the study and suggests areas for potential 
change. 
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The presidential veto and the Republican Contract with America were initiated in the 
1990s and both had the effect of slowing the progression of academic earmarking for a short 
period of time. These efforts in the 1990's appear to share the same historical outcome as 
President Cleveland's vain efforts to end the misuse of public funds for earmarks in the 19^ 
century (Christiansen, 1996). Additionally, the practice of earmarking is supported by the 
belief that it strengthens reelection possibilities, buys favors, and is a congressional right 
because the Constitution dictates that all funding initiatives start in congress (Savage, 1999). 
Earmarks also have political implications for the institutions seeking them. The 
pressure for public research institutions to seek prestige through the development of R&D 
expenditures has resulted in great efforts to seek earmarks (see Chapter 2). Academic 
earmarking became the new frontier for funding academic R&D in the 1990s and politically-
sawy institutions saw earmarking as an additional opportunity for new research funding. 
Whether they are called aspirational institutions (Morphew & Baker, 2004) or prestigious 
and prestige-seeking institutions (Brewer et al., 2002), public research institutions that seek 
prestige and intend to maintain prestige have sought earmarks. Clearly, professional 
organizations such as the AAU and AAAS have failed to dissuade public research 
institutions from seeking academic earmarks (Savage, 1999). Given the current climate, 
presidents of public research institutions have little choice but to seek earmarks if they intend 
to maintain their institutional inertia, which affects the institution's reputation and perhaps 
the job security of the president. Therefore, a change must take place to decrease to the 
prestige that results from seeking academic earmarks. 
One strategy is for professional organizations to place pressure on those prestige-
granting organizations that collect data on academic R&D expenditures, such as NSF, 
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TheCenter, U.S. News and World Report and others to differentiate between R&D 
expenditures from peer-reviewed funding and academic earmarks. Whereas professional 
organizations have been unable to influence their institutional members against seeking 
earmarks, they may have more success with prestige-granting organizations. Calculating 
rankings based on peer-reviewed expenditures result in decreasing the pressure to seek 
academic earmarks for prestige. 
Another change that may reduce the pressure for academic earmarks is a more 
equitable federal reimbursement of facilities and administrative (F&A) (e.g., indirect) costs 
to institutions. F&A rates are lower at colleges and universities than at other non-academic 
research institutions (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2000). Academic research 
institutions pay a portion of F&A costs that would otherwise be reimbursable from the 
federal government (Office of Science and Technology Policy). If educational research 
institutions are expected to operate like their counterparts, then they should be reimbursed 
equitably. The agencies responsible for conducting F&A analyses (e.g., Office of Naval 
Research and Department of Health and Human Services) should be allowed to assign F&A 
rates that reflect the true costs of conducting research, which will decrease the need to seek 
other revenue to meet escalating research costs. 
Another related change concerns the costs associated with operating research 
facilities. Savage (1999) suggested that the practice of academic earmarking developed as a 
result of the change in federal funding from institutional grants to funding individual students 
directly, principally in the form of financial aid. Without institutional grants, there was less 
funding for construction of facilities, which forced institutions to seek new revenue, 
including academic earmarks. A 2001 survey by NSF found that only 18% of the academic 
136 
institutions that conduct R&D had sufficient space to meet program demands. In addition to 
proper reimbursement for F&A expenditures, more federal funding should be dedicated for 
S&E space renovation and construction. This could either be accomplished through a block 
grant system that is assigned based on existing institutional research infrastructure or through 
a peer-reviewed system of granting funds for improved or new S&E space. 
Although this study showed that academic earmarks do not impact R&D 
infrastructure, there are political realities that should be given attention by policy makers. 
Increases in academic earmarks directly affect programs that administer peer reviewed 
funding. Until some of these realities are addressed, it is unlikely that the practice of 
earmarking will change appreciably. 
Study Limitations 
The study was limited in several important respects, including the amount of 
earmarked funding, the use of some variables, and the number of institutions in the 
population. These limitations are discussed in this section. 
Academic earmarks represented a significant and growing revenue source for 
academic R&D, but less than ten percent of total R&D expenditures overall. The lack of 
significance between the control variables, the academic earmarking variable, and the change 
in R&D expenditures may be due, in part, to academic earmarking as a developing resource. 
As academic earmarking grows in proportion to other revenue sources in an institutional 
R&D budget, greater effects may be shown. 
Change in total R&D expenditures is only one way to measure change in institutional 
R&D infrastructure. Other variables may have demonstrated different results. One suggestion 
for additional research (previously listed) was to measure the impact of academic earmarks 
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on S&E space. Another variable that could have been included was the quality of research 
faculty as identified by the National Research Council (Powers, 2003). 
EPSCoR status was found to be a significant predictor for academic earmarking 
activity, but this may be due to the number of institutions in a state rather than a function of 
affiliation with EPSCoR. For example, there are only two public research institutions in 
North Dakota, which is an EPSCoR state. It is a fair assumption that members of congress 
from North Dakota favor academic earmarks to North Dakota State University and the 
University ofNorth Dakota. These two EPSCoR affiliated institutions may receive a greater 
share of earmarks than other institutions because there are fewer research institutions in the 
state. The relationship between EPSCoR affiliation and academic earmarks may not be 
significant when controlling for the number of research institutions in each state, indicating a 
potential spurious effect. 
The number of variables that could be included in the model limited this study. 
Because there were only 165 institutions in the population, and 157 in the subset, the study 
was limited in scope. Guidelines for structural equation analysis indicate that for appropriate 
power there should be ten observations for each estimated parameter (e.g., Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2001). This study was limited by the number of variables that could be used in the 
model because it contained only 165 institutions in the population and 157 in the subset. 
Summary 
This study examined the impact of academic earmarks on change in research and 
development infrastructure at public research institutions. Structural equation path modeling 
and multiple regression were two statistical techniques used to measure the interaction of 
seven variables identified for the study. Results indicated that there was no evidence that the 
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practice of congressional academic earmarking, ranking, or EPSCoR affiliation affected 
institutional R&D expenditures or rankings. It also was found that three variables (EPSCoR 
affiliation, presence of an accredited engineering program, and institutional ranking) 
accounted for 39% of the variance in receipt of academic earmarks. 
The results of this inquiry helped to expand existing theory and to propose a new 
understanding for institutional peer competition. The study supported the application of 
Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs to the area of institutional research finance. The 
concepts associated with mimetic institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) help 
to provide a greater understanding of the pursuit of academic earmarks. Finally, two new 
institutional properties, Academic R&D Progression and Institutional Inertia, were discussed 
and may contribute to further understanding of institutional change in peer rankings. These 
should be studied further. 
The results of this study have implications that affect institutional leaders, 
researchers, higher education policy analysts, lobbyists, and members of Congress. Three 
trends were identified: academic earmarks are increasing at a great rate, they represent an 
opportunity cost for peer reviewed funding, and they are not distributed equitably to those 
institutions that could benefit most from the funding. 
Chapter 2 listed pressures on institutional leaders that influence the rise of the 
practice of academic earmarking. These pressures included the need to demonstrate prestige, 
the need to seek peer-review funding, the pressures of increasing and shifting costs, pressures 
from government bodies, and the pressure to develop research. This has resulted in the 
practice of academic earmarking as a new mechanism for institutional funding. This study 
lends credibility to Savage's (1999) claim that it is not surprising that academic earmarks 
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have grown at the rate they have, but it is surprising that the practice did not occur earlier and 
replace peer review at a faster rate. 
An irony exists in the development of the practice of academic earmarking. Despite 
the pressures for institutions to be accountable for institutional expenses, funds awarded 
through academic earmarks are not accountable in the same way (Savage, 2002). It stands as 
a strikingly incongruous development that the practice of academic earmarking has grown in 
prominence and, through this growth, has eliminated funding and programs that are 
accountable through merit. 
It is unlikely that the results of this study will change the practice of academic 
earmarking; however, this study contributes to a developing body of work that considers the 
impacts of this revenue mechanism. Although the present study found no implications of 
academic earmarks on R&D development, increases that are occurring in academic earmarks 
eventually will affect institutions in a measurable way. Indications from this study and from 
others demonstrate that if economic multipliers were calculated for earmarks and peer 
reviewed funding, the more promising route would be to pursue funding through a system of 
peer review. As a result, during this study period, $4.7 billion dollar allocated to public 
research institutions through earmarks may be considered an opportunity cost because 
opportunities to perform other worthy research were lost to a political process that favors 
institutions that had or could obtain political clout. 
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APPENDIX A. LISTING OF INSTITUTIONS IN SUBSET AND POPULATION BY 1994 
AND 2000 CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATIONS 
2000 Carnegie 
1994 Carnegie Classification — 
Institution Name Classification Doctoral/Research 
Alabama A & M University Master's I Intensive 
Arizona State University-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
Auburn University Main Campus Research II Extensive 
Ball State University Doctoral I Intensive 
Bowling Green State University-Main Campus Doctoral I Intensive 
Central Michigan University Master's I Intensive 
Clemson University Research II Extensive 
Cleveland State University Doctoral II Intensive 
College Of William And Mary Doctoral I Intensive 
Colorado State University Research I Extensive 
CUNY Graduate School And University Center Doctoral I Extensive 
East Carolina University Master's I Intensive 
East Tennessee State University Master's I Intensive 
Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton Doctoral II Intensive 
Florida International University Doctoral II Extensive 
Florida State University Research I Extensive 
George Mason University Doctoral II Intensive 
Georgia Institute Of Technology-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
Georgia State University Doctoral I Extensive 
Idaho State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Illinois State University Doctoral I Intensive 
Indiana State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Indiana University Of Pennsylvania-Main Doctoral I Intensive 
Campus 
Indiana University-Bloomington Research I Extensive 
Indiana University-Purdue University- Doctoral II Intensive 
Indianapolis 
Iowa State University Research I Extensive 
Jackson State University Master's I Intensive 
Kansas State University Research II Extensive 
Kent State University-Main Campus Research II Extensive 
Louisiana State Univ & Ag & Mech & Hebert Research I Extensive 
Laws Ctr 
Louisiana Tech University Doctoral II Intensive 
Miami University-Oxford Doctoral I Intensive 
Michigan State University Research I Extensive 
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2000 Carnegie 
1994 Carnegie Classification — 
Institution Name Classification Doctoral/Research 
Michigan Technological University Doctoral II Intensive 
Middle Tennessee State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Mississippi State University Research II Extensive 
Montana State University-Bozeman Doctoral II Intensive 
New Jersey Institute Of Technology Doctoral II Intensive 
New Mexico Institute Of Mining And School of engineering Intensive 
Technology and technology 
New Mexico State University-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
North Carolina State University At Raleigh Research I Extensive 
North Dakota State University-Main Campus Doctoral II Intensive 
Northern Arizona University Doctoral I Intensive 
Northern Illinois University Doctoral I Extensive 
Oakland University Master's I Intensive 
Ohio State University-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
Ohio University-Main Campus Research II Extensive 
Oklahoma State Univcrsitv-Main Campus Research II Extensive 
Old Dominion University Doctoral I Extensive 
Oregon State University Research I Extensive 
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
Portland State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Purdue University-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
Rutgers University-N ew Brunswick Research I Extensive 
Rutgers University-Newark Doctoral II Intensive 
San Diego State University Doctoral II Intensive 
South Carolina State University Master's I Intensive 
South Dakota State University Master's I Intensive 
Southern Illinois University-Carbondaie Research II Extensive 
SUNY At Albany Research II Extensive 
SUNY At Binghamton Doctoral I Extensive 
SUNY At Buffalo Research I Extensive 
SUNY At Stony Brook Research I Extensive 
SUNY College Of Environmental Science And Doctoral II Intensive 
Forestry 
Temple University Research I Extensive 
Tennessee State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Texas A & M University Research I Extensive 
Texas A & M University-Commerce Doctoral I Intensive 
Texas A & M University-Kingsville Master's I Intensive 
Texas Southern University Doctoral II Intensive 
Texas Tech University Research II Extensive 
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2000 Carnegie 
1994 Carnegie Classification — 
Institution Name Classification Doctoral/Research 
Texas Woman's University Doctoral I Intensive 
The University Of Montana-Missoula Doctoral II Intensive 
The University Of Tennessee Research I Extensive 
The University Of Texas At Arlington Doctoral I Extensive 
The University Of Texas At Austin Research I Extensive 
The University Of Texas At Dallas Doctoral I Intensive 
The University Of Texas At El Paso Master's I Intensive 
University Of Akron Main Campus Doctoral I Intensive 
University Of Alabama Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Alabama At Birmingham Research I Extensive 
University Of Alabama In Huntsville Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Alaska Fairbanks Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Arizona Research I Extensive 
University Of Arkansas At Little Rock Master's I Intensive 
University Of Arkansas Main Campus Research II Extensive 
University Of California-Berkeley Research I Extensive 
University Of California-Davis Research I Extensive 
University Of California-Irvine Research I Extensive 
University Of Califbmia-Los Angeles Research I Extensive 
University Of California-Riverside Research II Extensive 
University Of California-San Diego Research I Extensive 
University Of Califbmia-San Francisco Research I Intensive 
University Of Califbmia-Santa Barbara Research I Extensive 
University Of Califbmia-Santa Cruz Research II Extensive 
University Of Central Florida Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Cincinnati-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of Colorado At Boulder Research I Extensive 
University Of Colorado At Denver Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Connecticut Research I Extensive 
University Of Delaware Research II Extensive 
University Of Florida Research I Extensive 
University Of Georgia Research I Extensive 
University Of Hawaii At Manoa Research I Extensive 
University Of Houston-University Park Research II Extensive 
University Of Idaho Research II Extensive 
University Of Illinois At Chicago Research I Extensive 
University Of Illinois At Urbana-Champaign Research I Extensive 
University Of Iowa Research I Extensive 
University Of Kansas Main Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of Kentucky Research I Extensive 
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2000 Carnegie 
1994 Carnegie Classification — 
Institution Name Classification Doctoral/Research 
University Of Louisiana At Lafayette Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Louisville Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Maine Doctoral II Extensive 
University Of Maryland-Baltimore Medical school or Intensive 
medical center 
University Of Maryland-Baltimore County Doctoral II Extensive 
University Of Maryland-College Park Research I Extensive 
University Of Massachusetts-Amherst Research I Extensive 
University Of Massachusetts-Boston Master's I Intensive 
University Of Massachusetts-Lowell Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of Memphis Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor Research I Extensive 
University Of Minnesota-Twin Cities Research I Extensive 
University Of Mississippi Main Campus Research II Extensive 
University Of Missouri-Columbia Research I Extensive 
University Of Missouri-Kansas City Doctoral I Intensive 
University Of Missouri-Rolla Doctoral I Intensive 
University Of Missouri-St Louis Doctoral II Intensive 
University OfNebraska At Lincoln Research I Extensive 
University Of Nevada-Las Vegas Master's I Intensive 
University Of Nevada-Reno Doctoral II Extensive 
University Of New Hampshire-Main Campus Doctoral II Extensive 
University Of New Mexico-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of New Orleans Doctoral II Intensive 
University OfNorth Carolina At Chapel Hill Research I Extensive 
University OfNorth Carolina At Greensboro Doctoral I Intensive 
University OfNorth Dakota-Main Campus Doctoral II Intensive 
University OfNorth Texas Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Northern Colorado Doctoral I Intensive 
University Of Oklahoma Norman Campus Research II Extensive 
University Of Oregon Research II Extensive 
University Of Pittsburgh-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of Rhode Island Research II Extensive 
University Of South Alabama Master's I Intensive 
University Of South Carolina At Columbia Research II Extensive 
University Of South Dakota Doctoral II Intensive 
University Of South Florida Research II Extensive 
University Of Southern Mississippi Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Toledo Doctoral I Extensive 
University Of Utah Research I Extensive 
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2000 Carnegie 
1994 Carnegie Classification — 
Institution Name Classification Doctoral/Research 
University Of Vermont And State Agricultural Research II Extensive 
College 
University Of Virginia-Main Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of Washington-Seattle Campus Research I Extensive 
University Of Wisconsin-Madison Research I Extensive 
University Of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Research II Extensive 
University Of Wyoming Research II Extensive 
Utah State University Research I Extensive 
Virginia Commonwealth University Research I Extensive 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute And State Univ Research I Extensive 
Washington State University Research II Extensive 
Wayne State University Research I Extensive 
West Virginia University Research I Extensive 
Western Michigan University Doctoral I Extensive 
Wichita State University Doctoral II Intensive 
Wright State University-Main Campus Doctoral II Intensive 
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APPENDIX B. TECHNICAL NOTES FOR NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) 
SURVEYS 
NSF Academic Research and Development Expenditures: Fiscal Year 1995 
The following notes are taken directly from the NSF web site for the 2002 survey. They can 
be found at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/rdexp/93dst/technote.htm. 
.Scope of f&e Survey 
Data for the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) fiscal year (FY) 1993 report on 
research and development (R&D) expenditures were collected from 681 institutions of higher 
education in the United States and Outlying Areas. These institutions have doctoral programs 
in science and engineering, are historically black colleges or universities that expend any 
amount of separately budgeted R&D in science and engineering, and/or are other institutions 
that expend at least $50,000 in separately budgeted R&D in science and engineering. This is 
the first year since FY 1988 that the entire population of institutions meeting these criteria 
was surveyed. 
In addition, the survey includes 19 federally funded research and development centers 
(FFRDCs). To qualify, an FFRDC must be engaged in basic or applied research, 
development, or management of R&D activities, and the results of these activities must be 
directly monitored by the Federal Govemment-usually a single agency-in a relationship 
expected to be maintained on a long-term basis. The center must be operated, managed, and 
administered by either a university or consortium of universities as an autonomous 
organization or as an identifiable separate operating unit of its parent institution. Finally, 70 
percent or more of the center's financial support must be received from the Federal 
Government. 
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Although the same survey form (NSF Form 411) is used to collect data from both 
academic institutions and FFRDCs, the resulting data are presented separately in this report. 
The survey population was reviewed prior to mailing the questionnaires to ensure that each 
institutional classification was accurate. Characteristics of the schools were reviewed before 
and during the course of the survey to determine if changes had occurred (i.e., in highest 
degree granted or in terms of school openings, closings, or mergers). 
In FY 1993, NSF conducted a thorough review of higher education institutions to 
ensure that all universities and colleges meeting the criteria were included in the survey 
universe. As a result of dropping institutions from and adding institutions to the survey 
universe, the overall number of institutions increased from 613 in FY 1992 to 700 in FY 
1993. Although a change in the survey universe does affect the consistency of trend 
comparisons, this change increased total R&D expenditures by less than 0.6 percent from FY 
1992 to FY 1993. In other words, the 540 institutions that were in the universe in both FY 
1992 and FY 1993 performed approximately 99.4 percent of all expenditures reported 
through the survey. 
Survey /wfrw/MgMf 
Most major R&D performers have incorporated into their record keeping systems the 
data that are essential to complete this survey, thereby ensuring a consistent format from one 
year to the next. Such consistency yields the most useful statistics for time series. As a rule, 
information to complete this questionnaire is found within the institutions' yearend 
accounting records. 
The survey questionnaire consists of three main items: Item 1 is a request that 
institutions report their total current expenditures for separately budgeted science and 
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engineering (S&E) R&D for all activities specifically organized to produce research 
outcomes and commissioned by an agency either external to the institution or separately 
budgeted by an organizational unit, i.e., research centers, within the institution by source of 
funds. In addition, schools are asked to provide the percentage of the total and the percentage 
of the federally financed expenditures that are considered basic research. Included also are 
research funds for which an outside organization, educational or other, is a subrecipient. Care 
should be observed when interpreting data on source of funds; for example, industry R&D 
support is limited to grants and contracts for R&D activities from profitmaking 
organizations, and the total reported excludes research funded through unrestricted accounts 
and from corporate foundations, endowments, and fellowships to students. An increasing 
number of institutions have linkages with industry and foundations via subcontracts, thus 
complicating the identification of funding source. In addition, institutional policy may 
determine whether unrestricted State support is reported as State or as institutional funding. 
Item 2 is a request for total and federally financed current fund expenditures for 
separately budgeted R&D activities by detailed S&E fields. Major fields remain unchanged 
from the FY 1992 questionnaire. When interpreting these data at the detailed discipline level, 
users should keep in mind that there is considerable interdisciplinary activity and/or overlap 
among subdisciplines. 
Item 3 is a request for the portions of total and federally financed expenditures 
reported in items 1 and 2 that were used for the purchase of research equipment out of 
current funds. This portion includes all research equipment purchased under sponsored 
research project awards and disbursed in the same detailed disciplines as in item 2. These 
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data are of special interest to Federal and institutional policymakers in determining current 
funding levels for scientific research instrumentation. 
Tf&spowg yfafg 
The FY 1993 survey questionnaires were mailed in October 1993. Every effort was 
made to maintain close contact with respondents in order to preserve both consistency and 
continuity in the resultant data. Questionnaires were carefully examined for completeness 
upon receipt. Computerized facsimiles of the survey data were then prepared for each 
institution, comparing the current and 2 prior years' data and noting any substantive 
disparities. These facsimiles were mailed to the respondents so that they could provide 
revisions before final processing and tabulation of the data. 
Respondents were asked to explain significant discrepancies between current and 
prior years' reporting patterns previously verified as correct. They were encouraged to correct 
prior years' data if anomalies were identified. When updated or amended figures covering 
past years were submitted, trend data were correspondingly changed by NSF. Similarly, if a 
respondent institution underwent an organizational change, such as a merger, NSF 
incorporated the effects of such changes into prior years' data. 
By the survey closing date in mid-July, forms had been received from 659 
universities and colleges out of the academic population of 681, resulting in a 96.8-percent 
response rate. Responses were received from 97.7 percent of all doctorate-granting 
institutions, where 98.1 percent of the R&D expenditures in S&E fields was disbursed. Also, 
forms were received from all 19 FFRDCs. Table A-l displays a detailed breakdown of the 
response rates by highest degree granted. 
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AWofza/ Tbfo/ //MpwfofzoM 
To provide a national estimate for all universities and colleges performing R&D in 
FY 1993, it was necessary to implement two statistical procedures. First, data were estimated 
by "imputation" for approximately 3 percent of the population that had not responded by the 
closing date of the survey. Imputation has been used consistently since FY 1976. Second, 
data were either imputed or estimated for universities and colleges that submitted only partial 
responses. The combined imputed and/or estimated amounts totaled $23 million, or 0.1 
percent of the $19.9 billion total, as shown in table A-2. 
Tables A-3a and A-3b present a breakdown of the imputed and/or estimated amounts 
by broad S&E field. The dollar amount imputed and/or estimated is displayed along with the 
percentage it represents of the national estimate for universities and colleges in a particular 
Geld. The amount imputed and/or estimated is similarly broken down by source of funds in 
table A-4. 
Table A-5 represents the number of institutions actually surveyed each year since FY 
1988. In FY 1988 and FY 1993, all institutions in the survey universe were surveyed. During 
the intervening years, FY 1989 through FY 1992, the survey was conducted as a sample 
comprised of all doctorate-granting institutions, all historically black colleges and 
universities, all academically administered FFRDCs, and a random sample of all other 
institutions in the survey universe. 
A significant number of surveyed institutions have been responding only 
intermittently in past years, providing data one year, not responding for one or more 
subsequent years, and then providing data again. For the years in which no response was 
received, data have been imputed as previously described. Although the imputation algorithm 
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accurately reflects national trends, it cannot account for reporting anomalies at individual 
institutions. For this reason a separate backcasting of prior years' data was performed, 
following current-year imputation. 
For each institution, formerly imputed key variables for items 1 to 3 were compared 
with subsequent submissions to determine whether the imputed data accurately represent the 
growth patterns shown by reported data. Reestimation was applied when the imputed data 
were not consistent with reported data. If data were reported for fiscal years 1990 and 1993 
but not for the intervening years, for example, the difference between the reported figures for 
each item total was calculated and evenly distributed across the intervening years (1991-92). 
The new figures were spread across disciplines (items 2 and 3) or sources of support (item 1) 
on the basis of the most recent reporting pattern. A clean facsimile was generated for each of 
the institutions undergoing these procedures and returned to the school for comment. These 
procedures resulted in much more consistent reporting trends for individual institutions but 
had little effect upon aggregate figures reflecting national totals. 
Da/a 
Aggregate academic expenditure data are generally consistent from year to year, 
although data for individual institutions may vary considerably. Data anomalies may reflect 
true increases or decreases in expenditures or may be the result of changes in reporting 
methodology. 
Several longitudinal tables display data for institutions whose highest S&E degree 
granted is at the doctoral level. In tables produced prior to FY 1992, it would have been 
difficult to identify whether changes in yearly R&D expenditures were caused by changes in 
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expenditure levels or in the number of doctorate-granting institutions. In order to maintain a 
consistent group of institutions across all years, the highest-degree-granted status for each 
institution is based on the highest degree granted in the most recent year, FY 1993. 
Public-use data files from NSF's academic S&E surveys are available and will 
normally be shipped on tape (at a small charge) or electronically within 3 working days from 
receipt of order. Data files from the previous years and most recent surveys (1993) are 
currently available. Individuals interested in obtaining data files should request a copy of the 
Guide to the Data Files From the National Science Foundation's Annual Surveys of 
Academic Science and Engineering, which contains order forms and detailed information 
about the files. This document may be obtained by contacting NSF's Division of Science 
Resources Studies at— 
Research and Development Statistics Program 
Division of Science Resources Studies 
National Science Foundation 
4201 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 965 
Arlington, VA 22230 
Telephone: (703) 306-1772, ext. 6934 
Intemet:mmachen@nsf.gov 
Selected data items for individual doctorate-granting, master's-granting, and 
historically black institutions are available on computer-generated Institutional Profiles, 
which consist of data not only from this survey, but also from NSF's other two academic 
S&E surveys: Federal Support to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions (Federal 
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support survey) and Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering 
(graduate student survey). Institutional Profiles for a single institution or limited group of 
institutions may be ordered by contacting Mr. Richard Bennof at the above address or by 
phone or e-mail: 
Telephone: (703) 306-1772, ext. 6938 
Intemet:rbennof@nsf. gov 
The CASPAR (Computer-Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research) database 
system is an easy-to-use tool for retrieval and analysis of statistical data on academic S&E 
resources. CASPAR provides the analyst with an extensive and growing data library of 
multiyear statistics on the state of higher education in general and on S&E resources 
specifically. This data library is based on a set of standardized institutional and field of 
science definitions across the multiple sources used to develop the database. The CASPAR 
program includes built-in help capabilities to facilitate the use and interpretation of the data. 
CASPAR data are drawn from a number of sources. All data are available on the 
individual institutional, State, and national levels. Longitudinal data from surveys of 
universities and colleges conducted by the NSF Division of Science Resources Studies 
include this R&D expenditures survey, the Federal support survey, and the graduate student 
survey. Data from surveys of universities and colleges conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics include Earned Degrees; Opening Fall Enrollment; Faculty Salaries, 
Tenure, and Fringe Benefits; and Financial Statistics. Data from other sources include the 
National Research Council Doctorate Program Ratings. 
CASPAR is distributed on CD-ROM compact disc. For additional information on 
CASPAR, write or fax to the following— 
Quantum Research Corp. 
ATTN: CASPAR 
7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 631W 
Bethesda, MD 20814 
Fax: (301) 657-3862 
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NSF Academic Research and Development Expenditures: Fiscal Year 2002 
The following notes are quoted directly from the NSF web site for the 2002 survey. 
They can be found at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf04330/secta.htm. 
Scope of f&e Survey 
Data for the National Science Foundation's (NSF) fiscal year (FY) 2002 report on 
research and development (R&D) expenditures were collected from 625 institutions of higher 
education in the United States and Outlying Areas. These institutions have doctoral programs 
in science and engineering (S&E), are historically black colleges or universities (HBCUs) 
that expend any amount of separately budgeted R&D in S&E, or are master's or bachelor's 
degree-granting institutions that expend at least $150,000 in separately budgeted R&D in 
S&E. 
In addition, the survey collects information on R&D about each of the Nation's 36 
federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). Of these 36 FFRDCs, 16 are 
administered by academic institutions, 16 are administered by nonprofit organizations, and 4 
are administered by industrial organizations. 
To qualify, an FFRDC must be engaged in basic or applied research, development, or 
management of R&D activities, and the results of these activities must be directly monitored 
by the Federal Government—usually a single agency—in a relationship expected to be 
maintained on a long-term basis. The center must be operated, managed, and administered as 
an autonomous organization or as an identifiable separate operating unit of its parent 
institution. Finally, 70 percent or more of the center's financial support must be received 
from the Federal Government. Although the same survey form (NSF Form 411) is used to 
collect data from both academic institutions and FFRDCs, FFRDCs were asked to provide 
155 
only item 1 data, or their R&D expenditures by source of funding. The FFRDC R&D data are 
included in tables B70-72. 
The survey population was reviewed prior to mailing the questionnaires to ensure that 
each institutional classification was accurate. Characteristics of the schools were reviewed 
before and during the course of the survey to determine if changes had occurred (i.e., in 
highest degree granted or in terms of school openings, closings, or mergers). 
FF 2002 Survey Frame Dejzg% 
The NSF Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and 
Colleges (academic R&D expenditures survey) is a census of the full population of eligible 
academic institutions. Prior to FY 1998, a census of eligible institutions was conducted about 
every five years; during intervening years eligible institutions were sampled. Since then, a 
census is conducted annually. NSF has also conducted a population review each year to 
ensure that all institutions that meet the inclusion criteria are surveyed. This review is based 
on the survey Game design developed in FY 1998: 
All S&E doctorate-granting institutions and all HBCUs are surveyed. 
All S&E master's and bachelor's degree-granting institutions that reported at least $150,000 
in separately budgeted R&D expenditures in S&E in the previous fiscal year are surveyed. 
NSF contacted the master's and bachelor's degree-granting institutions that were not in the 
population prior to the census coverage to determine whether they met the $150,000 
expenditure criterion. Institutions with a minimum of $150,000 were added or retained in the 
survey population. 
In FY 2002 NSF conducted a population review using the above criteria. As a result 
of adding and deleting institutions from the survey population to comply with the inclusion 
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criteria, the overall number of institutions surveyed increased from 646 in FY 2001 to 661 in 
FY 2002. 
Survey /wYrwmeMf 
Most major R&D performers have incorporated into their record-keeping systems the 
data that are essential to complete this survey, thereby ensuring a consistent format from one 
year to the next. Such consistency yields the most useful statistics for time series. As a rule, 
information to complete this questionnaire is found within the institutions' year-end 
accounting records. 
The survey questionnaire consists of five main items: 
Item 1 is a request that institutions report their total current expenditures for 
separately budgeted science and engineering R&D for all activities specifically organized to 
produce research outcomes and either commissioned by an agency external to the institution 
or separately budgeted by an organizational unit (i.e., research centers) within the institution, 
by source of funds. In addition, schools are asked to provide the percentage of the total and 
the percentage of the federally financed expenditures that are considered basic research. Also 
included are research funds for which an outside organization, educational or other, is a 
subrecipient. Care should be observed when interpreting data on source of funds; for 
example, industry R&D support is limited to grants and contracts for R&D activities from 
profit-making organizations. Total industry funds excludes research funded through 
unrestricted accounts and from corporate foundations, endowments, and fellowships to 
students; those funds would be included in an institution's own funding totals. An increasing 
number of institutions have links with industry and foundations via subcontracts, thus 
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complicating the identification of funding source. In addition, institutional policy may 
determine whether unrestricted State support is reported as State or institutional funding. 
Item 1A is a request for total and federally financed current fund expenditures for 
separately budgeted science and engineering R&D passed through the institution to 
subrecipients. 
Item IB is a request for total and federally financed current fund expenditures for 
separately budgeted science and engineering R&D received by the institution as a 
subrecipient. 
Item 2 is a request for total and federally financed current fund expenditures for 
separately budgeted R&D activities by detailed S&E fields. When interpreting these data at 
the detailed discipline level, users should keep in mind that there is considerable 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary activity. 
Item 3 is a request for the portions of total and federally financed expenditures 
reported in items 1 and 2 that were used for the purchase of research equipment out of 
current funds. This portion includes all research equipment purchased under sponsored 
research project awards and disbursed in the same detailed disciplines as in item 2. These 
data are of special interest to Federal and institutional policymakers in determining current 
funding levels for scientific research instrumentation. 
.ReapoMje /fafg 
The FY 2002 survey questionnaires were e-mailed in February 2003. Respondents 
could choose to submit an Adobe Portable Document Format questionnaire from the Web or 
use a Web-based data collection system to respond to the survey. Every effort was made to 
maintain close contact with respondents in order to preserve both consistency and continuity 
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in the resultant data. Questionnaires were carefully examined for completeness upon receipt. 
Computerized facsimiles of the survey data were then prepared for each institution, 
comparing the current and 2 prior years of data and noting any substantive disparities. A 
personalized e-mail message was sent to the respondents so they could provide revisions 
before final processing and tabulation of the data. The e-mail message included a Web link to 
the academic R&D expenditures Web-based data collection system, allowing respondents to 
view and correct their data via the Web. 
Respondents were asked to explain significant discrepancies between current and 
prior years' reporting patterns previously verified as correct. They were encouraged to correct 
prior years' data if anomalies were identified. When updated or amended figures covering 
past years were submitted, NSF changed trend data in this report and the underlying 
microdata database correspondingly. Similarly, if a respondent institution underwent an 
organizational change, such as a merger, NSF incorporated the effects of such changes into 
prior years' data. 
By the survey closing date at the beginning of September 2003, forms had been 
received from 600 universities and colleges out of the academic population of 625, resulting 
in a 96.0 percent response rate. Responses were received from 97.8 percent of all doctorate-
granting institutions, where 98.3 percent of the estimated national R&D expenditures in S&E 
Gelds was disbursed. Also, forms were received from all of the 36 FFRDCs. Table A-l 
displays a detailed breakdown of the response rates by highest degree granted. 
AWofW TbW oW TmpwfaffoM 
To provide a national estimate for all universities and colleges performing R&D in 
FY 2002, it was necessary to implement two statistical procedures. First, data were estimated 
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by "imputation" for the 25 institutions that had not responded by the closing date of the 
survey, using imputation techniques that have been used consistently since FY 1976. Second, 
data were also imputed for universities and colleges that submitted only partial responses. 
The imputed total was $205 million, or 0.6 percent of the $36 billion total R&D 
expenditures, as shown in table A-2. 
Tables A-3a and A-3b present breakdowns of the total and Federal imputed amounts 
by S&E fields. The dollar amount imputed is displayed along with the percentage it 
represents of the national estimate for universities and colleges in a particular field. The 
amount imputed is similarly broken down by source of funds in table A-4. 
A number of surveyed institutions have responded only intermittently in past years, 
providing data one year, not responding for one or more subsequent years, and then 
providing data again. For the years in which no response was received, data have been 
imputed as previously described. Although the imputation algorithm accurately reflects 
national trends, it cannot account for specific trends at individual institutions. For this reason, 
a separate backcasting of prior years' data was performed, following current-year imputation. 
For each institution, formerly imputed key variables for items 1 through 3 were 
recomputed to ensure that the imputed data accurately represent the growth patterns shown 
by reported data. If data were reported for fiscal years 1996 and 2002 but not for the 
intervening years, for example, the difference between the reported figures for each item total 
was calculated and evenly distributed across the intervening years (1997-2001). The new 
figures were spread across disciplines (items 2 and 3) or sources of support (item 1) on the 
basis of the most recent reporting pattern. A clean facsimile was generated for each of the 
institutions undergoing these procedures and returned to the school for comment. These 
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procedures result in much more consistent reporting trends for individual institutions but 
have little effect upon aggregate figures reflecting national totals. 
C&amg&y m Borfzc jkfgwcA ToWa 
The Division of Science Resources Statistics regularly reviews the methodologies 
used in its Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges 
with the goal of producing the most accurate statistics possible for researchers and policy 
makers. In FYs 2001 and 2002 a review of responses of total and Federal research funds that 
were basic research determined that the aggregate statistics could be improved by refining 
the imputation methodology for the item. For a number of reasons some universities and 
colleges are either unable or unwilling to respond to this item. Values must be imputed for 
them in order to present aggregate statistics. 
In the past, if a respondent did not reply to the basic research items, the prior year's 
basic research share (whether reported by or imputed for the respondent) was carried 
forward. After interviews with respondents revealing that in some cases abnormal or 
erroneous values (such as zero percent basic research) were imputed forward for several 
years, a revised imputation methodology was introduced. The revised imputation 
methodology carries forward the prior year's basic research share only if that year's data were 
reported or estimated by the respondent. In all other cases an econometric model is used to 
impute the amount of total and Federal basic research for the respondent. The model 
employed takes into account differences between public and private institutions and non-
Federal sources of R&D funding. 
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Dafa 
Aggregate academic expenditure data are generally consistent from year to year, 
although data for individual institutions may vary considerably. Data anomalies may reflect 
true increases or decreases in expenditures or may be the result of changes in reporting 
methodology. None were reported in FY 2002. 
Aafg TaWa? 
The detailed statistical tables showing R&D expenditures at individual institutions by 
State provide detailed campus lists by control and source of funds in table B-29 and by 
control and science and engineering Geld in table B-31. 
Degree-Granfed 7a6/e? 
Several longitudinal tables display data for institutions whose highest S&E degree 
granted is at the doctoral level. In tables produced prior to FY 1992, it would have been 
difficult to identify whether changes in yearly R&D expenditures were caused by changes in 
expenditure levels or in the number of doctorate-granting institutions. In order to maintain a 
consistent group of institutions across all years in this report, the highest degree-granted 
status for each institution is based on the highest degree granted in the most recent year, FY 
2002. 
Dafa v4vai/aM#y 
Data from this survey and previous reports are available on the Web at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/rdexp/. 
Selected data items for institutions are available on the Web at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/profiles/start.htm. The institutional profiles cover data from this 
survey and data collected in NSF's other academic S&E surveys: the Survey of Graduate 
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Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering (graduate student survey) and the 
Survey of Federal Science and Engineering Support to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit 
Institutions (Federal S&E support survey). The profiles are also linked to the corresponding 
ranking table for each survey. 
Data for these and other surveys are available through the Web-Based Computer-
Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research (WebCASPAR) database system, which 
provides an extensive and growing data library with multiyear statistics on the state of higher 
education in general and on academic S&E resources specifically. This data library is based 
on a set of standard institutional and field-of-science definitions across the multiple sources 
used to develop the database. The WebCASPAR program includes built-in help capabilities 
to facilitate the use and interpretation of the data. The latest version of WebCASPAR can be 
accessed via the Web at http://caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar. 
WebCASPAR data are drawn from a number of sources. All data are available for 
individual institutions, by State, and at the national level. Longitudinal data from surveys of 
universities and colleges conducted by the NSF Division of Science Resources Statistics 
include the academic R&D expenditures survey, the graduate student survey, and the Federal 
S&E support survey. Data included in WebCASPAR from the surveys of universities and 
colleges conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics include earned degrees, 
opening fall enrollment, tuition, faculty salaries, tenure and fringe benefits, and financial 
statistics. 
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APPENDIX C. PERMISSION TO USE DATA AND CITE SOURCES 
CAromc/g of Congressional Earmark Database 
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 10:10:56 -0400 
From: Jeff Brainard <jeff.brainard@chronicle.com> 
Subject: Re: Congressional Earmark Database 
To: Matthew L Feldmann <feldmann@iastate.edu> 
Cc: Tom Wanat <tom.wanat@chronicle.com> 
Mr. Feldmann, 
The Chronicle's policy is to give academic researchers an electronic copy of the information 
that appears on our online database on Congressional earmarks to academe. I am cc-ing this 
message to Tom Wanat of our New Media department, who can arrange to provide this to 
you. You might want to contact him directly at tom.wanat@chronicle.com and provide a 
phone number. We require that you credit The Chronicle of Higher Education as the source 
of the information. 
As I may have mentioned when we corresponded previously, The Chronicle has decided to 
discontinue the annual survey of all earmarks in the federal budget. Thus, there will be no 
report on the 2004 fiscal year. Thus, the most recently available one is currently online at 
chronicle.com/stats/pork. We may occasionally report on earmarks in selected federal 
agencies. I can't tell you which or when. 
I would be interested to hear about your results. Please feel free to follow up. 
Sincerely, 
— Jeff Brainard 
Jeffrey Brainard 
Senior Reporter 
Chronicle of Higher Education 
1255 23rd St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20037 
(202) 466-1085 (direct) 
(202) 452-1033 (fax) 
www.chronic1e.com 
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TheCenter Corrected National Science Foundation Institutional Expenditure Data 1993 & 
2002 
Subject: RE: Permission to use TheCenter data for dissertation 
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 11:43:38 -0500 
From: "Reeves, Kristy" <kreeves@aa.ufl.edu> 
To: "Matthew L Feldmann" <feldmann@iastate.edu> 
Hi Matt, 
Thank you for contacting me. Please do go ahead and use our data for your dissertation, with 
acknowledgement of TheCenter, of course. I am glad that you have found our research 
useful. Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance, and good luck with your 
dissertation. 
-Kristy Reeves 
Original Message 
From: Matthew L Feldmann [mailto:feldmann@iastate.edu] 
Sent: Saturday, February 26, 2005 4:06 PM 
To: Reeves, Kristy 
Subject: Permission to use TheCenter data for dissertation 
Ms. Reeves, 
I am writing to formally request the use of TheCenter imputed National Science Foundation 
research expenditure data for 1993-2002. Specifically it is the "Total Research: 1993-2002 
(in Constant 1983 Dollars)" data tables found at the fallowing URL. 
http://thecenter.ufl.edu/research_data.html 
I am in the process of completing a dissertation concerning relationships between 
institutional R&D expenditures and congressional academic earmarking. I have already 
downloaded your tables for analysis, but would like your permission before completing the 
dissertation and submitting it to my chair and my committee. The imputation of variables that 
you have completed to account for institutions that report as a system is a real benefit to my 
research, because it permits many more institutions to be included in my sample. 
If you agree to let me use your data, please send me a reply email that I can use as an 
appendix in my dissertation document. 
Sincerely, 
Matt Feldmann 
Iowa State University 
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Breneman, D. (2000), An Essay on College Costs 
(jVbfe. David Breneman's work listed on the front page of the document the following 
statement: NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF 
THE AUTHOR.) 
From: David Breneman <dwb8n@virginia.edu> 
Subject: Re: Permission to cite your paper 
Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2005 15:49:14 -0500 
To: Matthew L Feldmann <feldmann@iastate.edu> 
Matthew, 
You are, of course, welcome to cite my work. Best wishes, 
David Breneman 
David W. Breneman 
University Professor and Dean 
Curry School of Education 
University of Virginia 
434-924-3332 
On Feb 26, 2005, at 1:58 PM, Matthew L Feldmann wrote: 
Dean Breneman, 
I am writing to ask your permission to cite the following paper: 
Brenneman, D.W. (2000). An Essay on College Costs (Commissioned Paper). Washington, 
DC: National Center for Education Statistics. 
that was found at the following location: 
http://curry.edschool.virginia.edu/admin/deans/Breneman/essay%20on%20college%20costs. 
pdf 
Specifically, I am interested in your writings on Howard Bowen's Resource Theory of Costs 
from his 1980 Book, The Costs of Higher Education. For my dissertation, I am 
testing/applying the theory in relation to public funding for university research activities with 
particular focus on congressional academic earmarking. Two specific citations from your 
work include the following from my draft dissertation: 
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The principal theory that guides this research on academic earmarks is Bo wen's revenue 
theory of costs, which says simply that institutions raise all the money that they can and than 
spend it on worthwhile activities (Bowen, 1980; Breneman, 2000; Johnstone, 1999). 
and 
Unit-cost variations, especially among supposedly similar institutions are likely due to 
variations in available revenue (Bowen, 1980). The implication is that the only way to limit 
costs is to limit revenues (Breneman, 2000). 
Please let me know if you need further information about the citation and whether you 
approve of the use of your work. I found the essay very informative. In addition, your work 
directed me toward Gordon Winston's work, which has been very helpful. 
Sincerely, 
Matt Feldmann 
Iowa State University 
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APPENDIX D. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC EARMARKS RECEIVED 1993-2002, BY 
INSTITUTION, IN 2002 CONSTANT DOLLARS 
Postsecondary Institution Amount 
Alabama A&M University 7,803,407 
Arizona State University - Tempe 18,011,361 
Auburn University 91,312,921 
Ball State University 3,578,946 
Binghamton University -
Bowling Green State University - Bowling Green 950,000 
Central Michigan University 2,359,261 
City University of NY - Graduate School and University Center -
Clemson University 60,207,761 
Cleveland State University 2,461,569 
College of William and Mary 1,437,046 
Colorado State University 35,359,832 
East Carolina University 1,448,914 
Florida Atlantic University 20,189,064 
Florida International University 22,909,017 
Florida State University 35,444,626 
George Mason University 30,139,779 
Georgia Institute of Technology 42,404,803 
Georgia State University 1,047,755 
Idaho State University 4,863,975 
Illinois State University 1,609,821 
Indiana State University 14,809,994 
Indiana University - Bloomington 31,508,620 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania 16,708,668 
Indiana University-Purdue University - Indianapolis 650,000 
Iowa State University 85,036,232 
Kansas State University 38,757,236 
Kent State University - Kent 2,010,266 
Louisiana State University - Baton Rouge 57,816,138 
Louisiana Tech University 2,307,119 
Miami University - Oxford 50,000 
Michigan State University 62,965,128 
Michigan Technological University 1,257,302 
Middle Tennessee State University 1,874,924 
Mississippi State University 97,410,585 
Montana State University - Bozeman 42,460,512 
New Jersey Institute of Technology 14,949,465 
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 53,219,912 
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Postsecondary Institution Amount 
New Mexico State University - Las Cruces 64,404,555 
North Carolina State University 38,621,849 
North Dakota State University 42,443,002 
Northern Arizona University 13,248,114 
Northern Illinois University 10,037,585 
Oakland University 669,762 
Ohio State University - Columbus 28,458,818 
Ohio University - Athens 4,501,166 
Oklahoma State University - Stillwater 62,319,654 
Old Dominion University 2,680,781 
Oregon State University 79,546,833 
Pennsylvania State University - University Park 129,362,892 
Portland State University 8,333,900 
Purdue University - West Lafayette 30,587,632 
Rutgers the State University of NJ - New Brunswick 57,500,700 
Rutgers the State University of NJ - Newark 327,577 
San Diego State University 56,101,282 
South Carolina State University 13,794,980 
South Dakota State University 5,485,600 
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale 15,307,116 
State Univ. of New York - College of Environmental Science and Forestry 3,116,546 
Stony Brook University 7,666,195 
Temple University 3,861,656 
Tennessee State University 3,077,874 
Texas A&M University 110,067,909 
Texas A&M University - Commerce -
Texas A&M University - Kingsville 2,048,882 
Texas Southern University 680,811 
Texas Tech University 39,978,799 
Texas Woman's University -
University at Albany 1,695,122 
University at Buffalo 33,210,076 
University of Akron — Akron 2,326,751 
University of Alabama - Birmingham 75,032,034 
University of Alabama - Huntsville 9,661,198 
University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa 90,894,600 
University of Arizona 54,544,571 
University of Arkansas - Pine Bluff 79,789,759 
University of California - Berkeley 5,348,905 
University of California - Davis 32,353,858 
University of California - Irvine 4,364,896 
University of California - Los Angeles 5,092,345 
169 
Postsecondary Institution Amount 
University of California - Riverside 13,388,731 
University of California - San Diego 8,229,627 
University of California - San Francisco 17,396,108 
University of California - Santa Barbara 3,333,000 
University of California - Santa Cruz 4,136,754 
University of Central Florida 23,731,491 
University of Cincinnati - Cincinnati 6,091,196 
University of Colorado - Boulder 18,157,349 
University of Connecticut - Storrs 54,675,410 
University of Delaware 18,460,397 
University of Florida 90,368,457 
University of Georgia 37,562,208 
University of Houston - University Park 11,785,580 
University of Idaho 39,814,617 
University of Illinois - Chicago 3,392,394 
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign 29,278,040 
University of Iowa 40,983,397 
University of Kansas - Lawrence 13,547,341 
University of Kentucky 45,208,824 
University of Louisiana - Lafayette 41,930 
University of Louisville 41,863,661 
University of Maine - Orono 41,752,054 
University of Maryland - Baltimore 6,441,216 
University of Maryland - Baltimore County 5,383,122 
University of Maryland - College Park 82,068,644 
University of Massachusetts - Amherst 42,187,576 
University of Massachusetts - Boston -
University of Massachusetts - Lowell 1,149,932 
University of Memphis -
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor 32,354,877 
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities 82,495,084 
University of Mississippi - Oxford 101,566,637 
University of Missouri - Columbia 127,157,085 
University of Missouri - Kansas City 3,714,906 
University of Missouri - Rolla 33,201,573 
University of Missouri - St. Louis 2,777,270 
University of Montana - Missoula 40,811,597 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 65,672,383 
University ofNevada - Las Vegas 45,430,636 
University ofNevada - Reno 19,692,301 
University ofNew Hampshire - Durham 132,089,983 
University ofNew Mexico - Albuquerque 75,959,594 
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Postsecondary Institution Amount 
University ofNew Orleans 52,719,346 
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill 22,638,980 
University of North Carolina - Greensboro 3,705,180 
University of North Dakota 52,778,101 
University of North Texas 592,243 
University of Oklahoma - Norman 16,172,953 
University of Oregon 10,034,284 
University of Rhode Island 25,270,329 
University of South Alabama - Mobile 41,039,687 
University of South Carolina - Columbia 59,940,000 
University of South Dakota 9,915,018 
University of South Florida 133,084,238 
University of Southern Mississippi 34,915,738 
University of Tennessee - Knoxville 28,933,445 
University of Texas - Arlington -
University of Texas - Austin 35,164,866 
University of Texas - Dallas 1,242,500 
University of Texas - El Paso 9,622,529 
University of Toledo 6,253,297 
University of Utah 36,858,007 
University of Vermont 17,897,564 
University of Virginia 6,941,653 
University of Washington - Seattle 39,511,327 
University of Wisconsin - Madison 49,636,820 
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee 4,466,586 
University of Wyoming 5,725,690 
Utah State University 27,604,936 
Virginia Commonwealth University 7,134,795 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 22,247,443 
Washington State University - Pullman 79,777,774 
Wayne State University 9,099,195 
West Virginia University 143,431,615 
Western Michigan University 11,038,732 
Wichita State University 17,177,179 
Wright State University - Dayton 2,925,767 
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APPENDIX E. EPSCOR INSTITUTIONS, BY STATE 
IPEDSID Institution State 
100654 Alabama A&M University Alabama 
100663 University Of Alabama At Birmingham Alabama 
100706 University Of Alabama In Huntsville Alabama 
100751 University Of Alabama Alabama 
100858 Auburn University Main Campus Alabama 
102094 University Of South Alabama Alabama 
106245 University Of Arkansas At Little Rock Arkansas 
106397 University Of Arkansas Main Campus Arkansas 
142276 Idaho State University Idaho 
142285 University Of Idaho Idaho 
155317 University Of Kansas Main Campus Kansas 
155399 Kansas State University Kansas 
156125 Wichita State University Kansas 
157085 University Of Kentucky Kentucky 
157289 University Of Louisville Kentucky 
159391 Louisiana State Univ & Ag & Mech & Hebert Laws Ctr Louisiana 
159647 Louisiana Tech University Louisiana 
159939 University OfNew Orleans Louisiana 
160658 University Of Louisiana At Lafayette Louisiana 
161253 University Of Maine Maine 
175856 Jackson State University Mississippi 
176017 University Of Mississippi Main Campus Mississippi 
176080 Mississippi State University Mississippi 
176372 University Of Southern Mississippi Mississippi 
180461 Montana State University-Bozeman Montana 
180489 The University Of Montana-Missoula Montana 
181464 University Of Nebraska At Lincoln Nebraska 
182281 University OfNevada-Las Vegas Nevada 
182290 University Of Nevada-Reno Nevada 
207388 Oklahoma State University-Main Campus Oklahoma 
207500 University Of Oklahoma Norman Campus Oklahoma 
217882 Clemson University South Carolina 
218663 University Of South Carolina At Columbia South Carolina 
218733 South Carolina State University South Carolina 
219356 South Dakota State University South Dakota 
219471 University Of South Dakota South Dakota 
231174 University Of Vermont And State Agricultural Coll Vermont 
238032 West Virginia University West Virginia 
240727 University Of Wyoming Wyoming 
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APPENDIX F. DETERMINATION OF OUTLIERS 
Outliers were determined using a formula to test for outliers (Weisberg, 1985). The 
formula uses the studentized residual determined from an initial test of linear regression, the 
number of parameters in the model, and the sample size. See the formula in Figure % 7. 
fzgwre # 7 ForfMw/ayôr Owf/fgr 
(n-(k+1)-1 ) 
t= r, * (n-(k+1)-rf ) 
In this formula f is the outlier lvalue that is checked against a critical value, r, is the 
studentized residual, » is the number of cases in the sample, and & the number of parameters 
in the model (which is also noted at f' in some models). The null hypothesis (Ho) for the 
model would be that a specific case is not an outlier. An outlier t-value was computed for 
each institution for each of three dependent variables in Model #1. 
The following institutions were determined to be outliers: University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, University of Northern Colorado, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Jackson State 
University, University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus, and East Tennessee State University. 
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APPENDIX G. PREDICTION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI AT OXFORD 
In Chapter 5, it was stated that for the University of Mississippi at Oxford (Ole Miss) 
to move 34 spots, from a ranking of 98 to a ranking of 64 ranking by 2012, Ole Miss would 
need to more than triple its R&D expenditures to an approximate level of $176 million. In 
2002, the University of South Carolina at Columbia was ranked 64 and had $123 million in 
R&D expenditures. Using average change statistics from the current study, which is a 43% 
increase every ten years (corrected for higher education inflation), an institution ranked 64 in 
2012 would be expected to have an annual $176 million R&D expenditure budget. See the 
following calculation. 
$123 million * 1.43 = $176 million 
Ole Miss generated $48 million in R&D expenditures in 2002. This amount would need to 
more than triple for Ole Miss to be ranked 64 in 2012. See the following calculation. 
$176 million / $48 million = 3.67 
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